Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0552-G
September 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants — the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas ("the Diocese"), the Reverend Charles V. Grahmann ("Grahmann"), together with his predecessors and successors, as Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, and Randal Mathis ("Mathis") — to dismiss, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the second amended complaint of the plaintiff Francis Sharpe ("Sharpe"). For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 1997, Sharpe began retrieving various items (such as documents, notes, and other correspondence) from within and around a trash dumpster located adjacent to the Diocese's building in Dallas, Texas. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint ("Plaintiff's Complaint") at 3. Sharpe would apparently recover these items, take them home, and catalog them in his own fashion. Id. at 3-4. He continued in this course of conduct until sometime in December 1998, when the Diocese learned of his activities and ordered him to cease. Id. at 3. Sharpe's "investigation" into the Diocese's dumpster was, according to him, conducted in conjunction with various federal agencies, including the Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See Joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, Reverend Charles Grahmann, His Predecessors and Successors, as Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, Randall Mathis and Munsch Hardt Kopf and Harr, P.C. ("Summary Judgment Motion") at 3, attached to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint ("Defendant's Motion") as Exhibit A. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that Sharpe has ever been a member of, worked on behalf of, or even been contacted by, any of these federal agencies. Sharpe also states that he was merely one of many individuals rummaging through the dumpster, which "was not enclosed by a fence or other structure . . . [or] . . . a 'No Trespassing' sign" to exclude the general public. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3. As a result of these dumpster expeditions, Sharpe claims that he acquired several items that were "damaging to the Diocese" with respect to a pending suit involving Rudy Kos, the Diocese, and certain "John Doe" plaintiffs, and that such documents reflected "acts of pedophilia and child abuse by Catholic Priests, knowledge of pedophilia by the Diocese and efforts of the Diocese to influence the Texas State Judicial system during and after the Kos trial." Id. at 4.
Sharpe's second amended complaint contains two conflicting sets of numbered paragraphs. Therefore, to avoid confusion, the court will refer only to the relevant pages of the complaint rather than to any particular paragraph.
After the verdict in the Kos trial but before the entry of judgment, the Diocese filed a motion to recuse Judge Ann Ashby, the presiding state judge, from any further involvement in the suit. Id. Just prior to the hearing on that motion, Sharpe claims to have turned over to plaintiffs' counsel in the Kos case a memorandum reflecting the minutes from an August, 1997 meeting of Grahmann's "advisory group," which included discussion of "potential ethical violations by lawyers and illegal ex-parte influence on the Texas State Judiciary by the Diocese." Id. Sharpe continued to provide allegedly incriminating documents to plaintiffs' counsel in Kos, including defendant Turley, who used defendant Fite and others as an intermediaries between himself and Sharpe. Id. at 4-5. Turley later subpoenaed Sharpe to produce additional dumpster documents at a deposition beginning on April 30, 1998. Id. at 5. During Sharpe's deposition, Turley — with Mathis (then attorney for the Diocese) present — stated that Sharpe would always have access to the documents and that the originals would be returned to him after copies were made. Id. at 6. The Kos litigation was settled on July 11, 1998. Id.
On July 15, 1998, Sharpe received a letter from Turley's office stating that he had transferred possession of the documents to Mathis but that a motion would be filed to have the documents returned to Sharpe. See Summary Judgment Motion at 5. No such motion was ever filed. Plaintiffs Complaint at 6. On July 28, 1998, Sharpe filed an unsuccessful pro se motion in the state district court for the return of the documents. Summary Judgment Motion at 5. In April, 1999, Judge Ashby ordered the documents placed in receivership with attorney Paul Lockey ("Lockey"), who secured the documents at a storage facility in Dallas, Texas. Plaintiffs Complaint at 7. Sharpe was not provided a key to the storage unit. Id. Sharpe appealed the state court order to the Dallas Court of Appeals which, on January 9, 2001, ordered the documents returned to the person last in possession and concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to turn the documents over to Lockey. Id. On February 7, 2001, Judge Ashby vacated the receivership order. Id.
Sharpe later filed suit in a state district court against the Diocese and various attorneys in the Kos litigation for conspiracy, conversion, fraud, and other state law claims. Id. On August 15, 2001, Grahmann, Mathis, the Diocese, and other defendants moved for summary judgment in that case on the ground that Sharpe had no legally recognized interest in the documents, which he scavenged from the Diocese's dumpster, and that such documents were therefore the sole property of the Diocese. See Summary Judgment Motion at 5-7. The state court granted that summary judgment motion on March 15, 2002. See Order on Joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, the Reverend Charles V. Grahmann, his Predecessors and Successors, as Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, Randal Mathis and Munsch Hardt Kopf and Harr, P.C. ("Summary Judgment Order") at 2, attached to Defendant's Motion as Exhibit B. Sharpe filed a notice of appeal challenging the state court ruling on April 12, 2002. See Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, located in Plaintiff's Appendix in Support of Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, the Reverend Charles V. Grahmann, his Predecessors and Successors, as Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas and Randal Mathis ("Appendix") at 5-8. To date, the Diocese has not turned over to Sharpe any of the documents he recovered from the dumpster. Plaintiff's Complaint at 8.
Sharpe filed suit in this court on March 18, 2002, alleging that the named defendants engaged in conduct which violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(2) and (3). On April 4, 2002, the defendants Grahmann, Mathis, and the Diocese filed a motion to dismiss Sharpe's first amended complaint. On April 24, 2002, Sharpe filed, contemporaneously with his response to the defendants' motion to dismiss his first amended complaint, a motion for leave to amend his first amended complaint. On May 29, 2002, the court granted Sharpe's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and denied as moot the defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. On July 12, 2002, the defendants Grahmann, Mathis, and the Diocese filed the instant motion to dismiss Sharpe's second amended complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
II. ANALYSIS A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Owen Equipment and Erection Company v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over cases only as expressly provided by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. III §§ 1-2; see also Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Federal law gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, a party attempting to invoke federal court jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction. Langley v. Jackson State University, 14 F.3d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 811 (1994).
1. The Legal Standard Under Rule 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be considered by the court before any other challenge because "the court must find jurisdiction before determining the validity of a claim." Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Company, 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) ("The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter . . . is inflexible and without exception") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On a Rule 12 (b)(1) motion, which "concerns the court's 'very power to hear the case . . . [,] the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.'" MDPhysicians Associates, Inc. v. State Board of Insurance, 957 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir.) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 861 (1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may rely on: "1) the complaint alone; 2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or 3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and the court's resolution of disputed facts." MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413).
While the defendants seek dismissal pursuant to both FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the strict standard for consideration of such a motion under Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), is not triggered since the jurisdictional attack the defendants make under Rule 12(b)(1) does not implicate the merits of Sharpe's federal causes of action. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415 n. 9. The defendants' challenge to this court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case is independent of their challenge to the sufficiency of Sharpe's federal causes of action under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Id.
On this motion, the defendants seek dismissal of Sharpe's §§ 1983 and 1985 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Specifically, defendants maintain that this court is without jurisdiction to award the relief sought by Sharpe, since awarding such relief would require the court to "review Judge Clayton's state court summary judgment" in violation of the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine. Defendant's Motion at 5. For the reasons discussed in detail below, the court agrees with the defendants' assertion that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.
2. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
It is well settled federal law that no court of the United States, other than the United States Supreme Court, can entertain a proceeding to reverse, modify, or otherwise engage in an appellate review of, a state court decision. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994); Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Matter of Reitnauer, 152 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816) (first case recognizing the scope of the Supreme Court's authority to review state court judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (statute establishing Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State"). It is this jurisdictional rule which forms the basis of the abstention principle first stated in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923), and restated in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). This principle has become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on a state court judgment. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 906 (1994). The Rooker-Feldman bar is not limited only to those actions which explicitly seek review of a state court decision, but "it [also] extends to others in which the constitutional claims presented in federal court are inextricably linked with the state court's grant or denial of relief." Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-1006 (under Rooker-Feldman, "a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a [federal] district court"). The federal plaintiff, however, must have been a party to the state proceedings for the doctrine to apply. Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that Rocker-Feldman prohibits a plaintiff from seeking reversal of his state court judgment in federal district court by recasting the complaint in the form of a federal civil fights action. See Chrissy F. By Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 995 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1214 (1994); Hale, 786 F.2d at 691; Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985); Sawyer v. Overton, 595 F.2d 252, 252 (5th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Tooke, 108 F.2d 758, 759 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 655 (1940).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been described as a "jurisdictional transmutation of res judicata doctrine." See, e.g., Narey v. Dean, 32 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 18B Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 4469.1 (2002) at 152.
In this case, Sharpe alleges that the defendants conspired to steal documents, which he had previously obtained from the Diocese's dumpster, and later "utilized a state court judge to perpetuate the theft" by obtaining favorable rulings. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, The Reverend Charles V. Grahmann, His Predecessors and Successors, as Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas and Randall Mathis ("Plaintiff's Response") at 4. According to Sharpe, these favorable rulings "merely ripened [his] causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985" by providing the state action required under § 1983 and the obstruction of justice and conspiracy elements required by § 1985. Id. at 4-9. Sharpe maintains that these federal claims do not constitute a collateral attack of the state court judgment, "but rather [are] premised on the obvious absurdity of the trial court's rulings." Id. at 4. Sharpe therefore argues that this court has jurisdiction over his §§ 1983 and 1985 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Plaintiffs Complaint at 1. Sharpe seeks relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from "destroying or otherwise damaging" the documents, as well as declaratory relief that the actions of defendants in withholding the documents are illegal and unconstitutional and that Sharpe is the "sole and rightful owner" of the documents. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 13-14. Sharpe further requests that this court order the Diocese to return to Sharpe any and all of the documents within the Diocese's possession. Id. at 14.
"While a losing party in state court proceedings may be able in some instances to sue in federal court to 'mount a general challenge to the constitutionality' of a statute or rule," Reed, 759 F.2d at 473 (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483); see also Musslewhite v. State Bar of Texas, 32 F.3d 942, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1103 (1995), no such situation is presented in this case Nor is this a case where the plaintiff has brought a fresh federal claim for adjudication before a United States district court. Rather, Sharpe's federal complaint is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to collaterally attack the validity of a state court judgment to which he was a party. See Chrissy F., 995 F.2d at 599; Hale, 786 F.2d at 690-91; Kimball v. The Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283, 1284 (5th Cir. 1980); Almon v. Sandlin, 603 F.2d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 1979).
In Sharpe's state court case, Grahmann, Mathis, the Diocese, and other defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Sharpe had no legally recognized interest in the documents and that such documents were therefore the sole property of the Diocese. Summary Judgment Motion at 5-7. The state court granted that summary judgment motion. Summary Judgment Order at 2. Sharpe now seeks to have this court review that judgment by declaring these documents to be his sole property and by awarding injunctive relief and damages against the defendants — all in the guise of a civil rights action. As discussed above, however, a plaintiff cannot seek reversal of a state court judgment in federal court by simply recasting his state complaint in the form of a federal civil rights action. Boiled down to essentials, the relief Sharpe seeks in this case, regardless of his artful pleading, is simply a reversal of the summary judgment rendered against him in the state court. See Reed, 759 F.2d at 473. It is, therefore, clear to this court that Sharpe's federal complaint is "inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial [of relief]," Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16, and, consequently, this court must dismiss Sharpe's action for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs second amended complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) is GRANTED. Accordingly, this court need not consider defendants' alternative challenge to Sharpe's causes of action under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). SO ORDERED.
Because Sharpe's complaint must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), defendant Windle Turley's motion to dismiss under FED R. CIV. P. 4(m), 12(b)(4), and 12 (b)(5) and defendant Monte Fite's pro se motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5) are denied as moot.