Opinion
Case No. C04-03675 HRL.
November 12, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Vlasta Sekyra filed a complaint for attorneys' fees pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) against defendant Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School District. Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to attorneys' fees because she prevailed at an administrative hearing concerning her daughter. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), on the grounds that plaintiff was not a prevailing party at the hearing because any relief she obtained was insufficient to alter the legal relationship between the parties. The court heard defendant's motion on November 2, 2004. Based upon the papers submitted, and the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Congress passed the IDEA "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [FAPE] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). States that meet federal requirements and provide all qualified children with a FAPE receive federal funding to educate children with disabilities. Id. at § 1412. Participating States have an affirmative duty to identify children with disabilities (known as "child find") and provide them with special education. Id. at § 1412(a)(3). Each disabled child is entitled to an individualized education program (IEP), the development of which the child's parents have a right to participate in. Id. at § 1414(d). A parent has the right to "present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child," which the parent may opt to have heard in an impartial due process hearing. Id. at §§ 1415(b)(6) and (f)(1). In California, such hearings are administered by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO). See Cal. Educ. Code § 56500 et seq. A court has discretion to award attorneys' fees to a parent who is the "prevailing party" at an administrative proceeding. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
B. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff's daughter Alexandra Oyer (Alex) is a student in the Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School District. Alex was suffering from depression, and plaintiff was unhappy with how defendant was handling her education. She requested a due process hearing on March 31, 2004. The issues to be decided by the hearing officer were:
1) Whether, from October 2003 to the April 26, 2004 hearing date, Alex was denied a FAPE by defendant's failure a) to conduct a timely assessment for special education, and b) to find Alex eligible for special education; and
2) If defendant denied Alex a FAPE, whether she was entitled to reimbursement for tutoring costs, counseling and psychiatric therapy, and compensatory education.
The hearing officer determined that Alex was the prevailing party on Issue 1, finding her eligible for special education for the period of January 24, 2004 to April 26, 2004. The hearing officer made no findings concerning Alex's subsequent eligibility for special education. All of Alex's requests for relief, including reimbursement for tutoring costs, counseling and psychiatric therapy, and compensatory education were denied. The hearing officer held that the defendant was the prevailing party on Issue 2.
In the present motion, defendant argues that plaintiff's claim should be dismissed, as her allegations are legally insufficient to state a claim for attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415. It alleges that the hearing officer's determination that plaintiff was the prevailing party on Issue 1 did not alter the legal relationship of the parties, since plaintiff was not awarded any affirmative relief, and has no enforceable judgment against defendant.
Plaintiff responds that she has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for attorneys' fees. She alleges that a dispute arose concerning Alex's education, that a hearing was conducted, and that the hearing officer determined that she was the prevailing party on Issue 1, pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d). She disputes defendant's allegation that this finding did not change the legal status of the parties, arguing that it makes Alex eligible for future special educational services to be determined after further evaluation by the IEP team.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Dismissal can be granted only where there is a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should accept all material factual allegations as true and construe them "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). "Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Epstein v. Washington, 83 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 1996). A court ruling on a motion to dismiss should not consider any matters outside the complaint. "However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir. 1989).
B. Attorneys' Fees Under IDEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) states that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party" at an administrative hearing. Under Ninth Circuit law, "[w]hen a parent obtains affirmative relief in a proceeding brought under the IDEA, then the parent is `the prevailing party.'" Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). A parent must "`succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.'" Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). Success occurs when the outcome "results in a `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.'" Id. A legal relationship has been materially altered where "`the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.'" Fisher v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992)). However, parents are barred from recovering attorneys' fees "`where the plaintiff's success on a legal claim can be characterized as purely technical or de minimis.'" Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1498 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
In McSomebodies v. Burlingame Elementary School Dist., 897 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that prevailing parents may bring an original suit for attorneys' fees, and need not be appealing an administrative decision to recover such an award.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Documents Considered by the Court
The court will consider the decision of the hearing officer in ruling on the motion to dismiss, as it was referenced in and attached to plaintiff's complaint. See Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1555. However, the court declines to take judicial notice of Richard England et al. v. Capistrano Unified School Dist. et al., Case No. CV 02-05478 RGK (SHx) (March 17, 2003) (unpublished), as requested by defendant.
B. Motion to Dismiss
In this motion, the parties do not dispute the facts, including that the hearing officer found plaintiff to be the prevailing party on Issue 1. Rather, they dispute the legal consequences of these facts, and whether they entitle plaintiff to an award of attorneys' fees. Defendant alleges that, notwithstanding the hearing officer's finding, plaintiff's facts are insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff responds that the hearing officer's decision was sufficient to alter the legal relationship of the parties. The court must determine whether the hearing officer's finding supports plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees. In other words, the court must determine whether this finding materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.
Plaintiff first argues that the hearing officer's determination that she prevailed on Issue 1 is itself sufficient to establish that she is entitled to recover. Plaintiff cites Miller v. San Mateo-Foster City Unified School Dist., 318 F. Supp. 2d 851, 863 (N.D. Cal. 2004), in support of her position, which states that "California Education Code [section 56507(d)] simplifies the inquiry into whether a party has prevailed by requiring the [hearing officer] . . . to designate the prevailing party for each issue."
However, the court finds that the hearing officer's determination (made pursuant to section 56507(d)) does not establish that plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Nothing in Miller changes the relevant Ninth Circuit law that a plaintiff must achieve a "`material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties'" to prevail. See Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1498. In fact, Miller is consistent with Ninth Circuit law, noting that a prevailing party is one who obtains "affirmative relief," such as the tuition reimbursement awarded to the parents in that case. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 857, 863. Additionally, even section 56507 does not purport to establish the prevailing party for purposes of obtaining attorneys' fees, stating that any such award may only be made "by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (i) of Section 1415 of Title 20 of the United States Code." Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(b). Thus, the hearing officer's determination that plaintiff prevailed on Issue 1 does not establish that she is the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys' fees.
Plaintiff next argues that the hearing officer's finding that Alex was eligible for special education nonetheless materially alters the legal relationship between the parties because it obligates defendant to provide future special education services. The court finds that the facts do not support this argument. Plaintiff did not obtain any affirmative relief as a result of the hearing. See Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1498. All of her requests for relief, including reimbursement for tutoring costs, counseling and psychiatric therapy, and compensatory education, were denied.
Furthermore, the hearing officer's decision expressly limited Alex's eligibility from January 24, 2004 to April 26, 2004, stating that "Alex's prospective eligibility for special education was not an issue to be decided in [the] hearing," and that "[n]o findings are reached with regard to [her] eligibility thereafter." As a result of this limitation, the district is under no duty to provide future services, as plaintiff claims. Plaintiff is not "entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant," or otherwise "force the defendant to do something he otherwise would not have to do." Fisher, 214 F.3d at 1118.
The hearing officer based this on the fact that the district had submitted a special education assessment plan to Alex's parents in mid-March, due to the worsening of her condition, and that the "assessment had not been completed as of the date of the hearing, and thus an IEP team had not yet met to discuss the assessment information or consider eligibility." SEHO Decision at 8 and n. 8.
The court finds that the facts alleged are insufficient to establish that plaintiff was the prevailing party for purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). While the hearing officer did determine that plaintiff "prevailed" on Issue 1, plaintiff cannot establish that she obtained any affirmative relief or a judgment that materially altered the legal relationship of the parties. The finding of eligibility does not provide the level of relief necessary to materially alter the parties' legal relationship. See Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist. No. 69, 374 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004) (legal status changed where parent obtained an award of money damages); Dept. of Education v. Rodarte, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Haw. 2000) (legal relationship between parties changed where district was ordered to provide compensatory education); Noyes v. Grossmont Union High School Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1245 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (legal relationship between parent and district materially altered where district was obligated to provide counseling services and additional assessments). Any success obtained by virtue of the decision is technical and de minimis. See Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1498.
Plaintiff's argument that the finding of retroactive eligibility changed the status quo (in that it would have forced defendant to proceed with an IEP assessment), is unpersuasive, in that it ignores that the district was already in the process of assessing Alex's future eligibility for special education. The finding did not impose any additional burdens on the defendant, or force it to do something it was not already doing. Furthermore, since the assessment was proceeding at the time of the hearing, any future benefit obtained as a result of the assessment would not change this, as there would be no "causal link between the litigation brought and the outcome gained." See Parents of Student W, 31 F.3d at 1498.
IV. CONCLUSION
The facts in plaintiff's complaint are insufficient to demonstrate that the legal relationship between the parties was altered as a result of the hearing. As such, she cannot state a claim for attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). On this record there are no additional facts that plaintiff might allege which could cure the deficiency in her complaint. Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend.IT IS SO ORDERED.