Opinion
CV156057734S
01-18-2017
Richard Seeley v. Quinnipiac University, et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Sybil V. Richards, J.
This defamation action comes before the court by way of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Citing this state's longarm statute, the defendant maintains that this state has no jurisdiction over him as he is a resident of Tequesta, Florida, he has committed no activity that falls within the scope of said statute and on the ground that derivative claims arising from the underlying defamation lawsuit are excluded from said statute.
This state's longarm statute is set forth in Connecticut Gen. Statutes § 52-59b.
Background
The plaintiff, Richard Seeley, a resident of this state, was Quinnipiac University's head women's ice hockey coach from 2008 until he was terminated on April 9, 2015. Prior to his termination, Quinnipiac offered to renew the plaintiffs existing employment contract with a five-year contract for the period beginning on July 1, 2014 and ending on June 30, 2019. Under the terms of said contract, the plaintiff's annual salary would be $165,000 in the first year, subject to adjustments for merit increases each year, with a car allowance of $900 a month and an opportunity to operate a summer youth hockey camp for a compensation of $11,500 per season. On February 5, 2015, the plaintiff accepted Quinnipiac's offer. On or about April 8, 2015, officials from Quinnipiac confronted him with many allegations including allegations by a student athlete that the plaintiff yelled at her and grabbed her by her helmut's chin strap. Although the plaintiff denied any wrongdoing, he was terminated. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant. In his multi-count complaint, the plaintiff brings claims against the defendant for libel per se (count three), negligent infliction of emotional distress (count five), intentional infliction of emotional distress (count six), tortious interference with contract (count seven) and tortious interference with business expectancies (count eight). Read broadly, the plaintiff alleges that his termination resulted from oral and written communications that the defendant had with a student run, Quinnipiac television station called " Q30 Television, " which published an article entitled " Former Clarkson players accuse ex Quinnipiac coach Richard Seeley of abuse" on its website even though Clarkson, the plaintiff's previous employer, found these accusations of abuse to be unfounded during its investigation.
Shortly after filing his complaint, the plaintiff withdrew his complaint against Quinnipiac.
The defendant denied the allegations and filed the present motion to dismiss. In support of this motion, the defendant submitted his own affidavit attesting to his purported lack of substantial contact with the state of Connecticut. The plaintiff responded by filing a motion in opposition, without a counteraffidavit or any other evidence refuting the defendant's evidence, arguing that this state has personal jurisdiction over the defendant under its longarm statute and that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would not violate constitutional principles of due process. The court heard oral arguments on October 24, 2016 and considered the parties' briefs submitted in connection therewith relative to this memorandum of decision.
Discussion
The court begins by setting for the relevant rules of law. " Any defendant, wishing to contest the court's jurisdiction . . . shall do so by filing a motion to dismiss . . ." Practice Book § 10-30(b). A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 568, 877 A.2d 761 (2005). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). " [A] motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts." Golodner v. Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 826, 917 A.2d 959 (2007).
" In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis removed; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. at 651-52. " Affidavits are insufficient to determine the facts unless . . . they disclose that no genuine issue as to a material fact exists." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 651 n.14.
" A ruling on a motion to dismiss is neither a ruling on the merits of the action . . . nor a test of whether the complaint states a cause of action . . . Motions to dismiss are granted solely on jurisdictional grounds." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Villager Pond, Inc. v. Darien, 54 Conn.App. 178, 182, 734 A.2d 1031 (1999). " When a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction raises a factual question is not determinable from the face of the record, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to present evidence which will establish jurisdiction . . . Thus, once the defendant contest[s] personal jurisdiction . . . it [is] the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence adequate to establish such jurisdiction." Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 515-16, 923 A.2d 638 (2007). " If the defendant challenging the court's personal jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove the court's jurisdiction." Id., at 515, 923 A.2d 638.
I. Motion to Dismiss
At the onset, the court notes that it has considered the pleadings in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff in accordance with above-referenced legal principles in connection with the defendant's motion to dismiss. With that in mind, the court next turns its attention to the instant motion to dismiss. In reviewing Practice Book § 10-30, the court finds that the motion to dismiss was timely and properly filed. That is not a matter for dispute between the parties and, as a preliminary matter, the court also notes that it has considered the undisputed factual allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint and the affidavit submitted by the defendant in support of his motion to dismiss. The court also reiterates, purely for the sake of contextual clarity, that the plaintiff submitted no counteraffidavit with its objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss. In reviewing the defendant's affidavit, the court finds that it consists of, for the most part, mere denials. The relevant parts of the defendant's affidavit provides as follows:
" I do not, however, maintain minimum contacts with Connecticut for purposes of personal jurisdiction . . . [o]ther than the above stated communications, I have no contacts with Connecticut . . . I do not transact business in Connecticut . . . I have not committed any tortious act within Connecticut . . . I have not committed any tortious act outside Connecticut, which cause injury to any person or property within Connecticut . . . I do not solicit business in Connecticut, nor engage in any other persistent course of conduct within Connecticut . . . I do not derive substantial revenue from any goods used or consumed or services rendered in Connecticut . . . I do not derive substantial revenue from any interstate or international commerce in Connecticut . . . I do not own, use, or possess any real property situated within Connecticut . . . I do not use any computer, or computer network within Connecticut."
Thus, the court finds that the defendant's evidentiary proof on which his motion to dismiss is predicated is nothing more than an attestation of denials relating to each one of the factors that could conceivably permit the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. As such, the court finds the defendant's affidavit to be self-serving and further finds that it fails to raise any issues regarding the adequacy of the plaintiff's allegations in his complaint relating to the jurisdictional facts claimed. The court need not view affidavits containing self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations as persuasive. See 2830 Whitney Avenue Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Associates, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 563, 568, 636 A.2d 1377 (1994). The court concludes, therefore, that the defendant's affidavit is wholly insufficient to refute the plaintiff's jurisdictional claims as it simply provides the court with evidence of disputed rather than undisputed facts about the present jurisdictional controversy at bar.
II. Jurisdiction
For a court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must ensure that two conditions are met. The first condition is that the nonresident defendant's conduct and/or activity is covered by the state's longarm statute. The second condition consists of two parts, to wit: (a) whether the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant comports with fair play and substantial justice and (b) whether said exercise is reasonable under the circumstances presented. The court will address each condition in turn beginning with the first 'condition.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding the court's finding in relation to the defendant's affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss, the court will now proceed to focus initially on the matter of personal jurisdiction.
Connecticut's longarm statute, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual . . . who in person . . . (1) [t]ransacts any business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state, is such person . . . [A] regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state; or (5) uses a computer . . . or computer network . . . located within the state." Gen. Statutes § 52-59b(a).
Before the court can determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is permissible under Gen. Statutes § 52-59b(a), the court is required to perform a two-prong inquiry. " The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state [longarm] statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [nonresident defendant]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606, 674 A.2d 426 (1996). " If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [nonresident defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " As long as it creates a substantial connection with the forum state, even a single act can support jurisdiction." Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.App. 634, 639, 736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d 359 (1999).
Our Supreme Court has held that " [f]alse representations entering Connecticut by wire or mail constitute tortious conduct in Connecticut under [§ 33-929(f)(4)] . . . because the alleged misrepresentations . . . would have been made by way of communications sent to and received by [the plaintiff] from the [out-of-state] defendants in Connecticut." Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., supra, 236 Conn. at 610-11, 674 A.2d 426. This reasoning has been extended to cases involved § 52-59b. " Although in [Knipple] the court was addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction under [§ 33-929(f)(4)], it cited with approval David v. Weitzman, 677 F.Supp. 95, 98 (D.Conn. 1987), in which the District Court held that the transmission of fraudulent misrepresentations into Connecticut by mail or telephone was " tortious conduct in Connecticut sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under Connecticut's longarm statute, § § [33-929(f)(4)] and 52-59b(a)(2).'" (Emphasis in original.) Pro Performance Corporate Services, Inc. v. Goldman, 47 Conn.Supp. 476, 484, 804 A.2d 248 [32 Conn.L.Rptr. 404, ] (2002). " Even where the sole contact of the defendants with Connecticut is to send fraudulent misrepresentations into Connecticut by mail and telephone, personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasors under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a)(2) has been found." Center Capital Corp. v. Hall, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at New Britain, Docket No. CV-92-0452084-S, (June 9, 1993, Dorsey, J.T.R.). Cited by the court in Banning v. Re/Max at the Lake, kka, judicial district of New Haven, CV13-6036005-S, (December 30, 2013, Fischer, B., J.)
The undisputed facts are as follows. The plaintiff is a resident of the state of Connecticut. The defendant is not a Connecticut resident but is a resident of the state of Florida. By his own admission, the defendant attests that he engaged, in essence and to a limited degree, in certain conduct raised by the plaintiff in his complaint. More specifically, the relevant portions of the defendant's affidavit states: " On or about April 9, 2015, I left a private comment to an article published online by Q30Television.com . . . regarding the Plaintiff's resignation as women's hockey coach from Quinnipiac University . . . The comment was not displayed publicly on the website . . . On or about April 9, 2015 at approximately 10:02 p.m., I placed a telephone call to Quinnipiac University's athletic department, expressing my satisfaction with the Plaintiff's resignation . . . The only other contact I have had with Connecticut was via telephone and e-mail with a Quinnipiac University Student Journalist . . . who was conducting research for a news story about the Plaintiff, after he resigned."
(1) Libel Per Se
In reviewing the state's longarm statute, particularly subsection (2) and applying the provision set forth in said subsection to count three of the plaintiff's amended complaint, in which he alleges libel per se, it is obvious that said defamation allegation cannot serve as the basis for the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in this action. Consequently, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss as to count three (libel per se) of the plaintiff's amended complaint.
(2) Negligence and Tort Claims
Next, the court further applies Gen. Statutes § 52-59b to the remaining counts five (negligent infliction of emotional distress), six (intentional infliction of emotional distress), seven (tortious interference with contract) and eight (tortious interference with business expectancies).
" When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction . . . [t]he trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenny v. Banks, 289 Conn. 529, 533, 958 A.2d 750 (2008).
Given that the defendant simply argued that the so-called derivative defamation claims related to a defamation lawsuit cannot be the grounds for the court's exercising personal jurisdiction under the state's longarm statute, absent sufficient legal principles to support his position and in light of the fact that § 52-59b does not expressly exclude such so-called derivative claims, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss relating to these counts. Moreover, the court notes that said remaining counts sound in negligence and tort and not defamation as maintained by the defendant and said remaining counts are wholly unrelated to the plaintiff's defamation count in his complaint.
B. Due Process
" The due process clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has held that the test to be applied in considering the reach of personal jurisdiction is whether (1) the nonresident party has created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction based on those minimum contacts would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 111-12, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). As long as it creates a substantial connection with the forum state, even a single act can support jurisdiction. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).' Cashman v. Cashman, 41 Conn.App. 382, 389, 676 A.2d 427 (1996)." Tri-State Tank Corp. v. Higganum Heating, Inc., 45 Conn.App. 798, 802-03, 699 A.2d 201 (1997).
" The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components: the 'minimum contacts' inquiry and the 'reasonableness' inquiry. The court must first determine whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . For purposes of this initial inquiry, a distinction is made between 'specific' jurisdiction and 'general' jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.App. 634, 639, 736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d 359 (1999). " A state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has 'purposefully directed' [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] result[ed] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 288, 661 A.2d 595 (1995). " The second stage of the due process inquiry asks whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice--that is, whether it is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case . . . The Supreme Court has held that the court must evaluate the following factors as part of this reasonableness analysis: (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Panganiban v. Panganiban, supra, 54 Conn.App. at 640, 736 A.2d 190. " [W]hile the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 525, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).
" As articulated in the seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the constitutional due process standard requires that, 'in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' . . . In other words, [t]he [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations . . . By requiring that individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign . . . the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit . . . 'The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components: the 'minimum contacts' inquiry and the 'reasonableness' inquiry. The court must first determine whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . See [ International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316]. " Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CECO Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d.Cir., 1996)."
" For the purposes of this initial inquiry, the Supreme Court of the United States has articulated, and this court has recognized, two types of personal jurisdiction. 'Either specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction can satisfy the constitutional requirement of sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum. A state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] result[ed] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities . . . Whether a given defendant has contacts with the forum state sufficient to satisfy due process is dependent upon the facts of the particular case. 'Like any standard that requires a determination of reasonableness, the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite affiliating circumstances are present." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. at 524-25.
" A key component of the minimum contacts analysis is the concept of foreseeability; that is, whether a potential defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. . . . Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. at 529. Although there is no bright-line test, it is clear that the unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Id., at 530. Instead, the nonresident defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. Id. This requirement prevents the exercise of jurisdiction predicated solely upon random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts which the forum state. Id. Nevertheless, a single transaction can give rise to jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or corporation . . . New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 745, 36 A.3d 224 (2012) (referencing § 52-59b(a)(1)).
" Due process demands more, however, than the existence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Once minimum contacts have been established', [t]he second stage of the due process inquiry asks whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'--that is, whether it is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case . . . [Therefore] [w]hile the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents 'a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. at 525. The Supreme Court has held that the court must evaluate the following factors as part of this reasonableness analysis: (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.App. 634, 640, 736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d 359 (1999), quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CECO Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006, 117 S.Ct. 508, 136 L.Ed.2d 398 (1996).
While the plaintiffs have the burden of proof with respect to the court's jurisdiction, under the " fairness" test of the due process inquiry " [t]he burden is on the defendant to prove a compelling case that personal jurisdiction is unreasonable under the circumstances." Broad. Mktg. Int'l, Ltd. v. Prosource Sales & Mktg., Inc. 345 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1063 (D.Conn. 2004). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CECO Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006, 117 S.Ct. 508, 136 L.Ed.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1996) (" While the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable" (Internal quotation marks omitted).
In completing its analysis regarding the first prong of the two-part jurisdiction test as it pertains to personal jurisdiction, the court will next apply the due process principles referenced above to the present facts. Again, in giving consideration of the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, the court has to now determine whether the actions of the defendant created a substantial connection in Connecticut by way of his oral and written communications with Q30. The court finds that defendant attested in his affidavit that he participated in communications with Q30. There is no evidence in the record that said communications were not voluntary or of his own accord. Rather, the evidence reflects that the defendant initiated his oral and written interactions with Q30. He admits that he sent Q30 a " private comment" and had an interview with Q30 in which he expressed his satisfaction with Quinnipiac's termination of the plaintiff. The defendant admits, too, that he shared information about Clarkson's investigation into similar allegations about the plaintiff when he was an employee of Clarkson. The court finds that the defendant's purposeful actions regarding alleged defamatory comments about the plaintiff's purported prior actions while at Clarkson was directed to this state and that this minimal conduct constitutes a sufficient basis to create a substantial connection to this state regardless of the paucity of said contacts.
The court next finds that it would not offend the constitutional notions of reasonableness and fairness because the defendant should have anticipated, from the very nature of his purposeful actions aimed at a resident of this state, that a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff may ensue. The court is not persuaded, from the evidence presented by the defendant in his affidavit, that the defendant could have reasonably expected a different outcome and further could not have foreseen the plaintiff's filing of the current suit against him or being haled into Connecticut for the resolution of the plaintiff's claims when the defendant's communications were directed toward a Connecticut resident. By virtue of his purposeful activities, the defendant created the requisite type of minimum contacts necessary for the court to assert jurisdiction over him without unreasonably impinging on the defendant's constitutional rights. Under the circumstances presented in this case, the court finds that the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant had established sufficient minimum contacts with this state by virtue of the defendant's communications with Q30 about the plaintiff. The court rejects the defendant's contentions, in his motion, that " . . . defending a suit in a state with which Bills has had little to no ties" and " [he should not] be put to the costs and burden of long distance litigation to defend . . . tortious interference claims, " and does not find this argument, in and of itself, be compelling. The court further finds that the defendant did not show that the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unduly burdensome on him as to violate due process considerations.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendant's motion to dismiss as follows: The court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss as to count three and denies the defendant's motion to dismiss as to counts five, six, seven and eight as the court concludes that the plaintiff's allegations were adequate enough to survive the defendant's jurisdictional challenge without the need for a counteraffidavit. The court also concludes that it would not violate the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice in exercising personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant given the state's interest in adjudicating the allegations raised in the plaintiff's complaint.