In view of the importance of the jury system, and the need for diverse representation on juries, some courts have inferred a public policy mandate against discharging employees for missing work to perform jury service. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 57 Ohio App. 3d 18, 566 N.E.2d 193 (1990). An employer who refuses to allow an employee to miss work in order to serve on a jury places the employee in the "untenable position of choosing between his employment and [a statutorily] mandated duty."

"When a corporate officer commits a tort while in the performance of his duties, he is individually liable for the wrongful act." Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc. (1990), 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 22, 566 N.E.2d 193, 197, citing Young v. Featherstone Motors, Inc. (1954), 97 Ohio App. 158, 171, 55 O.O. 405, 411, 124 N.E.2d 158, 166. The trial court therefore did not err in awarding appellees a new trial on their conversion claim.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reiterated this rule in Mers, and Ohio courts of appeals have followed it consistently. E.g., Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 566 N.E.2d 193 (1990); Boggs v. Avon Products, Inc., 56 Ohio App.3d 67, 564 N.E.2d 1128 (1990); Boundy v. Arnold Haviland Co., 33 Ohio App.3d 156, 514 N.E.2d 931 (1986). At oral argument, counsel for Humphreys conceded that the only consideration supplied by Humphreys was his forbearing from looking for other employment, but contended that this inactivity supplied all the consideration necessary to support the alleged contract.

This Court, respectfully disagrees with the Defendants' conclusions. Just like in Arizona, Ohio recognizes that "[w]hen a corporate officer commits a tort while in the performance of his duties, he is individually liable for the wrongful act." See, e.g., Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ohio App., 1990). This factor, therefore, presents no barrier to litigation in this case.

The more plausible interpretation, however, in light of the likely legislative intent behind § 4113.52 and the Greeley court's stated goal of enforcing the legislature's will, is that a Greeley cause of action is available only when (1) an employer's behavior violates either a statute or a deeply engrained public policy, and (2) the legislature has neither provided a private remedy nor expressed an intent to preclude a private remedy. See Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 566 N.E.2d 193, 195 (Defiance County 1990) (distinguishing between statutory and Greeley exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine and indicating that Greeley addressed areas where statutory exceptions did not exist). Accordingly, the Plaintiff was required to bring his action within one hundred eighty days of his discharge.

Id. at syllabus. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc. (1990), 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 566 N.E.2d 193; Clipson v. Schlessman (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 230, 624 N.E.2d 220; cf. Edelman v. Franklin Iron Metal Corp. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 406, 622 N.E.2d 411; Sabo v. Schott (Mar. 2, 1994), Hamilton App. No. C-920941, unreported, 1994 WL 59464, discretionary appeal allowed in (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 1435, 638 N.E.2d 1039; Collins v. Rizkana (Nov. 22, 1993), Stark App. No. CA-9310, unreported, 1993 WL 500478, motion to certify the record allowed in (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 1429, 631 N.E.2d 640; Ricciardi v. Babcock Wilcox Co. (Jan. 27, 1993), Summit App. No. 15728, unreported, 1993 WL 20999, motion to certify the record allowed in (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 1409, 615 N.E.2d 1044, appeal dismissed on joint application in (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 1420, 631 N.E.2d 160; Eagleye v. TRW, Inc. (Feb. 17, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 64662, unreported, 1994 WL 50671. The majority in Tulloh consisted of Chief Justice Moyer, Justice Wright, and two judges of courts of appeals sitting by appointment.

Thus, as any acts Perlman engaged in were in his capacity of a corporate officer for Perlman Agency, he could not be personally liable. {¶ 24} Notwithstanding, appellant attempts to circumvent the usual legal route of piercing the corporate veil by relying upon Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc. (1990), 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 566 N.E.2d 193, for the proposition that, when a corporate officer commits a tort while in the performance of his duties, the officer is individually liable for the wrongful act. In Shaffer, a mother and daughter filed an action against their employer when the daughter was fired from her employment for missing work to attend jury duty and the mother was subsequently fired in retaliation for her daughter's attending jury duty.

{¶ 41} Consequently, a decision overruling a former statute as being unconstitutional is retrospective in its operation, "and the effect is not that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law." Roberts v. Treasurer, 147 Ohio App.3d 403, 2001-Ohio-8867, ¶ 20, citing Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 209, 210; Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc. (1990), 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 20; Anello v. Hufziger (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 28. This general rule has been applied in cases where the Supreme Court is not overruling one of its former decisions but interpreting a statute.

In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc.(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 the Ohio Supreme Court created an exception to the "employment-at-will" doctrine by establishing a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy as articulated in a specific statute. Shaffer v. Frontrunner (1990), 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 20. However, in order for an employee to avail herself of a Greely claim, the employee must be an "employee-at-will" and a not party to an employment contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement.

A decision overruling a former statute as being unconstitutional is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law. Peerless Electric Co. v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 209, 210; Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc. (1990), 57 Ohio App.3d 18, 20; Anello v. Hufziger (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 28. This general rule has been applied in cases where the Supreme Court is not overruling one of its former decisions but interpreting a statute.