It is elementary that the default of a defendant in a divorce action does not possess the significance which attaches in an ordinary civil action. The interest of the public in divorce cases, including the possibility of collusive arrangements therein, is such that a divorce may not be granted on a judgment by default without proof of a cause for divorce. Without reference to which of the two controlled (see, Shaff v. Shaff, 72 Colo. 184, 186, 210 Pac. 400; XXI Dicta No. 3, p. 68), section 9, c. 56, '35 C.S.A. (S.L. '93, p. 238, § 5) and section 10, c. 56, '35 C.S.A. (S.L. '17, p. 182 § 8), effective at the times involved herein, both so contemplated. However, in neither of said sections was there any procedural requirement "inconsistent or in conflict with" Rule 55 (b) (2), supra. In fact, examination shows that on the subject of the latter both are silent.

21 R.C.L. 491, 355; Flynn v. Barnes, 156 Ky. 498, 161 S.W. 523; Goff v. Nat. R. L. Co., 249 Ky. 363, 60 S.W.2d 944; Littleton v. Littleton, 224 Ala. 103, 139 So. 335; Sharp v. Sharp, 230 Ala. 539, 161 So. 709; Stephens v. Stephens, 233 Ala. 178, 170 So. 767. Condonation is a matter to be plead in defense. Newton v. Newton, 86 N.J. Eq. 129, 97 A. 294; Brown v. Brown, 219 Ala. 104, 121 So. 386; Turner v. Turner, 217 Ala. 621, 116 So. 918; Rich v. Rich, 109 N.J. Eq. 216, 156 A. 442; Morris v. Morris, 50 Nev. 298, 258 P. 232; McDaniels v. McDaniels, 152 Okl. 258, 4 P.2d 112; Barta v. Barta, Tex.Civ.App., 283 S.W. 201; White v. White, 121 Va. 244, 92 S.E. 811; 19 C.J. 114, § 285; 9 R.C.L. 385, § 179; Shaff v. Shaff, 72 Colo. 184, 210 P. 400. STAKELY, Justice.

As to implied repeals, we quote with approval from People v. Capp, 61 Colo. 396, 158 P. 143, wherein it is said at page 401: "While repeals by implication are not favored, they must and should be recognized where, as here, the legislative intent to substitute a new law for an old one upon the same subject is clear. * * * This court has repeatedly recognized and sanctioned the doctrine of repeals by implication, as indicated in the following cases: Lovelace v. Tabor, 29 Colo. 62, 66 P. 892; People v. Lange, 48 Colo. 428, 110 P. 68; Sugar City v. Commissioners, 57 Colo. 432, 140 P. 809." In Shaff v. Shaff, 72 Colo. 184, 186, 210 P. 400, we held that where a new law covers the whole subject matter, and is intended as a substitute for a former statute, it will be deemed a repeal of the earlier act. 4.

It is obvious that he preferred to adjust his liability at the liquidated, moderate sum of $15 per week rather than expose himself to the uncertainty of litigating the question of support. Sound public policy encourages such agreements ( Shaff v. Shaff, 175 Misc. 339). If additional consideration be needed to support the agreement such consideration is supplied by the defendant's exposure to liability for damages resulting from his fraud and deceit in inducing the marriage (cf.