Opinion
A21-1524
01-24-2023
In re the Marriage of: Kyle John Severson, petitioner, Appellant, v. Sara Elizabeth Sigfrinius, f/k/a Sara Elizabeth Severson, Respondent.
Washington County District Court File No. 82-FA-13-3689
Considered and decided by Gai'tas, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant-father Kyle John Severson and respondent-mother Sara Elizabeth Sigfrinius f/k/a Sara Elizabeth Severson are the parents of two children who are currently 16 and 13 years old. Father appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to modify custody and instead granting sole legal and sole physical custody of their two children to mother. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by appointing a parenting consultant because mother and father had not entered into an agreement or stipulation for the appointment of such a professional, and the district court does not have 1 the authority to appoint a parenting consultant upon its own motion. Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the appointment of a parenting consultant without prior agreement of the parties, we reverse and remand the district court's order.
Mother did not file a brief and instead submitted a letter asking that father's appeal be determined on the merits.
2. In October 2013, mother and father finalized their divorce. As part of their decree for dissolution of marriage with children, the district court ordered joint legal and joint physical custody of their two children.
3. On March 28, 2016, by agreement of the parties, the district court filed a stipulated order appointing a parenting consultant for a term of two years to help mother and father "resolve their disputes concerning their children." The parenting consultant resigned in April 2017.
4. On May 26, 2017, by agreement of the parties, the district court filed another stipulated order that appointed a second parenting consultant for a term of two years. The second parenting consultant resigned in June 2018. Mother and father never entered into an agreement to appoint a third parenting consultant.
5. In November 2018, father filed a motion to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. He sought sole legal custody of the children. The parties participated in a custody and parenting-time evaluation performed by a neutral parenting-time evaluator.
6. The evaluator submitted a report and testified during a two-day evidentiary hearing held on father's motion. The evaluator recommended that mother be granted sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. Along with providing recommendations for how to manage holidays, medical appointments, and communications regarding the 2 children, the evaluator recommended the parties utilize a parenting consultant to (1) manage the children's sports each season and (2) resolve "any future parenting disputes and establish[] protocols to minimize the children's exposure to their conflict." The evaluator recommended that the parenting consultant "monitor the parents' compliance with the Court Order and have the authority to modify parenting time or impose sanctions for non-compliance."
7. On August 10, 2021, the district court filed an order granting mother sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. Relevant to the issue on appeal, the district court ordered that the children be allowed to participate in one sport per season, and that mother and father "meet with the Parenting Consultant in advance of each season for assistance in identifying the sport . . . and any other logistical information necessary to ensure the children are shielded from the parents' conflict." Additionally, the district court voided "all previous [parenting consultant] directives" and stated that mother and father "shall appoint a [parenting consultant] to make decisions as outlined in [the evaluator's] report and ordered herein."
8. Father filed a motion to amend the district court's order or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied father's motion.
9. On appeal, father raises just one issue: whether the district court abused its discretion by requiring the appointment of a third parenting consultant without the agreement of the parties. 3
Father does not appeal the district court's overall custody or parenting-time determinations.
10. A district court's decision regarding parenting-time questions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn.App. 2017). The district court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record, it improperly applies the law, or it resolves the question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); see also Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021) (making a similar statement). We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to require the appointment of a parenting consultant without a prior stipulation or agreement from the parties.
11. The term "parenting consultant" does not exist in any Minnesota statutes. Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn.App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2006). Parenting consultants are "a creature of contract of an agreement of the parties which is generally incorporated into (or at least referred to in) a district court's custody ruling." Id. As such, parenting consultants require a stipulation or agreement between the parties and cannot be appointed by a district court on its own motion. See id.; see also Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n.1 (Minn.App. 2000) (concluding that while a stipulation entered into by the parties is not binding on the district court, the district court "cannot, by judicial fiat, impose conditions on the parties to which they did not stipulate and thereby deprive the parties of their 'day in court'"); Minn. Stat. § 518.1751, subd. 4 (2022) (allowing parties to "voluntarily agree[] to submit their parenting time dispute to a neutral third party" (emphasis added)).
12. "Stipulations are . . . accorded the sanctity of binding contracts." Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). "Absent ambiguity, the interpretation of a 4 contract is a question of law," which is reviewed de novo. Roemhildt v. Kristall Dev., Inc., 798 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Minn.App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). But the existence of a contract is a question of fact. Morrisette v. Harrison Int'l Corp., 486 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1992). Appellate courts will not disturb a district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978).
13. Here, the record shows that mother and father never entered into a third stipulation or agreement to appoint a third parenting consultant. The district court did not make the appointment of the third parenting consultant optional in its August 10, 2021 order; instead, it stated that mother and father "shall appoint" such a professional whose scope of authority and fees, we note, are not defined in the order or by statute. To the extent the district court implicitly found that mother and father had agreed to appoint a parenting consultant, that finding is clearly erroneous. And, because mother and father did not agree to appoint a parenting consultant, the district court's directive to appoint one was an abuse of discretion.
14. We recognize that a district court has the authority to appoint a parentingtime expeditor under Minn. Stat. § 518.1751 (2022) without a prior agreement of the parties. Minn. Stat. § 518.1751, subd. 1. Parenting-time expeditors are distinct from parenting consultants. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 293. "The purpose of a parenting time expeditor is to resolve parenting time disputes by enforcing, interpreting, clarifying, and addressing circumstances not specifically addressed by an existing parenting time order and, if appropriate, to make a determination as to whether the existing parenting time order has been violated." Minn. Stat. § 518.1751, subd. 1b(a). The statutory appointment 5 procedure for a parenting-time expeditor 518.1751, subdivision 2. Nothing in this o district court's authority to appoint a p adequately explained by any order making s
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's directive consultant in the August 10, 2021 order is remove this directive from the order.
2. Other than reversing the district court's directive to mother and father to appoint a parenting consultant, this order opinion does not affect the district court's order granting mother sole physical and sole legal custody of the children.
3. On remand, the district court, within its discretion, may consider the request of either party, the parties' stipulation, or the district court's own motion to appoint a parenting-time expeditor under Minnesota Statutes section 518.1751, subdivision 2.
4. Pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 136.01, subdivision 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 6