Opinion
CASE NO. 20-61006-CIV-DIMITROULEAS
2021-08-13
SECURITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. GLADSTONE LAW GROUP, P.A.; Rashida Mosi Overby; Rodolfo Rodriguez; and Maria Graciella Rodriguez, Defendants.
Daniel Michael Hirschman, James Miller Kaplan, Kaplan Zeena LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Joseph Peter Klock, Jr., Rasco Klock Perez Nieto, Coral Gables, FL, Ria Sankar Balram, Ria Balram Law Group, PLLC, Margate, FL, for Defendant Rashida Mosi Overby 2555 Ponce de Leon Blvd Ste 600 Coral Gables, FL 33134. Amado A. Alvarez, Alvarez & Alvarez-Zane, Miami, FL, for Defendants Rodolfo Rodriguez, Maria Graciella Rodriguez.
Daniel Michael Hirschman, James Miller Kaplan, Kaplan Zeena LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Joseph Peter Klock, Jr., Rasco Klock Perez Nieto, Coral Gables, FL, Ria Sankar Balram, Ria Balram Law Group, PLLC, Margate, FL, for Defendant Rashida Mosi Overby 2555 Ponce de Leon Blvd Ste 600 Coral Gables, FL 33134.
Amado A. Alvarez, Alvarez & Alvarez-Zane, Miami, FL, for Defendants Rodolfo Rodriguez, Maria Graciella Rodriguez.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS, United States District Judge
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff, Security National Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Defendant, Rashida Mosi Overby ("Overby"), (the "Motion") [DE 45] and Statement of Material Facts in Support (the "Statement") [DE 44], filed herein on May 28, 2021. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, pro se Defendant Rashida Mosi Overby ("Defendant" or "Overby")’s Response [DE 48] and Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts [DE 49], Plaintiff's Reply [DE 51], the exhibits and affidavits filed in the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
I. Background
This insurance coverage action arises out of a lawsuit captioned Rodolfo Rodriguez, et al. v. Globality Partners Corp., et al. , Case No. CACE 16-019583, 2016 WL 6442427, which was filed on October 25, 2016 in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida (the "Underlying Action"). On March 5, 2020, Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez filed the operative complaint in the Underlying Action. See [DE 1-2].
In the operative complaint in the Underlying Action, Rodolfo Rodriguez ("Mr. Rodgriguez") and Maria Graciella Rodriguez ("Mrs. Rodriguez") (collectively, "the Rodriguezes") allege that they fell behind on their home mortgage payments and that on October 3, 2011, a foreclosure action was filed by their mortgage lender against them in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, captioned Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, U.S. Bank National Association v. Rodolfo Rodriguez, et al. (the "Foreclosure Action"). See [DE 1-2] at ¶ 14. Defendants Overby and Gladstone Law Group, P.A. ("Gladstone") , represented the lender in the Foreclosure Action. See id. at ¶16.
Gladstone was dismissed as a Defendant from this federal court declaratory action on March 3, 2021 pursuant to a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal. See [DE's 40, 41].
On August 24, 2015, in the Foreclosure Action, the court denied a motion filed by the Rodriguezes for rehearing on their objections to the foreclosure sale of their home. ¶15. Overby attended the hearing on behalf of the mortgage lender against the Rodriguezes. ¶16. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, Mrs. Rodriguez pleaded with Overby to stop the sale in the Foreclosure Action, saying that for years the Rodriguezes had attempted to modify their mortgage and the lender had refused to cooperate with same. ¶17. In response to Mrs. Rodriguez's pleas, Overby gave Mrs. Rodriguez her business card, which identified her as an attorney at Gladstone, and referred Mrs. Rodriguez to Peter Carey ("Carey"), assuring Mrs. Rodriguez that Carey could help her buy back her home. ¶¶19-21. Carey advised Mr. Rodriguez to appeal the order denying the objections to the sale in the Foreclosure Action. ¶24. In order to appeal the order, Carey gave Mr. Rodriguez a completed notice of appeal form, which Mr. Rodriguez signed and filed with the court in attempt to stop and delay the proceedings in the Foreclosure action. ¶¶25-27.
On November 24, 2015, the Rodriguezes met with Carey and Overby, and during this alleged meeting, Carey and Overby advised them that Overby would assist them in stopping the sale of their home in the Foreclosure Action. ¶¶38, 39, 41. Carey and Overby instructed the Rodriguezes that they were not to tell anyone about Overby's involvement in the negotiations and the preparation of all the legal documents. ¶41.
On December 2, 2015, the appellate court dismissed the appeal in the Foreclosure Action. ¶50. In response to the appeal's dismissal, Carey advised Rodriguez that it was okay because the appeal (during the time it was pending) allowed Carey the necessary additional time needed to proceed with the buy-back efforts of the Rodriguez home. ¶51.
On December 26, 2015, the Rodriguezes won a large cash prize through one of the state-approved lotteries, receiving a net amount of $182,770.81. ¶¶53, 55. After receiving this news, Carey requested that the Rodriguezes give him the lottery winnings to show the bank that the Rodriguezes could afford to buy back their home. ¶56. The Rodriguezes agreed to do so, giving Carey a check in the amount of $150,000 on December 30, 2015. ¶57. Overby was aware of this transaction. ¶57.
On September 21, 2016, the Rodriguezes were served with a Writ of Possession, which had been issued by the Clerk of Court that day, together with a 24 Hour Final Notice of Eviction. ¶69. Upon receipt of the final notice, the Rodriguezes contacted Carey, who advised them that the buy-back process was ongoing. ¶¶70-71. When the Rodriguezes asked Carey whether their funds were used to effectuate the buy-back, Mr. Carey was non-responsive and refused to provide an accounting of their funds, saying only that they had been invested. ¶¶75-76. Letters from the Rodriguezes to Overby and to Carey inquiring about the buy-back efforts and the money they paid went unanswered. ¶¶80-82.
In the operative complaint in the Underlying Action, the Rodriguezes allege that the purported buy-back of their home was a scheme orchestrated by Carey and Overby with the intent to defraud the Rodriguezes of their funds and that Overby and Carey blatantly stole the Rodriguezes’ money that was tendered for the purpose buy-back of their home. ¶¶83, 88. The operative complaint in the Underlying Action alleges claims against Overby for Fraud in the Inducement (Count VI); Negligent Misrepresentation (Count X); Civil Conspiracy to commit fraud and deprive the Rodriguezes of their funds (Count XIII); and Civil Theft (Count XVI). See [DE 1-2]. The operative complaint in the Underlying Action seeks the entry of a judgment against Overby for: (1) Damages, (2) Treble Damages, (3) Interest, (4) Court Costs, and (5) any further relief that the court deems just and proper. See [DE 1-2].
On May 21, 2020, Security National commenced this declaratory judgment action against Overby and Gladstone , requesting that this Court issue declarations that Security National has no obligation to defend or indemnify Overby and/or Gladstone in the Underlying Action under the Security National Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy issued to Gladstone for the policy period of March 21, 2016 to March 21, 2017 (the "Policy"). See [DE 1] ; [DE 1-3]. The Policy's Prior and Pending Litigation Date is March 21, 2015. See [DE 1-3].
On March 26, 2021, the parties stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of Gladstone with prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs, expenses, and legal fees. See [DE 40]. On March 29, 2021, the Court entered an Order approving the dismissal with prejudice of Gladstone from this action. See [DE 41].
Security National also included the Rodriguezes as defendants in this declaratory action in order to bind them to the result. See [DE 1].
The Policy contains an insuring agreement that provides, in relevant part, as follows:
I. INSURING AGREEMENT
A. The Company shall pay Damages and Claim Expenses, in excess of the Self-Insured Retention identified in the Declarations, if applicable, and subject to the Policy's Limit of Liability, that the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as a result of a Claim made against the Insured for a Wrongful Act, provided that (i) the Claim is first made against the Insured and reported to the Company, in writing, during the Policy Period or the Extended Reporting Period, if applicable; (ii) the Insured has no knowledge of such Wrongful Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy; and (iii) such Wrongful Act took place on or after the Retroactive Date set forth in the Declarations Page of this Policy and prior to the end of the Policy Period.
See [DE 1-3], Policy Form AES PL 005 01 14.
The Policy defines a "Claim" in relevant part as:
A written demand received by the Insured for monetary Damages which alleges a Wrongful Act, including:
1. the service of suit or any civil proceeding in a court of law or equity including any appeal therefrom, which is commenced by the filing of a complaint, motion for judgment, or similar proceeding;
2. institution of arbitration, mediation or other formal alternative dispute resolution proceeding;
3. any written request to toll or waive a statute of limitations.
See [DE 1-3], Policy Form AES PL 005 01 14.
The Policy defines an "Insured" in relevant part as:
1. the Named Insured and any Predecessor Firm designated in the Declarations;
2. any individual or professional corporation who is or becomes a partner, officer, director, stockholder, per diem attorney, independent contract attorney, or employee of the Named Insured, but solely while acting within the scope of their duties as such on behalf of the Named Insured in rendering Professional Services;
3. any individual or professional corporation who was a partner, officer, director, stockholder, per diem attorney, independent contract attorney, or employee of the Name Insured, but solely while acting within the scope of their duties as such on behalf of the Named Insured in rendering Professional Services;
4. any individual or professional corporation designated "counsel" or "of counsel" to the Named Insured, but solely while acting within the scope of their duties as such on behalf of the Named Insured for which a fee insures to the Named Insured;
See [DE 1-3], Policy Form AES PL 005 01 14.
The Policy defines "Professional Services" to mean services:
1. provided by any Insured to others as a lawyer, mediator, arbitrator or notary public but solely for services on behalf of the Named Insured or Predecessor Firm designated in the Declarations; or
2. performed by any Insured as an administrator, conservator, receiver, executor, guardian, trustee, or in any other fiduciary capacity, but only if the act or omission in dispute is in the rendering of services ordinarily performed as a lawyer an then only to the extent that such services are on behalf of and insure to the benefit of the Named Insured, or any Predecessor Firm designated in the Declarations.
See [DE 1-3], Policy Form AES PL 005 01 14.
The Policy contains certain exclusions to insurance coverage that provide, in relevant part, as follows:
III. EXCLUSIONS
This policy does not apply to any Damages or Claim Expenses incurred with respect to any Claim:
A. based upon or arising out of any actual or alleged dishonest, criminal, intentional, malicious or fraudulent act, error or omission or any willful violation of any statute or regulation by an Insured, if a final adjudication adverse to such Insured establishes such a dishonest, criminal, intentional, malicious or fraudulent act, error or omission or willful violation.
...
C. based upon or arising out of any written demand, litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing brought prior to or pending as of the Prior and Pending Litigation Date as stated in the Declarations as well as any future litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing based upon any such pending or prior litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing or derived from the same or similar essential facts or circumstances underlying or alleged in any such pending or prior litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing.
...
F. based upon or arising out of any gaining by the Insured of any profit, remuneration or advantage to which such Insured was not legally entitled, including the disgorgement of any such profit, remuneration or financial advantage by the Insured, if a final adjudication adverse to such Insured establishes such conduct.
See [DE 1-3], Policy Form AES PL 005 01 14.
On November 21, 2016, Gladstone tendered the claims made by the Rodriguezes to Security National for coverage under the Policy. PSOF ¶ 39; DSOF ¶ 39. On November 23, 2016, Security National acknowledged receipt of the tendered claims, advising Gladstone that it was investigating the claims and reserving all of its rights under the Policy. PSOF ¶ 40; DSOF ¶ 40. On December 21, 2016, Security National agreed to defend Gladstone and Overby against the claims under a reservation of rights, specifically reserving the right to disclaim coverage and to file a declaratory judgment action to determine its duties of defense and indemnity under the Policy. PSOF ¶ 41; DSOF ¶ 41. On April 7, 2020, Security National issued an updated reservation of rights to Gladstone and Overby, which supplemented the previous reservation of rights, reserving the right to disclaim coverage and to file a declaratory judgment action to determine its duties of defense and indemnity under the Policy. PSOF ¶ 42; DSOF ¶ 42.
Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts [DE 44] and Defendant Rashida Overby's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts [DE 49] include various citations to portions of the record. Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts [DE 44] is cited as "PSOF and Defendant Rashida Overby's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts [DE 49] is cited as "DSOF." Any citations herein to the statement of facts, response, and reply thereto should be construed as incorporating those citations to the record.
On March 26, 2021, the parties stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of Gladstone from this action with prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs, expenses, and legal fees. PSOF ¶ 43; DSOF ¶ 43; see also [DE 40]. On March 29, 2021, the Court entered an Order approving the stipulation of dismissal. PSOF ¶ 43; DSOF ¶ 43; see also [DE 41]. Security National has defended Overby against the claims made by the Rodriguezes under a reservation of rights. PSOF ¶ 44; DSOF ¶ 44. Security National has never waived its right to disclaim coverage for the claims made by the Rodriguezes or to file a declaratory judgment action to determine its duties of defense and indemnity under the Policy. PSOF ¶ 45; DSOF ¶ 45.
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears "the stringent burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Sauve v. Lamberti , 597 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ).
"A fact is material for the purposes of summary judgment only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Kerr v. McDonald's Corp. , 427 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, "[a]n issue [of material fact] is not ‘genuine’ if it is unsupported by the evidence or is created by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative.’ " Flamingo S. Beach I Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Southeast , 492 F. App'x 16, 26 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party." Id. at 26-27 (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Accordingly, if the moving party shows "that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party" then "it is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, comes forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Rich v. Sec'y, Fla. Dept. of Corr. , 716 F.3d 525, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
"It is well settled that an insurer's duty to defend its insured against a legal action arises when the complaint alleges facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage." Jones v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. , 908 So. 2d 435, 442–43 (Fla. 2005). "The duty to defend must be determined from the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 443. "Although the alleged facts may fall within the coverage of the policy, if the face of the complaint shows the applicability of an exclusion, the insurer has no duty to defend." O'Rear v. Greenwich Ins. Co. , No. 8:09-CV-1903-T-26TGW, 2010 WL 4867527, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2010), aff'd , 432 F. App'x 877 (11th Cir. 2011). "Where the application of one or more policy exclusions applies to the face of the complaint, no duty to defend exists, even if the complaint alleges facts that would otherwise give rise to a covered claim." Id. (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Northland Ins. Co. , 31 So.3d 214, 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). Furthermore, "a finding of no duty defend, as a matter of Florida law, necessarily includes a finding of no duty to indemnify." Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. , 32 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1230 & n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. , 657 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2011) ).
When interpreting insurances contracts, under Florida law, the contract is construed according to its "plain meaning." Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co. , 511 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2008). The insurance contract is ambiguous if its language lends itself to more than one interpretation. Id. "Ambiguous policy provisions ... should be construed liberally in favor of coverage of the insured and strictly against the insurer." Dickson v. Econ. Premier Assur. Co. , 36 So. 3d 789, 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Furthermore, ambiguous "exclusionary clauses are construed even more strictly against the insurer than coverage clauses." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson , 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). However, "strict construction does not mean ... that clear words may be tortured into uncertainty so that new meanings can be added." State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. , 678 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), on reh'g (Aug. 20, 1996), approved, 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998). "Only when a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning remains after resort to the ordinary rules of construction is the rule apposite." Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store , 369 So. 2d 938, 942 (Fla. 1979).
Plaintiff Security National seeks the entry of summary judgment on Counts I and II of the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Overby, requesting that the Court issue a declaration that Security National has no duty to defend or indemnify Overby in the Underlying Action under the Policy issued to Gladstone for each of the following separate and independent reasons: (1) Overby is not an "Insured" under the insurance policy; (2) the claims against Overby do not arise out of services performed by her on behalf of Gladstone; (3) the Rodriguezes allege claims against Overby that are based upon and arise out of the Foreclosure Action which was filed on October 3, 2011, and remained pending through December 2, 2015 and therefore coverage is excluded under Exclusion C of the insurance policy, which has a Prior and Pending Litigation date of March 21, 2015; and (4) the claims against Overby seek damages that are not covered under the insurance policy. Upon careful consideration, the Court finds merit in, at a minimum, Plaintiff's second and third arguments. Moreover, each of these is independently sufficient grounds to grant Plaintiff's summary judgment motion and determine that Plaintiff has no duty to defend or indemnify Overby in the Underlying Action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
Plaintiff argues that the Rodriguezes’ claims against Overby in the Underlying Action do not arise out of services performed by her on behalf of Gladstone. The Court agrees. The Policy provides, in pertinent part, that Plaintiff shall pay Damages on behalf of the Insured resulting from any Claim first made against the Insured and reported to Security National in writing during the Policy Period for any "Wrongful Act" committed on or after the Retroactive Date and before the Policy terminates. The Policy defines the term "Wrongful Act" to mean in relevant part as any actual or alleged negligent act, error, or omission committed or attempted in the rendering or failing to render Professional Services. The Policy defines the term "Professional Services" to mean in relevant part the services provided by an Insured to others as a lawyer on behalf of Gladstone. Here, Overby argues that, under the allegations in the operative complaint in the Underlying Action, she rendered services as a lawyer on behalf of Gladstone to the Rodriguezes during her employment at Gladstone by referring the Rodriguezes to Carey in attempt to save their home. However, pursuant to the allegations in the Underlying Action, any legal service that Overby may have rendered to the Rodriguezes during her employment at Gladstone would not have been rendered on behalf of Gladstone, who was the representing the mortgage lender, the direct adversary of the Rodriguezes in the Foreclosure Action. To the contrary, Overby would have been rendering legal services to the Rodriguezes to the detriment of Gladstone and its client, the mortgage lender, who were seeking to prosecute the Foreclosure Action, not to derail it. Accordingly, construing the Policy, the insurance contract at issue, according to its "plain meaning," see Mills , 511 F.3d at 1304, the allegations in the operative complaint in the Underlying Action do not allege facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within coverage of the Policy. See Jones , 908 So. 2d at 442–43. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to summary judgment in the instant declaratory judgment action.
In the alternative or in addition, Plaintiff argues that the Underlying Action arises out of the Foreclosure Action and, thus, the claims against Overby are excluded from coverage under Exclusion C of the Policy, which excludes coverage for any Claim that is "based upon or arising out of any written demand, litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing brought prior to or pending as of the Prior and Pending Litigation Date [of March 21, 2015] as stated in the Declarations as well as any future litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing based upon any such pending or prior litigation, proceeding, administrative action or derived from the same or similar essential facts or circumstances underlying or alleged in any such pending or prior litigation, proceeding, administrative action or hearing." In her Response [DE 48], Overby fails to address, much less to refute, this argument, thereby abandoning any opposition to it. See, e.g., Emrit v. Universal Music Grp. , No. 8:19-CV-2562-T-33SPF, 2020 WL 4751446, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020), aff'd , 833 F. App'x 333 (11th Cir. 2021) ("[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.") (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Exclusion C of the Policy operates to exclude from coverage the operative complaint filed against Overby in the Underlying Action. The Court must begin its analysis with the plain language of the insurance policy. See Mills , 511 F.3d at 1304. Exclusion C's plain language states that no coverage is provided for claims "based upon or arising out of" any litigation brought prior to or pending as of March 21, 2015. Although ambiguous terms are to be construed in favor of the insured, these terms are not ambiguous. Under Florida law, the insurance policy terms "arising out of" is "unambiguous and should be broadly interpreted." Falcon Trust Group, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. , 725 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2010). "The term ‘arising out of’ is broader in meaning than the term ‘caused by’ and means ‘originating from,’ ‘having its origin in,’ ‘growing out of,’ ‘flowing from,’ ‘incident to’ or ‘having a connection with.’ " Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. , 913 So. 2d 528, 539 (Fla. 2005). As such, the Complaint in the Underlying Action arises out of the Foreclosure Action, which was pending prior to the Policy's Prior and Pending Litigation Date of March 21, 2015. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in Exclusion C supports Plaintiff's denial of coverage to Overby for the Underlying Action. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to summary judgment in the instant declaratory judgment action.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment in this matter that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Overby in the Underlying Action. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 45] is GRANTED ;
2. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), the Court will enter a separate final judgment;
3. Based on the rulings herein, Defendant Overby's Motion seeking to stay the trial pending the conclusion of her criminal matter [DE 67] is DENIED AS MOOT .
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Ft. Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 13th day of August, 2021.