Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-cv-3453-RBH-TER
12-20-2023
MUHAMMAD Z. SHAIKH, Plaintiff, v. AEKTA MOTELS, LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for discrimination and retaliation on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 52). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in June of 2018 as a manager for a hotel. Comp. ¶ 10 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him because of his Muslim religion by calling him into work when he was supposed to be off to attend mosque services and making negative comments about his beard and his wife's hijab. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12, 15. He alleges that he was terminated after complaining about these incidents. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16.
Pandoria testified that Defendant always employed less than fifteen people. Pandoria Dep. 22-23, 39 (ECF No. 50-6); see also Pandoria Aff ¶ 3 (ECF No. 50-8); EEOC Position Statement (ECF No. 50-3). Defendant's Quarterly Federal Tax Returns show less than fifteen employees for each quarter. Federal Tax Returns (ECF No. 50-3). Defendant's Quarterly Wage Reports for the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (SCDEW), see SCDEW Wage Reports (ECF No. 52-4), also show less than fifteen employees for each quarter, though the number of employees reported in those reports differs from the number of employees reported in the Quarterly Federal Tax Returns.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 87475 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4thCir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because it does not fall within the definition of employer under Title VII, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation cause of action, and Plaintiff fails to show a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant discriminated against him because of his religion or retaliated against him for complaining of the discrimination. Because the record fails to show that Defendant meets the definition of employer under Title VII, summary judgment is appropriate.
“An entity can be held liable in a Title VII action only if it is an ‘employer' of the complainant.” Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir.2015). To be a Title VII “employer,” an entity must “ha[ve] fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2016). “A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the number of employees, including the duration of their employment, with some element of precision.” Taylor v. Cardiology Clinic, Inc., 195 F.Supp.3d 865, 869-70 (W.D. Va. 2016) (citing Wilson v. Comtrust LLC, 249 F.Supp.2d 993, 997 (N.D.Ill.2003)) (internal quotations omitted); Arbauqh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (holding in Title VII context that 15-employee threshold is an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, rather than a jurisdictional issue).
“Courts consistently have held that the phrase ‘current calendar year' refers to the year in which the alleged discrimination occurred.” Komorowski v. Townline Mini-Mart & Rest., 162 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.1998) (collecting cases); e.g., Richardson v. K.C. Concepts, LLC, No. CA 6:08-3186-HMH-BHH, 2010 WL 500418, at *9 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2010); Spencer v. Morningside Police Dep't, No. 8:01-CV-03746-PJM, 2002 WL 32356380, at *2 (D.Md. July 24, 2002). In Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination, he asserts that the alleged discrimination occurred between June of 2018 and July of 2020. See Charge of Discrimination (ECF No. 50-2).
There is no evidence in the record indicating that Defendant employed fifteen or more employees during the relevant time period. Pandoria testified that Defendant always employed less than fifteen people. Pandoria Dep. 22-23, 39 (ECF No. 50-6); see also Pandoria Aff. ¶ 3 (ECF No. 50-8). Plaintiff argues in his Response that neither Pandoria or Ratra would have any direct knowledge of how many individuals Defendant employed because Plaintiff handled the payroll and hiring/firing of employees, however he provides no citation to evidence in the record to support this.Further, Defendant presents Quarterly Federal Tax Returns for April of 2018 through June of 2020, which show no more than twelve employees during that time. See Federal Tax Returns. Plaintiff presents Defendant's Quarterly Wage Reports for the SCDEW for January through March of 2018, and July of 2018 through March of 2019, which likewise show no more than twelve employees during those time periods. See SCDEW Wage Reports. However, discrepancies exist between the Tax Returns and the Wage Reports from July of 2018, through March of 2019, regarding the number of employees reported. Thus, Plaintiff argues, these documents are unreliable and a genuine issue of material fact exists.
There are several statements of “fact” in Plaintiff's Response with no citation to the record.
The Quarterly Federal Tax Returns show eight employees for the quarter ending September of 2018, seven employees for the quarter ending December of 2018, and nine employees for the quarter ending March of 2019. See Federal Tax Returns. The Quarterly Wage Reports for the SCDEW show eleven employees for the quarter ending September of 2018, twelve employees for the quarter ending December of 2018, and twelve employees for the quarter ending March of 2019. See SCDEW Wage Reports.
However, though a genuine dispute of fact exists as to which report contains the correct number of employees, that dispute is not material to the question before the court because neither the Federal Tax Returns or the SCDEW Wage Reports indicate that Defendant employed fifteen or more employees. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Under either report, Defendant never employed more than fifteen employees during the relevant time period. The dispute over whether Defendant employed twelve or seven employees does not change the outcome of the case when the governing law requires fifteen or more employees.
Further, even if the court found the reliability of the reports in question, Plaintiff still fails to present sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact as to whether Defendant employed fifteen or more employees during the relevant time period. As stated above, “plaintiff bears the burden of proving the number of employees, including the duration of their employment, with some element of precision.” Taylor, 195 F.Supp.3d at 869-70. Though Plaintiff alleges that Defendant employed fifteen or more employees, he has failed to present any evidence to support this allegation. To survive a motion for summary judgment, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations of his pleadings, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, but must cite to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to show that Defendant qualifies as an employer for Title VII purposes, his claims against Defendant fail and summary judgment is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) be granted and this case be dismissed in its entirety.