arial judge may appropriately rely on information beyond the scope of the evidence produced at trial, including information contained in the defendant's pre-sentence report and information obtained during the plea hearings of co-defendants, when imposing sentence. Cf. Serapo v. United States, 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979) (Sentencing judge may consider information obtained from trials of co-defendants); United States v. Scalzo, 716 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1983) (Reliance upon hearsay and other types of inadmissible information in assessing the factors affecting punishment is not per se improper); United States v. Cusenza, 749 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (Sentencing judge "may properly consider hearsay evidence of other criminal activity by the defendant, in some cases even if the defendant has pleaded not guilty to related charges."). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a trial judge in the federal judicial system generally has wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose . . ." and "before making that determination, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come."
We agree, given the breadth of discretion we accord sentencing judges in considering outside information. In Serapo v. United States, 595 F.2d 3, 4 (9th Cir. 1979), we noted that "[a] sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited as to the kind of information which he may consider or the source from which it may come." While settlement of the underlying civil action before appeal leaves unanswered the question of Godfree's liability, Godfree has not shown that the district judge's conclusions in that regard are materially false, or that the sentence is disproportionately harsh as a result.
The defendant's argument, however, ignores the fact that the trial judge may appropriately rely on information beyond the scope of the evidence produced at trial, including information contained in the defendant's pre-sentence report and information obtained during the plea hearings of co-defendants, when imposing sentence. Cf. Serapo v. united States, 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979) (Sentencing judge may consider information obtained from trials of co-defendants); United States v. Scalzo, 716 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1983) (Reliance upon hearsay and other types of inadmissible information in assessing the factors affecting punishment is not per se improper); United States v. Cusenza, 749 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (Sentencing judge "may properly consider hearsay evidence of other criminal activity by the defendant, in some cases even if the defendant has pleaded not guilty to related charges."). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a trial judge in the federal judicial system generally has wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose.
Consideration of the appellants' prior involvement with cocaine is permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Wondrack, 578 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1978); Serapo v. United States, 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979), and Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1978). We therefore find no basis for resentencing.
To this end, a judge may conduct a broad inquiry, largely unlimited as to either the kind of information he may consider or its source. Tucker, supra; Serapo v. United States, 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979). The justification for this policy is the strong public interest in imposing sentences based upon a complete evaluation of each individual offender and designed to aid in his particular rehabilitation.
Likewise, a judge may draw upon his knowledge of the defendant and his activities. Serapo v. United States, 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979). It was appellant who initiated these communications with the trial judge. He cannot now complain that he was unaware of them and their potential influence on his sentencing.