Opinion
04 Civ. 8424 (RCC).
May 19, 2006
MEMORANDUM ORDER
In a March 6, 2006 memorandum and order this Court denied Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his request to conduct a final premium audit. Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of that portion of the order. For the reasons explained, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
I. Standard for Reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) or Local Rule 6.3 "must be narrowly construed and strictly applied to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court." Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Reconsideration is appropriate in the limited circumstances in which the court has overlooked relevant data or case law "that were put before it on the underlying motion,"id. at 392 (quoting Yurman v. Chaindom Enters., Inc., 2000 WL 217480, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2000) (emphasis included), which, had it been considered, might have reasonably altered the result. Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A court will deny the motion when the movant "seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
II. Discussion
The Court presumes familiarity with the facts giving rise to this dispute. See Frontier Ins. Co. v. Surge Resources, No. 04 Civ. 8424 (RCC), 2006 WL 559460, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006). As the Court explained in its March order, it denied Plaintiff's application for a declaratory judgment to conduct a final premium audit because the policy language clearly stated that such an audit would be conducted "during the policy period and within three years after the policy period ends." (Complaint ¶ 44.) The parties did not dispute that the three-year period following the termination of the policy period expired on August 1, 2004. Plaintiff now argues that the Court overlooked its equitable estoppel argument and allegations that Defendant's stonewalling merited a final audit outside the three-year period.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the Court did consider Plaintiff's allegations regarding Defendant's stonewalling. See Frontier, 2006 WL 559460, at *2 (recounting Complaint's claims that Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's requests for an audit). More importantly, however, Plaintiff did not urge the Court to grant its motion for summary judgment on equitable estoppel grounds. Plaintiff cites a portion of its brief in which it discusses estoppel. (See Plaintiff's Mem. in Opp. to Defendant's Mot. to Dismiss and in Support of its Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.) Those arguments, however, were made to counter Defendant's own estoppel argument put forth in its motion to dismiss (see Defendant's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 13), not in support of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.See Albury v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 2005 WL 1653939, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2005) (explaining a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to advance new legal theories). Rather, the crux of Plaintiff's argument for summary judgment was that the policy language was unambiguous and did not give rise to any factual disputes — a contention this Court disagreed with. (Plaintiff's Mem. in Opp. to Defendant's Mot. to Dismiss and in Support of its Mot. for Summ. J. at 24.) Again, while an audit may eventually be ordered, the Court declines to order it based on expired policy language before discovery has been conducted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this Court's March 6, 2006 order is denied.