Sharood v. Hatfield

46 Citing cases

  1. Irwin v. Surdyk's Liquor

    599 N.W.2d 132 (Minn. 1999)   Cited 26 times
    Holding section 176.081 unconstitutional to the "extent that it impinges on our inherent power to oversee attorneys and attorney fees"

    Id. at 199, 12 N.W.2d at 518 (emphasis added). In Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973), we struck down as unconstitutional a statute requiring attorney registration fees to be diverted into the state's general fund rather than into a separate fund for use in the administration of the bar. See id. at 429, 210 N.W.2d at 282.

  2. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham

    486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that "a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney when appearing in district court"

    No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution. In Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 425, 210 N.W.2d 275, 280 (1973), we held that, "[T]he power to make the necessary rules and regulations governing the bar was intended to be vested exclusively in the supreme court, free from the dangers of encroachment either by the legislative or executive branches." Id. at 425, 210 N.W.2d at 280 (citation omitted).

  3. In re Order Promulgating Amendments to the Minn. Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure

    ADM 10-8003 (Minn. May. 14, 2014)

    Comity in this context is the deference that courts give to reasonable legislative regulation as a matter of courtesy to a co-equal branch of government, rather than as an acknowledgment of legislative power. Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 426, 210 N.W.2d 275, 281 (1973). "We have occasionally permitted a statute to stand as a matter of comity, even where the legislature has encroached somewhat upon a judicial function, so long as the statute does not conflict with this court's inherent authority to make the final decision."

  4. Prior Lake American v. Mader

    642 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 2002)   Cited 41 times
    Stressing the critical importance of the ability of the public and the courts to review government decisions

    State by Humphrey v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 509 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 1993); see Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 424, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279 (1973) (noting that "this court has acquiesced in legislative acts prescribing administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attorneys as long as such acts did not usurp the right of the court to make the final decision"). The supreme court, as we have noted, has the inherent power to regulate the practice of law.

  5. State v. Johnson

    514 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1994)   Cited 85 times
    Holding that a statute that regulated the certification of a misdemeanor as a petty misdemeanor was procedural

    Id. Of course, if the legislature passes a statute in an area not already governed by a rule, the court, as a matter of comity, may let it stand. For example, in Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973), this court addressed a legislative act intended to regulate the practice of law, over which the court has inherent power: It is true that this court has acquiesced in legislative acts prescribing administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attorneys as long as such acts did not usurp the right of the court to make the final decision.

  6. State ex Rel. Quelch v. Daugherty

    172 W. Va. 422 (W. Va. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that legislature could not enact law regulating admission to practice and discipline of lawyers

    The case reporters are replete with examples of state supreme courts invalidating legislation that encroaches upon their constitutionally granted powers. Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652, 656 (1961); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790, 796 (1969), reh. denied, U.S. cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 916, 25 L.Ed.2d 94; Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973); In re 42 Pa.C.S. § 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 394 A.2d 444 (1978); In Matter of Washington State Bar Association, 86 Wn.2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976). The Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that any power that had resided in the legislature regarding bar admissions was superseded by Kentucky's 1975 Judicial Amendment:

  7. Mack v. City of Minneapolis

    333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1983)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that the "power" of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals, an executive branch court, "to set attorney fees is constitutionally permissible, because these awards are reviewable by this court"

    As a result, the act of the legislature imposing limits and allowing an administrative agency to set fees is claimed to be violative of the separation of powers guaranteed by Minn. Const. art. 3, § 1. Relators place strong reliance on Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973), in which the legislature purported to amend the rules of professional responsibility to require the Board of Law Examiners to use certain tests and to transfer attorney registration fees from a special trust account — which the legislature had previously assured would "never cancel" — to the general fund. We invalidated the statute on the grounds it transgressed the principle of separation of powers.

  8. Attorney General v. Waldron

    289 Md. 683 (Md. 1981)   Cited 138 times
    Striking down, on rational basis review, statute discriminating against retired judge practitioners

    State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929); Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467, 470-71, 13 A.L.R.3d 799 (1969) (en banc); State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank T. Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 868-69, 69 A.L.R.2d 394 (1958); Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528, 531-39 (1949); In re Mitan, 75 Ill.2d 118, 25 Ill. Dec. 622, 387 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); Matter of Kesler, 397 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Ind. 1979); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Gartin, 272 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Iowa 1979); State v. Schumacher, 210 Kan. 377, 502 P.2d 748, 752 (1972); Ratterman v. Stapleton, 371 S.W.2d 939, 940-42 (Kentucky 1963); Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So.2d 66, 69 (La. 1979); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Freddie F. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 49 U.S.L.W. 2370 (Me. 1980); Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 87 N.E.2d 838, 839-41 (1949); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313, 316 (1935); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279-82 (1973); Bramlett v. Burgin, 382 So.2d 284, 285-86 (Miss. 1979); Matter of Mississippi State Bar, 361 So.2d 503, 505-06 (Miss.

  9. Banales v. Jackson

    601 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    Mr. Jeffers cites many cases from courts across the nation, a few of which are set out in the margin. Matter of Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976); State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wn.2d 266, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973); Ross v. Industrial Comm'n, 566 P.2d 367 (Colo.App. 1977); Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1977); In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 259 S.W.2d 144 (1953); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937); In re Houston, 378 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1963). Other cases from Florida, Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island are also cited.

  10. Smith v. Magras

    124 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 1997)   Cited 18 times
    In Magras, we stated that the ROA "envisions the possibility of the sharing of power over the regulation of attorneys between the Virgin Islands courts and the Virgin Islands legislature, at least to the extent of imposing a license fee."

    At least one court has even invalidated a measure that was non-regulatory and only revenue-raising. In Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a statute that diverted registration fees collected statewide from attorneys to general treasury funds improperly infringed on the constitutionally provided, exclusive power of the courts to regulate attorneys. See id. at 279-82. Sexton and Sharood notwithstanding, it is the rare case in which licensing schemes are found infirm.