Summary
finding that the plaintiff's race, gender, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims were barred because she checked only the national origin and age discrimination boxes on the EEOC charge
Summary of this case from Stone v. La. Dep't of RevenueOpinion
No. CA 3:00-CV-386-R
July 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is before the Court. Plaintiff Maria Seppy ("Seppy" or "Plaintiff") filed this suit against Defendant City of Irving ("City" or "Defendant"), alleging: (1) race discrimination; (2) gender discrimination; (3) retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) hostile work environment; (5) national origin discrimination; and (6) age discrimination. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all claims.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff was hired by the City on or about January 17, 1984. On the date Plaintiff was demoted, she was a Recreational Supervisor and was responsible for supervising the West Park Recreational Center. The City has five recreational centers: (1) West Park Recreational Center; (2) Lively Senior Activity Center; (3) Senter Recreational Center; (4) Northwest Park Recreational Center; and (5) Cimarron Recreational Center.
On the dates in question, Dwight Pinnix ("Pinnix") was the Superintendent over the Recreation Department. In January of 1999, Pinnix requested that Bill Beaven ("Beaven") review the accounting books kept by the recreational centers for the City of Irving. Beaven was responsible for reviewing the books for the recreational centers in the past.
Beaven began by reviewing the accounting books of the West Park Recreational Center, which was supervised by Plaintiff. Beaven compared the receipts for funds received at the West Park Recreational Center with the bank statements showing funds deposited from that center. Subsequent to this review, Beaven reported to Pinnix that the funds accounted for were insufficient for the receipts written, with deposits short nine hundred dollars ($900.00).
Pinnix then contacted Richard Garcia ("Garcia"), an Employee Relations Specialist in the City's Human Resources Department, for guidance. It was, and is, standard procedure for any employee of the City to contact Human Resources for advice on employment situations. Garcia advised Pinnix to meet with Plaintiff giving her an opportunity to explain why there was a shortage of funds at the West Park Recreational Center. If Plaintiff was unable to explain the missing funds, Garcia instructed Pinnix that the procedure was to place Plaintiff on paid administrative leave. After that, Pinnix was to contact the City Auditor's Office, requesting a full, independent audit of all the City's recreational centers.
Pinnix and Beaven subsequently met with Plaintiff. At that meeting, Pinnix went over the books and receipts with Plaintiff calculating the nine hundred dollar ($900.00) shortage of funds. Plaintiff was unable to explain the nine hundred dollar ($900.00) shortage of funds during the meeting.
Pinnix then followed Garcia's instructions and placed Plaintiff on administrative leave. On April 15, 1999, Pinnix contacted the City Auditor's Office, requesting a full, independent audit of all the City's recreational centers. At this time, Human Resources took over the investigation from the Parks and Recreation Department. City Auditor Patrice Randall ("Randall") conducted the audit of all the City's recreational centers. Randall's qualifications include a CPA degree and fifteen years of governmental auditing experience. When Randall audited the West Park Recreational Center, she found the receipts written for cash intake did not correspond with the income to the center. Specifically, Randall concluded that there were more receipts than funds and that the West Park Recreational Center was missing funds totaling $2,962.00 for the months of November 1998 through April 1999.
Subsequent to the City Auditor Randall's findings, Randall requested a second meeting with Plaintiff to review the findings of the audit. At this second meeting, Plaintiff attended with her husband, Rudy Seppy. Garcia and Pinnix were also present at the second meeting with Plaintiff. At that time, Plaintiff came forward with additional receipts for disbursement of some funds. City Auditor Randall's final conclusion was that there were funds unaccounted for at West Park Recreational Center totaling $2,863.24.
When Randall audited the Lively Senior Recreational Center, her results found more money than receipts. Subsequent to these findings, it was ascertained that the additional moneys from the Lively Senior Recreational Center were attributed to a receipt book inadvertently thrown away when a metal cabinet was cleaned by a volunteer. The bank statements verified the money was properly in the bank as income from the Lively Senior Center. When Randall audited the Cimmaron Recreational Center, the funds balanced within $15.00. When Randall audited the Lively, Northwest, and Senter Recreational Centers, all of their accounts balanced.
Subsequent to all of these findings by City Auditor Randall, Pinnix again discussed the matter with Garcia, who informed Pinnix that demotion and termination were the available disciplines for this type of matter. Pinnix chose demotion as the form of discipline for Plaintiff, and Garcia recommended Plaintiff be demoted to a position not involving the management of funds. Accordingly, after a full, independent review by the City Auditor's Office and after two meetings with Plaintiff, Pinnix demoted Plaintiff two steps to Senior Recreation Specialist on June 1, 1999. The reasoning behind Plaintiffs demotion was mismanagement of funds.
Plaintiff received a full administrative appeal. On May 28, 1999, Plaintiff appealed her demotion to Paul Gooch ("Gooch"), Director of the Parks and Recreation Department. On June 10, 1999, Gooch upheld the findings of mismanagement of funds and the discipline of a two-step demotion to Senior Recreation Specialist. One June 15, 1999, Plaintiff, via her attorney, Irene Jackson ("Jackson") appealed to the Appeal Board for the City of Irving. On August 12, 1999, after a hearing at which there were live witnesses for both sides, the Appeals Board affirmed Plaintiffs demotion as administered. Plaintiff then appealed to the City Manager's Office. Assistant City Manager Sandy Cash, as designee for the City Manager's Office, affirmed the findings of mismanagement of funds, but reduced Plaintiffs demotion by one step with the caveat that Plaintiff would not manage funds at the City's recreational centers until instructed by her supervisor. The reduction of Plaintiffs demotion to one step lessened the impact on her income and removed the Plaintiff from the responsibility of managing funds at the City's recreational centers. During the entire administrative appeal process, Plaintiff did not claim discrimination or retaliation.
On November 18, 1999, Plaintiff filed her first charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging only national origin discrimination. On January 25, 2000, Plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging only age discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that the national origin discrimination and the age discrimination occurred on June 1, 1999.
Plaintiff failed to file a charge of race, gender, retaliatory or hostile work environment discrimination with the EEOC within the mandatory time period.
Subsequent to Plaintiffs demotion, the position of Supervisor of West Park Recreational Center was posted, and a qualified pool of applicants was interviewed for the position. Don Moses ("Moses"), an African American male, was awarded the position. Prior to his promotion, Moses held two jobs: (i) a part-time Senior Recreational Specialist with the City of Irving; and (ii) a full-time recreational supervisor with the City of Garland. Moses had substantial experience in the area of recreational supervision and management with the City of Grand Prairie for eight years and with the City of Irving. Moses also had a degree from Dallas Baptist University in recreation management.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Plaintiff's Allegations of Race, Gender, Retaliatory, and Hostile Work Environment Discrimination
Plaintiffs allegations of race, gender, retaliatory, and hostile work environment are barred for numerous failures to meet the mandatory prerequisites of exhausting administrative remedies prior to filing suit. On November 18, 1999, Plaintiff filed her initial charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging she was demoted as a result of national origin discrimination, which allegedly occurred on June 1, 1999. On January 1, 2000, Plaintiff filed a subsequent charge of discrimination alleging age discrimination, which also allegedly occurred on June 1, 1999, claiming she was replaced by an African American male who was approximately thirty-five (35) years of age. Each charge specifically checked: (1) national origin discrimination; and (2) age discrimination. No other discrimination was alleged in any manner.
It is well-settled that a trial court is without jurisdiction to consider claims brought under Title VII unless the aggrieved party first exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the EEOC or the Texas Commission on Human Rights within 180 days of the alleged conduct. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 711 (5th Cir. 1994); Clark v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 18 F.3d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff never filed a charge alleging race, gender, retaliatory, and hostile work environment discrimination. Therefore, summary judgment is proper as to Plaintiffs race, gender, retaliatory, and hostile work environment discrimination claims.
C. Plaintiff's National Origin and Age Discrimination Claims
Plaintiffs national origin and age discrimination claims also fail as a matter of law. In reviewing discrimination claims, courts apply the burden-shifting framework applied by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1990). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). This burden-shifting analysis also applies to national origin and age discrimination claims. See Magana v. Tarrant/Dallas Printing, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0865D, 1998 WL 548686, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 1998); see also Meinecke v. HR Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995).
Pursuant to the burden-shifting analysis, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, thus, creating a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff based on her age or her national origin.
The burden of production then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing evidence that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Once the employer produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision, which rebuts the Plaintiffs prima facie case, all presumptions drop from the case. See Grimes v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of showing pretext on the part of the employer. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Swanson v. General Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1186 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1997).
But the burden of persuasion, that the employer intentionally discriminated against the Plaintiff, remains at all times with the Plaintiff.
To establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) despite her qualifications, she suffered an adverse employment action or decision made by the City; and (4) she was replaced by, or received less favorable treatment than, similarly situated non-Brazilians. See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) as a result of her age, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the City intended to replace her with a substantially younger individual. See Hagen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of national origin and age discrimination because she fails to establish that she was qualified for the position. Plaintiff was demoted subsequent to a finding of mismanagement of funds, with missing funds totaling $2,863.24. This mismanagement of funds was confirmed by a full, independent audit by the City Auditors Office. Plaintiff was given the opportunity, in two meetings, to provide reasons and substantive documentation to explain the missing funds. The City Auditor's Office also audited all recreational centers for the city at the same time and in the same manner.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs demotion to a Recreation Specialist was directly related to the basis for her discipline. The decision to demote Plaintiff was based on the responsibilities of the position. One of the primary responsibilities of a Recreational Center Supervisor involves keeping the books/receipts and balancing/depositing money. A Senior Recreation Specialist does not have management responsibilities over funds. In addition, when the City Manager's Office chose to amend Plaintiffs discipline to a one-step demotion, with the caveat that Plaintiff have no management responsibility over funds, Plaintiff actually received more pay. Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot show she continued to be qualified for the job of Recreational Supervisor after a mismanagement of funds resulting in a $2,863.24 deficit, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs national origin and age discrimination claims.
Defendant also presents compelling evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for demoting Plaintiff, which is her unsatisfactory work performance in the mismanagement of funds over which she was responsible.