Opinion
00 Civ. 6286 (RWS).
October 6, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Lauren Shapiro ("Shapiro") pro se has moved for appointment of counsel for Fay Sanders, a minor, and for reconsideration of the judgment for costs entered on February 23, 2006. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.
The Bill of Costs was docketed as a judgment against Shapiro on February 17, 2006. It was initially submitted on December 15, 2004 after entry of judgment on November 30, 2004. The judgment was appealed, the appeal was dismissed on December 22, 2005, and the mandate was entered on January 10, 2006.
The defendant the City Administration for Children's Services ("CACS") has opposed the motion for reconsideration as untimely under Rule 54(d) (1), Fed.R.Civ.P., which provides for a five-day period during which the Court may review the action of the taxation of cost by the clerk.
On February 15, 2006, Shapiro faxed a letter to defendants' counsel and the court stating that she had been served on February 9, 2006 with notice of the application for costs and that she opposed the application for failure of the CACS to meet the 30-day period set forth in Local Rule 54.1.
Given Shapiro's pro se status it is appropriate to consider her letter of February 15 as a notice under Rule 54 (d) (1) which is timely within the 5-day period calculated in accordance with Rule 6, Fed.R.Civ.P., and it is therefore appropriate to consider her opposition to the costs on the merits.
Local Rule 54.1 provides a 30-day period after final disposition of the appeal for the filing of a request to tax costs. Based on the foregoing, the CACS application for costs on February 9 was timely based on the filing of the mandate on January 10.
The CACS has stated that it is not proceeding against Fay Sanders, a minor, and the Bill of Costs recited that the judgment was entered against Shapiro alone. There is therefore no requirement that Fay Sanders, a non-party, be represented.
As to the costs, no valid ground has been asserted for setting aside transcript and deposition costs. Shapiro has contended that the "bust" fee was attributable to the defendants, and her assertion is unrebutted. The "bust" fee will be stricken from the Bill of Costs and the judgment amended accordingly.
No other valid ground for altering the Bill of Costs having been set forth, the action of the clerk is reviewed and affirmed except as stated above.
It is so ordered.