, 529 A.2d 44 (1987); Appeal of Kilcullen, 103 Pa. Commw. 521, 520 A.2d 947 (1987); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Turner, 100 Pa. Commw. 539, 515 A.2d 96 (1986); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Bartelt, 94 Pa. Commw. 198, 503 A.2d 103 (1986); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Doherty, 88 Pa. Commw. 482, 490 A.2d 481 (1985); King v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 81 Pa. Commw. 177, 472 A.2d 1196 (1984); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Mumma, 79 Pa. Commw. 108, 468 A.2d 891 (1983); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Miele, 75 Pa. Commw. 130, 461 A.2d 359 (1983); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Wroblewski, 65 Pa. Commw. 333, 442 A.2d 407 (1982); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 53 Pa. Commw. 342, 417 A.2d 867 (1980); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Herman, 49 Pa. Commw. 201, 410 A.2d 1296 (1980); Sentle v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. Commw. 479, 410 A.2d 903 (1980); Weitzel Appeal, 41 Pa. Commw. 235, 400 A.2d 646 (1979); Ford v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 45 Pa. Commw. 268, 406 A.2d 240 (1979); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O'Rourke, 25 Pa. Commw. 580, 361 A.2d 496 (1976); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Cannon, 4 Pa. Commw. 119, 286 A.2d 24 (1972). This state of affairs is unacceptable because it is fraught with pitfalls for the arrestee who is not trained to recognize the difference between a civil or criminal investigation and becomes a source of accusation of manipulation by the police over confused individuals who are suspected of having dulled senses.
Cases excluding the evidence include Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.App. 1975); Price v. North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518 (1978); Raine v. Curry, 45 Ohio App.2d 155, 341 N.E.2d 606 (1975); Fuller v. State, Dep't of Transp., 275 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1979); Moore v. Motor Vehicles Div., 293 Or. 715, 652 P.2d 794, 799 (1982). Cases which do not employ an exclusionary rule include Haas v. State, Dep't of Licensing, 31 Wn. App. 334, 641 P.2d 717 (1982); Westmoreland v. Chapman, 268 Cal.App.2d 1, 74 Cal.Rptr. 363 (1968); State v. Severino, 56 Haw. 378, 537 P.2d 1187 (1975); Steward v. State, 436 N.E.2d 859 (Ind.App. 1982); Winter v. Peterson, 208 Neb. 785, 305 N.W.2d 803 (1981); Sentle v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa.Cmwlth. 479, 410 A.2d 903 (1980); Blow v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); State v. Berry, 165 W. Va. 783, 271 S.E.2d 776 (1980); State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis.2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980). These cases, however, seem to be premised primarily on a formal distinction between criminal and civil proceedings.
It has been consistently held that there is no constitutional or statutory right for the arrested operator to confer with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to the chemical test. Morris Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 218 Pa. Super. 347, 280 A.2d 658 (1971); Herbert v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. Commw. 28, 460 A.2d 920 (1983); Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Wroblewski, 65 Pa. Commw. 333, 442 A.2d 407 (1982); Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Herman, 49 Pa. Commw. 201, 410 A.2d 1296 (1980); Sentle v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. Commw. 479, 410 A.2d 903 (1980); Weitzel Appeal, 41 Pa. Commw. 235, 400 A.2d 646 (1979); Department of Transportation v. Cannon, 4 Pa. Commw. 119, 286 A.2d 24 (1972). Section 1547(a) provides:
Miele v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. Commw. 130, 461 A.2d 359 (1983). Just as Appellant has no right to confer with an attorney prior to making a decision whether or not to assent to an officer's request to submit to a chemical test, see e.g. Sentle v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. Commw. 479, 410 A.2d 903 (1980), he has no right to consult with a parent or other relative prior to making such a decision. Appellant's admitted failure to make a decision in response to the officers' requests constitutes a refusal under 75 Pa. C. S. § 1547.
Invariably the licensee wanted to consult his lawyer or have one present before submitting to the breathalyzer test. See Miele v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. Commw. 130, 461 A.2d 359 (1983), Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Wroblewski, 65 Pa. Commw. 333, 442 A.2d 407 (1982); Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Herman, 49 Pa. Commw. 201, 410 A.2d 1296 (1980); Sentle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 48 Pa. Commw. 479, 410 A.2d 903 (1980); Weitzel Appeal, 41 Pa. Commw. 235, 400 A.2d 646 (1979); and Department of Transportation v. Cannon, 4 Pa. Commw. 119, 286 A.2d 24 (1972). In each case, this conditioned response was construed to be a refusal which justified the suspension of a driver's license.
Weitzel Appeal, 41 Pa. Commw. 235, 236-37, 400 A.2d 646, 647 (1979). See also Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Wroblewski, 65 Pa. Commw. 333, 335, 442 A.2d 407, 408 (1982); Sentle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 48 Pa. Commw. 479, 480, 410 A.2d 903, 903 (1980). "[W]e have consistently defined a refusal as anything substantially short of an unqualified unequivocal assent to an officer's request to the arrested motorist."