Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-5767.
February 4, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Douglas Seville commenced this pro se action in the Western District of Pennsylvania against multiple defendants, including members of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, the superintendent and employees of SCI-Huntingdon, a hearing examiner for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and an unnamed Bensalem Township police officer, later identified as Officer Dennis Hart. In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought damages for injuries stemming from an unlawful arrest, revocation of parole, illegal sentence, and false misconduct charges by prison officials.
While this case was pending in the Western District of Pennsylvania, The Honorable Malcolm Muir granted the motion to dismiss as to all defendants except Bensalem Township Police Officer Dennis Hart. Judge Muir severed the plaintiff's remaining claims relating to the validity of his arrest by Officer Hart, granted Officer Hart's motion for a change of venue, and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Officer Hart has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court will grant the motion to dismiss; but the Court will allow the plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before Monday, March 7, 2005.
I. Procedural History
The plaintiff initiated this action on March 29, 2004, by filing a complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint on April 13, 2004.
At the time that the plaintiff initiated this action, he was confined at the State Correctional Institution in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. He was released on parole on September 29, 2004, and he is currently residing in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
While this case was pending in the Middle District, Officer Hart filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for a change of venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In support of his motion for a change of venue, Officer Hart asserted that because he resides in the Eastern District and the plaintiff's arrest occurred within the Eastern District, venue is proper here.
The other named defendants, individuals employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, filed a separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The claims against the Commonwealth defendants have been dismissed, and they are no longer parties to this action.
After the remaining claims against Officer Hart were transferred to this Court, Officer Hart filed this motion to dismiss. With the exception of the request for a change of venue, the present motion is virtually identical to the motion that Officer Hart filed in the Middle District. Although the plaintiff did not file a response in opposition to the present motion, the plaintiff did file several responses to Officer Hart's motion while the case was pending in the Middle District.
II. Facts
The plaintiff alleges the following facts, which for purposes of this motion to dismiss are taken as true. On October 17, 2002, upon returning to his vehicle from a public place of business the plaintiff discovered that his tire had been intentionally torn and ripped. The plaintiff reentered the place of business to report the vandalism to the manager. The manager returned to the vehicle with the plaintiff to inspect the damage. The plaintiff alleges that when he returned to his vehicle with the manager, he found a dirty-handed Bensalem police officer who had suddenly appeared and instead of offering assistance to the plaintiff, asked for his driver's license and vehicle registration.
The Bensalem police officer, now identified as Officer Hart, took the plaintiff's license and registration to his patrol car. When Officer Hart returned, he started to question the plaintiff by asking the plaintiff repeatedly to recite his social security number, date of birth, and home address.
Officer Hart returned the license and registration to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff went back inside the place of business to get his wife. When the plaintiff and his wife exited the business a short time later, the plaintiff was arrested by Officer Hart on an outstanding warrant that was filed that same day.
In his response to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff attempts to clarify the allegations and claims that he made against Officer Hart in the amended complaint. The plaintiff clarifies that the place of business referred to in the amended complaint was the Lincoln Motel in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff also alleges that he witnessed Officer Hart wiping some black substance off his hands. The plaintiff alleges that when he and his wife attempted to leave the premises, they were approached by numerous Bensalem Township police officers with their guns drawn.
The remaining allegations in the plaintiff's complaint relate to claims against the Commonwealth defendants and are not relevant to the present motion to dismiss.
III. Discussion
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court will "accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them." Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint and "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court may dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim only if it appears "beyond doubt" that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the plaintiff presents only vague and conclusory allegations, however, the complaint should be dismissed. Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 1985).
To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must satisfy two elements: "(1) the conduct complained of must be committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) it must have deprived the plaintiff of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or the law of the United States." Riley, 777 F.2d at 145 (citations omitted). The defendant does not dispute that Officer Hart is a state actor. Resolution of the motion to dismiss rests, then, on whether the allegations in the amended complaint state a claim for violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
In liberally construing the plaintiff's complaint, the Court discerns three potential theories of liability encompassed in the plaintiff's allegations. The first theory of liability is based on the plaintiff's allegations that his tire was intentionally cut and that Officer Hart's hands were dirty. In his response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff adds that Officer Hart was wiping a black substance off his hands as he approached the plaintiff. The plaintiff seeks to recover $320.00 against Officer Hart for damage to his vehicle.
There are not sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to allow a reasonable inference that Officer Hart slashed the plaintiff's tire. The complaint does not even say so. The complaint does say that Officer Hart was "dirty handed," but such a fact, even if true, does not lead to the conclusion that Officer Hart's hands were dirty because he slashed the tire.
The second theory of liability is based on the plaintiff's allegation that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant that was "allegedly" filed that day. The central issue in determining liability in a § 1983 action based on a claim of false arrest is "whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense." Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). An arrest violates the Fourth Amendment if executed pursuant to an erroneously issued warrant. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269-71 (3d Cir. 2000). Where a law enforcement officer executes an arrest based on an objectively reasonable belief that there is a valid warrant, the officer is generally immune from suit. Id. at 272.
It is not clear from the amended complaint that the plaintiff disputes the validity of the arrest warrant. Even if the plaintiff does claim that the arrest warrant was somehow defective, the plaintiff does not allege any circumstances that would make Officer Hart's reliance on the warrant unreasonable or that would subject Officer Hart to suit for a constitutional violation.
The third theory of liability is based on the plaintiff's apparent attempt to question the propriety of Officer Hart's actions in approaching the plaintiff and requesting his license and registration. To the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would suggest his encounter with Officer Hart was anything but consensual. A request for identification by police and questioning related to an individual's identity does not, without more, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1984).
The Court, therefore, will dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff may file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies in his pleadings on or before Monday, March 7, 2005. The Court will dismiss the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Officer Hart in his official capacity with prejudice. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1988).
An appropriate Order follows.