Opinion
CV166065237S
02-05-2019
SERAMONTE ASSOCIATES, LLC v. TOWN OF HAMDEN
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sybil V. Richards, Judge
This court is presented with the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant properly imposed the tax penalty for plaintiff’s late submission of a real property tax payment. Additionally, the second issue presented is whether the court should grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant improperly imposed the tax penalty.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute in this action. The plaintiff, Seramonte Associates, LLC, was the owner of real estate situated in the Town of Hamden, known as 520 Mix Avenue, 609 Avenue, and 617 Mix Avenue. On February 1, 2016, the defendant, Town of Hamden, assessed the real estate as $ 15, 683, 080 for 520 Mix Avenue, $ 2, 927, 890 for 609 Avenue, and $ 10, 521, 560 for 617 Mix Avenue. Pursuant to General Statutes § 12-63c, the plaintiff submitted by mail information the defendant required on or before June 1, 2018. Nevertheless, the defendant imposed a 10 percent penalty, allegedly because the plaintiff’s submission was late. The penalty was a fine amounting to $ 132, 145.16.
The plaintiff timely appealed the imposition of the fine to the Hamden Board of Assessment appeals, and appeared before it on March 2, 2017. On March 21, 2017, the Board denied the appeal. The plaintiff subsequently appealed to this court by complaint dated September 27, 2016. Initially, the plaintiff challenged the valuation of the properties and the imposition of the 10 percent penalty, but subsequently withdrew the former claim. On March 27, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s complaint (# 112), accompanied by a memorandum of law and exhibits, on the ground that it properly imposed the penalty. On April 26, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (# 113), accompanied by a memorandum of law and exhibits, on the ground that the defendant improperly imposed the penalty.
Subsequently, on May 1, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (# 117), adding a count that the penalty is unconstitutional under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions. In response, on December 21, 2017, the defendant filed another motion for summary judgment as to count one of the plaintiff’s amended complaint (# 122), accompanied by a memorandum of law and exhibits, on the ground that it properly imposed the penalty. On July 27, 2018, the defendant filed its objection to the plaintiff’s motion. On September 20, 2018, the plaintiff filed a reply in support of its motion. On September 27, 2018, the plaintiff filed its objection to the defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment. On October 11, 2018, the plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion. The court heard oral argument at short calendar on October 29, 2018.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). Questions of statutory interpretation and legislative history present legal questions properly resolved by summary judgment. Palmer v. New Britain General Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-05-4011575-S (July 20, 2011, Wilson, J.).
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
The first issue is whether the defendant’s and plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment (# 112, # 113) remain pending after the plaintiff’s filing of an amended complaint. "When an amended pleading is filed, it operates as a waiver of the original pleading. The original pleading drops out of the case and although it remains in the file, it cannot serve as the basis for any future judgment ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lund v. Milford Hospital, Inc., 326 Conn. 846, 850, 168 A.3d 479 (2017). Superior Courts hold that a motion for summary judgment is moot if the plaintiff files a new complaint in response to the motion. Knoob v. North Branford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 96-0389536-S (April 6, 1999, Delvin, J.) (24 Conn.L.Rptr. 337).
Here, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint after the defendant’s first motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, it should make both motions moot. However, the amended complaint does not substantially differ from the original complaint in alleging that the defendant incorrectly imposed the tax penalty. Moreover, the defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment is substantially similar to its first motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court will consider the defendant’s latter motion for summary judgment (# 122) and, out of fairness to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (# 113).
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that it properly imposed the tax penalty pursuant to § 12-63c. Specifically, the defendant argues that "submit" as used in the statute means the town must receive the tax forms by June 1. The plaintiff disagrees, arguing that "submit" merely means that the forms are sent to the town, whether by dropping it in the mailbox or sending it electronically. This is a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. See Hibner v. Bruening, 78 Conn.App. 456, 458, 828 A.2d 150 (2003).
"The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply ... When construing a statute, [the court’s] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... In other words, [the court seeks] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs [the court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotations omitted.) Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308, 943 A.2d 1075 (2008). If, however, "a statute is not plain and unambiguous, [the court looks] for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 399, 999 A.2d 682 (2010). "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Section 12-63c(a) provides in relevant part: "In determining the present true and actual value in any town of real property used primarily for purposes of producing rental income, the assessor ... may require in the conduct of any appraisal of such property ... that the owner of such property annually submit to the assessor not later than the first day of June ... the best available information disclosing the actual rental and rental-related income and operating expenses applicable to such property."
The word "submit" is not defined in § 12-63c(a). Similarly, other statutes use "submit," but none define it. See, e.g., General Statutes § § 12-80a(a) and 12-89a. When a statute does not provide a definition, the court construes words and phrases according to their common usage in the dictionary. Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co., 298 Conn. 620, 633, 6 A.3d 60 (2010).
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "submit" as "to present or propose to another for review, consideration, or decision; to deliver formally." Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993). It also defines "submit" as "to send or commit for consideration, study, or decision" or "to present or make available for use or study ..." Id. Accordingly, as used in § 12-63c(a), both definitions of "submit" could apply. It is entirely possible that "submit" could mean the town must receive the forms by June 1 or that the forms must be mailed to the town by June 1. Accordingly, "submit" is ambiguous because it is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. Thus, the court must look the legislative history of § 12-63c(a).
The legislative history, however, does not make clear what "submit" means. Nothing in the committee hearings or debate on the floors of the Senate or House of Representatives shed any light on what the General Assembly intended by using the word "submit." Nevertheless, numerous statements explain the purpose of the tax penalty. Specifically, during the Senate’s debate of the bill, Senator Di Bella stated: "[The bill] calls for a penalty of 10 percent of the property tax change for falsification of this information ... There has got to be a penalty for those who refuse with the law. It’s a reasonable one." 27 S. Proc., Pt. 7, 1984 Sess., p. 2477, 2479, remarks of Senator William DiBella. In addition, numerous statements in the House of Representatives and the Finance Committee state that the purpose of the bill was to ensure that municipal assessors could accurately and equitably assess the value of commercial properties.
Moreover, the Supreme Court stated: "The purpose of the penalty [in § 12-63c] is to compel the submission of information to assist the assessor in performing his duties ... [W]ith respect to the magnitude of the penalty, we have stated that penalty provisions in taxing statutes are quite common and ... such provisions, though often attacked as confiscatory, are almost always upheld by the courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 145, 971 A.2d 24 (2009).
Additionally, based on the language of the statute, one Superior Court held that a town must receive the tax forms by June 1. MSK Properties, LLC v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-6029158-S (July 3, 2017, Huddleston, J.) (64 Conn.L.Rptr. 747, 753-54). "However draconian the result may seem, any other construction of the statute would ignore its plain language. It would also introduce an element of subjectivity into the statute, as municipal tax assessors would have to determine whether a delay of one day, or fifteen days, or thirty-two days, or fifty-nine days would require the imposition of a penalty. Such subjectivity could easily lead to claims that the taxing statutes were being applied in a discriminatory manner." Id., 754. Similarly, our Supreme Court held that a town’s tax assessor could impose the 10 percent penalty pursuant to § 12-63c(a) for taxpayers’ failure to submit the request information by June 1. PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, supra, 292 Conn. 140-41.
Further, in interpreting another tax statute, General Statutes § 12-41(e)(1), a Superior Court held that "file," as used in that statute, meant that the tax information had to be received by the town by November 1. SBC Internet Services, Inc. v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-06-6000408-S (February 14, 2008, Stodolink, J.T.R.) (44 Conn.L.Rptr. 870, 871).
Accordingly, "submit" as used in § 12-63c(a) means that the town must receive the tax forms by June 1 of each year. This interpretation ensures uniformity in the tax filing process and provides town assessors with the consistency they need in collecting and enforcing the tax code. Given that the legislature created the penalty to ensure that municipal assessors could accurately and equitably assess the value of commercial properties, the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute would frustrate that fundamental purpose. See Narel v. Liburdi, 185 Conn. 562, 571, 441 A.2d 177 (1981) ("[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute is not to be construed so as to thwart its purpose"). As the court in MSK Properties, LLC noted, if "submit" meant the date on which taxpayers put their forms into the mail, it would result in "subjectivity [that] could easily lead to claims that the taxing statutes were being applied in a discriminatory manner." MSK Properties, LLC v. Hartford, supra, 64 Conn.L.Rptr. 754. Thus, "submit" as used in § 12-63c(a) means the town must receive the forms by June 1. Should the town not receive the information by that time, it may impose a 10 percent penalty.
In the present case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the town properly imposed the 10 percent penalty on the plaintiff. The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff put his forms in the mail on May 31, 2016 and that the defendant did not receive them until June 2, 2016. Accordingly, because the defendant did not receive the forms by June 1, 2016, the defendant could and did impose a 10 percent penalty on the plaintiff for its late filing. The defendant was entitled to do so pursuant to General Statutes § 12-63c(d). Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant properly imposed the penalty. The defendant is entitled to summary judgment on count one of the plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant correctly imposed the tax penalty, the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on its motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (# 122) is granted and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (# 113) is denied.