Summary
In Shajan, the physician not only was assigned to supervise the attending physician assistant, but she countersigned the patient's chart.
Summary of this case from M.L. v. PanzaOpinion
2012-10-10
Baby SHAJAN, et al., respondents, v. SOUTH NASSAU COMMUNITIES HOSPITAL, et al., defendants, Regina E. Hammock, etc., appellant.
Bréa Yankowitz P.C., Floral Park, N.Y. (Patrick J. Bréa of counsel), for appellant. A. Paul Bogaty, New York, N.Y. (Joan P. Brody of counsel), for respondents.
Bréa Yankowitz P.C., Floral Park, N.Y. (Patrick J. Bréa of counsel), for appellant.A. Paul Bogaty, New York, N.Y. (Joan P. Brody of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendant Regina E. Hammock appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O'Donoghue, J.), entered March 30, 2011, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the motion of the defendant Regina E. Hammock for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her. The plaintiffs asserted that Hammock's malpractice arose from her supervision of the medical care provided to the injured plaintiff, Baby Shajan, by the defendant Brian J. Janicek, a physician's assistant. A physician-patient relationship may be created, and a physician may be held liable for medical malpractice, where a physician is responsible for supervising a health-care professional such as a physician's assistant, and the physician inadequately supervises the health-care professional, thus causing or contributing to the inadequacy or impropriety of the care rendered by that health-care professional ( seeEducation Law § 6542[1], [3]; 10 NYCRR 94.2[a], [f]; Baressi v. State of N.Y., 232 A.D.2d 962, 963–964, 649 N.Y.S.2d 207;see generally Cullinan v. Pignataro, 266 A.D.2d 807, 698 N.Y.S.2d 381). Contrary to Hammock's contentions, she failed to make a prima facie showing that no physician-patient relationship existed between herself and the injured plaintiff at the time of the alleged malpractice ( see Sheppard–Mobley v. King, 8 A.D.3d 358, 777 N.Y.S.2d 767;Wienk–Evans v. North Shore Univ. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 269 A.D.2d 443, 702 N.Y.S.2d 917),since she failed to establish that she was not responsible for supervising Janicek. Moreover, Hammock did not submit an expert's affirmation in support of her motion. Accordingly, she also failed to establish, prima facie, that she did not deviate or depart from accepted medical practice in her supervision of the care rendered to the injured plaintiff by Janicek, or that any alleged departure was not a proximate cause of the injuries allegedly sustained by the injured plaintiff ( see Sheppard–Mobley v. King, 8 A.D.3d at 359, 777 N.Y.S.2d 767;Wienk–Evans v. North Shore Univ. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 269 A.D.2d 443, 702 N.Y.S.2d 917). Since Hammock failed to meet her prima facie burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers ( see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642;Caggiano v. Cooling, 92 A.D.3d 634, 938 N.Y.S.2d 329).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied Hammock's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.