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noting that interlocutory appeals exist primarily to enable courts of appeals to rale on "ephemeral questions of law that might disappear in the light of a complete and final record" or to "avoid protracted litigation"
Summary of this case from Green v. Humana At Home, Inc.Opinion
No. 11 Civ. 9645 (RJS)
08-05-2013
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. ELEK STRAUB, et al., Defendants.
The SEC is represented by Jeffrey Thomas Infelise, Kara Novaco Brockmeyer, and Robert Irving Dodge, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, District of Columbia 20549. Elek Straub is represented by Robert B. Buehler, Heller Ehrman, LLP, 7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036, Amanda Grier, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom LLP, 1440 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20005; Carl S. Rauh, Hogan Lovells LLP, 555 Thirteenth Street, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20004; and Lisa J. Fried, Hogan Lovells LLP, 875 Third Avenue. New York, New York 10022. Andras Balogh is represented by John A. McMillan and William Michael Sullivan, Jr., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20037. Tamas Morvai is represented by Michael Louis Koenig and Victoria Pauline Lane, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 54 State Street, Albany, New York 12207.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER :
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") brings this action against Defendants Elek Straub, Andras Balogh, and Tamas Morvai (collectively, "Defendants") - executives of the Hungarian company Magyar Telekom, Plc. ("Magyar") - arising out of alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the "FCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. On November 5, 2012, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the Complaint, which the Court denied in an Order dated February 8, 2013 (the "Order"). Now before the Court is Defendants' joint motion (the "Motion") requesting that the Court certify an interlocutory appeal of its Order. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendants' Motion in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts alleged in the Complaint, which are set forth more fully in the Order. Therefore, only a brief summary of the facts is provided here. In connection with the instant Motion, the Court also considers Defendants' opening brief ("Mem."), the SEC's opposition brief ("Opp'n"), and Defendants' reply brief ("Reply").
The SEC alleges that Defendants, who are all Hungarian citizens believed to be residing in Hungary, engaged in two related schemes involving the bribery of public officials in Macedonia and Montenegro. Thereafter, Defendants allegedly covered up these schemes by making false entries in Magyar's records. Since Magyar's securities were publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange and thus registered with the SEC, Defendants, as executives of Magyar, were required to make certifications to the company's auditors regarding the accuracy of the company's financial statements and the adequacy of its internal controls. The Complaint alleges that Defendants falsified these certifications in order to cover up the bribery schemes.
The SEC filed the Complaint in this action on December 29, 2011, bringing claims for: (1) bribery under the FCPA, (2) aiding and abetting bribery under the FCPA, (3) aiding and abetting Magyar's violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), which require issuers to maintain accurate books and records and a sufficient system of internal accounting controls, (4) falsifying books and records in violation of Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1, and (5) making false or misleading statements to an auditor or accountant in violation of Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2. (Doc. No. 1.)
On November 5, 2012, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants; (2) the SEC's claims are time barred; and (3) the Complaint fails to state a claim for the bribery-related causes of action because it lacks sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendants intended to use an instrumentality of interstate commerce, as required by the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). (Doc. No. 36.) The Court's Order denied the motion in full. First, the Court held that "the SEC has met its burden of proving a prima facie case of jurisdiction . . . [because] the Defendants here allegedly engaged in conduct that was designed to violate United States securities regulations and was thus necessarily directed toward the United States, even if not principally directed there." (Order at 8.) Second, the Court found that the statute of limitations provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 has not yet expired because Defendants were not physically located within the United States during the limitations period, and thus were never "found" within the United States. (Id. at 12-14.) Third, the Court found that Defendants' use of the Internet to send emails in furtherance of the bribery scheme was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of the FCPA. (Id. at 15-17.)
Defendants' motion also sought dismissal of certain other causes of action due to an alleged failure to state a claim, which the Court also denied. Because Defendants do not seek an interlocutory appeal of the Court's decision on these issues, they are not discussed here.
The statute provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon." 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (emphasis added).
Defendants have now filed a Motion for the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, to certify its Order for interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and to stay this action pending the appeal. (Doc. No. 62.) Defendants argue that each of the three issues presented in their joint motion to dismiss and decided in the Order meets the criteria for certification set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and that the Court should therefore grant its Motion. The Court disagrees.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Litigants are generally required to wait for a final judgment before they may appeal. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990). However, a district court may certify an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order if the court finds that the order (1) "involves a controlling question of law" (2) "as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and (3) "that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
A question of law is "controlling" if "reversal of the district court's order would terminate the action." SPL Shipping Ltd. v. Gujarat Cheminex Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15375 (KMK), 2007 WL 1119753, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2007) (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24); see also S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 103 F. Supp. 2d 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("In determining whether a controlling question of law exists[,] the district court should consider whether: reversal of the district court's opinion could result in dismissal of the action; reversal of the district court's opinion, even though not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action, or; the certified issue has precedential value for a large number of cases.") (citing Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24-25, and In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 51, 54-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). As for the second criterion, "[f]or there to be a 'substantial ground for difference of opinion' under the law . . . there must be 'substantial doubt' that the district court's order was correct." SPL Shipping Ltd., 2007 WL 1119753, at *2 (quoting N.F.L. Ins. v. B & B Holdings, No. 91 Civ. 8580 (PKL), 1993 WL 255101, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1993). The third criterion is primarily concerned with judicial efficiency and is the "most important" of the three factors. S.E.C. v. Gruss, No. 11 Civ. 2420 (RWS), 2012 WL 3306166, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2012). Thus, "it is not enough that the interlocutory appeal would not delay the action; it must advance the time for trial or . . . shorten the time required for trial." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). These three criteria are "conjunctive, not disjunctive," and courts may only certify an interlocutory appeal where all three are satisfied. Id. at *1 (quotations and citations omitted).
"[D]istrict court judges have broad discretion to deny certification even where the statutory criteria are met." Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 369, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted); see also SPL Shipping Ltd., 2007 WL 1119753, at *1 (quoting Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 139, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the authority to deny certification, even where the three statutory criteria are met, is "independent" and "unreviewable")) (additional citation omitted). Indeed, "only exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment." Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 25 (quotations and citation omitted). The Second Circuit has noted that "Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) primarily to ensure that the courts of appeals would be able to 'rule on . . . ephemeral question[s] of law that m[ight] disappear in the light of a complete and final record.'" Weber v. U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, interlocutory appeal is "'a rare exception' where, in the discretion of the district judge, it 'may avoid protracted litigation.'" In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d 134, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Koehler, 101 F.3d at 865-66 (2d Cir. 1996)). Consequently, "federal practice strongly disfavors discretionary interlocutory appeals [as they] prolong judicial proceedings, add delay and expense to litigants, burden appellate courts, and present issues for decisions on uncertain and incomplete records, tending to weaken the precedential value of judicial opinions." In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Defendants argue that the Court's ruling on personal jurisdiction satisfies the three criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and that certification of an interlocutory appeal of that determination is therefore appropriate. Even assuming that the Court's decision on personal jurisdiction constitutes a controlling issue of law, Defendants have not demonstrated that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists on this issue or that an interlocutory appeal is likely to result in reversal by the Second Circuit and thus termination of this litigation.
The SEC challenges Defendants' assertion that there is a controlling issue of law concerning personal jurisdiction that can be appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that it is a mixed question of law and fact and therefore not ripe for interlocutory appeal. This depends somewhat on the precise question that the Court would certify. However, because the Court finds that no question that the Court could certify concerning personal jurisdiction would satisfy all three elements of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court need not resolve this issue.
Defendants do not argue that the Order's ruling on this issue is necessarily incorrect, but do insist that there exist "substantial differences of opinion regarding the reach of personal jurisdiction." (Reply at 4.) In support of this contention, Defendants first note that the Court's Order goes beyond that of any prior court in expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction, stating that no other court "had ever held that personal jurisdiction exists in an FCPA action over foreign defendants whose sole contact with the United States involved signing allegedly false management certifications and sub-certifications." (Mem. at 2.) Defendants also point to a recent decision in this district, S.E.C. v. Sharef, No. 11 Civ. 9073 (SAS), 2013 WL 603135 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013), which they characterize as presenting "substantially similar circumstances to those presented here" but reaching a different outcome. (Mem. at 7.) The Court does not find these points persuasive.
The Court disagrees that its Order broke new ground. Defendants made a similar claim in connection with their joint motion to dismiss, and the Order specifically addressed this argument by citing no less than five opinions in which a district court exercised personal jurisdiction over an auditor or corporate executive based on false or misleading financial statements. (Order at 9.) Thus, Defendants' insistence that neither the Second Circuit nor Supreme Court has applied the "minimum contacts" test to facts analogous to those alleged here is clearly not sufficient to render this "jurisdictional issue a question with substantial ground for difference of opinion." (Mem. at 8-9, n.6.)
Defendants also make much of the fact that, just weeks after the Court's Order, Judge Scheindlin granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant allegedly engaged in covering up a bribery scheme. Sharef, 2013 WL 603135. However, the Court does not find any tension between the decision in Sharef and its Order. In Sharef, Judge Scheindlin acknowledged that "there is ample (and growing) support in case law for the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals who played a role in falsifying or manipulating financial statements relied upon by U.S. investors in order to cover up illegal actions directed entirely at a foreign jurisdiction." Id. at *4-5 (citing three such cases and also the Order in this case). In finding personal jurisdiction to be lacking, Judge Scheindlin did not buck this trend, but rather found the facts before her to be distinguishable from these other cases. As Judge Scheindlin explained, the defendants in the Straub case "orchestrated a bribery scheme aimed at the Macedonian government, and as part of the bribery scheme signed off on misleading management representations to the company's auditors and signed false SEC filings." Id. at *5 (emphasis in original). By contrast, in Sharef, "[t]he SEC [did] not allege that [the defendant] directed, ordered or even had awareness of the cover ups that occurred at [the company] much less that he had any involvement in the falsification of SEC filings in furtherance of those cover ups. Nor is it alleged that his position as Group President of [the company] would have made him aware of, let alone involved in falsification of these filings." Id. Thus, the situation presented in Sharef, where the defendant had taken no action with any connection to the United States, is unlike this case and the others cited in the Order. Accordingly, the Sharef decision does not provide any reason to find that there is a difference of opinion as to whether personal jurisdiction exists in this case, let alone create "substantial doubt" that the Court's Order is correct. Moreover, Defendants do not identify any other authority that is inconsistent with the Order.
Actually, here, while the SEC alleges that all Defendants made misleading management representations to auditors, only Defendant Straub is alleged to have signed a false SEC filing. (See Order at 3-4.)
Defendants also argue that even where this second § 1292(b) criterion is not met, a strong showing on the first and third criteria provides a sufficient basis for the certification of an interlocutory appeal. (Mem. at 14 (citing Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 306, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).) As an initial matter, the Court notes that virtually every case in which a court finds personal jurisdiction over a defendant could meet these two conditions, and thus, satisfying the first and third criteria alone cannot be sufficient grounds for certifying an interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the case cited by Defendants provides far more compelling reasons for certifying an interlocutory appeal. Most notably, there were seventeen other pending actions before the UBS court that presented similar legal questions that would all be impacted by the outcome of an interlocutory appeal - thus, the efficiencies to be gained by certifying the appeal were significant. Id. at 338. Further, although the court characterized the grounds for a difference of opinion on the legal question as "weak," there were, nonetheless, two district court decisions suggesting that a difference of opinion was possible. Id. at 340.
Defendants next suggest that the Court may have applied the wrong test for establishing "minimum contacts" based on a defendant's actions outside the jurisdiction. Defendants point to the Second Circuit's decision in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2011, which quotes the Supreme Court case, Calder v. Jones, and held that, to establish personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant "engaged in 'intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions . . . expressly aimed' at residents of the United States." 538 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)). Defendants argue that "the Order declined to require the SEC to establish that the defendants 'expressly aimed' conduct at the United States to sustain jurisdiction, even though the Second Circuit" required this "more stringent test" in the Terrorist Attacks case. (Mem. at 8, n.5.)
The Court disagrees with Defendants' reading of Terrorist Attacks. That case quotes Calder, in which the Supreme Court held that engaging in actions "expressly aimed" at residents of the United States is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. However, nowhere does the Calder decision state that such conduct is "necessary." Supreme Court cases subsequent to Calder bear this out. For instance, the decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, issued barely one year after Calder, cites the defendant's actions in Calder as one of several examples of the type of activity that is "purposefully directed" at the forum and thus gives a defendant "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," but Burger King does not reference or adopt the "expressly aimed" language. 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). Indeed, even Terrorist Attacks suggests that the "expressly aimed" language in Calder did not create a new, heightened standard for personal jurisdiction; it merely illustrated the standard. See 538 F.3d at 93 ("The fair warning requirement is satisfied if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. Put differently, personal jurisdiction is proper where the defendant took intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions . . . expressly aimed at the forum state.") (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the Second Circuit did announce a new, higher "expressly aimed" standard for activities establishing personal jurisdiction, the allegations in the Complaint are still sufficient to make out a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. See Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "[p]rior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith . . . legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction, i.e., by making a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." (quotation marks, citations and internal citation omitted)). Unlike the Terrorist Attacks case on which Defendants rely, the connection between Defendants' activities and the United States in this case is quite direct. Indeed, the factual allegations in the Complaint clearly support the inference that Defendants knew that the certifications made to auditors would be incorporated into the reports filed with the SEC in violation of United States securities regulations. Therefore, even if the Court of Appeals were to endorse the personal jurisdiction standard asserted by Defendants, the Complaint's allegations are still sufficient to support a finding that Defendants' actions were "expressly aimed" at the United States.
Finally, Defendants argue that "the Court strayed from the obligation to evaluate personal jurisdiction on a per-claim, per-defendant, basis" and that the Order did not explain "how the defendants' sole contact with the United States - their alleged participation in preparing SEC filings - may support the exercise of jurisdiction over the bribery-based claims." (Mem. at 2, 9, n.6.) In their original motion and briefs, Defendants did not argue that personal jurisdiction might exist over some claims and not others, nor did they offer a more nuanced, claim-by-claim analysis of the personal jurisdiction issue. (See Doc. No. 37 at 6-16; Doc. No. 42 at 4-9.) Neither have Defendants made a motion for the Court to reconsider its Order because of some error or oversight in the Court's analysis. Even in the present Motion, Defendants fail to articulate how a claim-by-claim analysis would lead to the conclusion that personal jurisdiction exists over some claims but not others. (See Mem. at 2, 9, n.6.) Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the Second Circuit dismissed some claims, but not others, for lack of personal jurisdiction, the litigation still would not be terminated. Therefore, this argument does not provide a persuasive reason to certify an interlocutory appeal. See infra Part II, Section C (addressing Defendants' argument that the potential to dismiss even a portion of the SEC's claims justifies certification of an interlocutory appeal).
C. Statute of Limitations and
Interstate Commerce
Defendants argue that the two remaining issues in the Court's Order - the statute of limitations and interstate commerce rulings - also satisfy the three criteria for an interlocutory appeal. The Court finds, however, that even if the first two criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are met, the third and "most important" is not. Gruss, 2012 WL 3306166, at *4 (denying motion for interlocutory appeal where, "even assuming arguendo that this case of first impression involves a controlling question of law, and assuming that the novelty and complexity of the issues presented by the motion to dismiss gave rise to a substantial ground for disagreement," defendant could not demonstrate "that an immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.")
On the statute of limitations issue, Defendants argue that a reversal of the Court's Order "would swiftly bring about an end to this case because it would eliminate any prospect of the recovery of civil penalties," and "in the absence of civil penalties, there is almost nothing for the parties in this case to fight over." (Reply at 9.) However, even if reversal would eliminate the SEC's claim for civil penalties, the claims for disgorgement and injunctive relief would still survive. See S.E.C. v. Kelly, 663 F. Supp. 2d 276, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he great weight of the case law in this jurisdiction supports the SEC's contention that equitable remedies are exempted from section 2462's limitations period.") Further, in seeking these equitable remedies, the SEC will still need to establish Defendants' liability. Thus, "the SEC's liability case . . . will drive the scope of discovery and length of trial." (Opp'n at 9.)
Similarly, with regard to the interstate commerce issue, Defendants acknowledge that a reversal of the Court's Order would only eliminate the bribery counts, but they contend that elimination of these counts would narrow the scope of discovery and the proof that the parties would present at trial. (Mem. at 5-6.) However, even if the bribery counts are dismissed, the SEC would still need to establish the existence of the bribery scheme in order to prove the remaining three counts relating to violations of the Exchange Act - namely, failing to maintain accurate books and records and a sufficient system of internal accounting controls; falsifying books and records; and making false or misleading statements to an auditor or accountant. (Opp'n at 10-11.) Therefore, the scope of discovery and length of trial would not be significantly reduced.
In sum, even a reversal by the Second Circuit on these two issues would not entirely dispose of this case. In addition, Defendants have not demonstrated that reversal by the Second Circuit would necessarily lead to a significant reduction in the scope, length, or quantity of discovery in this action. Indeed, there is ample reason to believe that discovery would remain largely unchanged. See id. at 9-11; see also Gruss, 2012 WL 3306166, at *5 (denying motion for interlocutory appeal because "regardless of whether the immediate appeal is successful, [defendant] will nonetheless be required to review the entire process by which the 160 inter-fund transfers were made and will have to incur the costs and the expenditure of time related to defending his claim").
Defendants' argument that reversal by the Second Circuit on either or both of these two issues would bring about a quick settlement is also unavailing. First, the relevant inquiry is whether the interlocutory appeal will "advance the time for trial or . . . shorten the time required for trial," Gruss, 2012 WL 3306166, at *5 (internal citations omitted), not whether it might induce the parties to settle. Regardless, the Court is reluctant to engage in an analysis of how its decisions might impact the parties' incentives to settle. Any decision by the Court would obviously change the parties' settlement calculations; however, the manner or degree to which a decision impacts a party's incentives is hard to predict. Therefore, the Court will not certify an interlocutory appeal simply because a reversal by the Second Circuit might cause the parties to settle sooner than they otherwise would. Moreover, Defendants' analysis of the efficiencies to be gained by this Court certifying an interlocutory appeal, aside from being entirely speculative, ignores the time that will be spent waiting for the interlocutory appeal to be briefed, argued, and decided.
Because an interlocutory appeal on either the statute of limitations or interstate commerce issue will not lead to the termination of this litigation, the Court need not consider the other two criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in declining to certify an interlocutory appeal of these issues.
* * *
For each of the issues that Defendants seek to appeal, the three criteria under section 1292(b) are not met. Moreover, even if they were, the Court would not certify an interlocutory appeal in this matter. This is not a case that presents "ephemeral question[s] of law that m[ight] disappear in the light of a complete and final record." Weber, 484 F.3d at 159. Further, an interlocutory appeal is likely to "prolong judicial proceedings" and "add delay and expense to litigants." In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 144. As Defendants themselves noted in support of their motion to dismiss, the Complaint was filed on December 29, 2011, more than five years after the alleged conduct that is the subject of this lawsuit. (Doc. No. 37 at 17.) Since the Complaint was filed, another eighteen months have now passed. It is high time that the parties resume discovery and develop the factual record necessary to resolve this dispute. As such, the Court will not endorse any further delay in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that this case does not present the sort of "exceptional circumstances" that would justify an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion is denied.
The Court is issuing another Order ("Discovery Order") today that addresses discovery disputes between the parties and sets in place a Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order. Because Defendants' motion to dismiss has been decided and there will be no interlocutory appeal of that decision, the parties shall resume all discovery in accordance with the Court's Discovery Order.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the Motion at Doc. No. 62. SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge Dated: August 5, 2013
New York, New York
* * *
The SEC is represented by Jeffrey Thomas Infelise, Kara Novaco Brockmeyer, and Robert Irving Dodge, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, District of Columbia 20549.
Elek Straub is represented by Robert B. Buehler, Heller Ehrman, LLP, 7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036, Amanda Grier, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom LLP, 1440 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20005; Carl S. Rauh, Hogan Lovells LLP, 555 Thirteenth Street, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20004; and Lisa J. Fried, Hogan Lovells LLP, 875 Third Avenue. New York, New York 10022.
Andras Balogh is represented by John A. McMillan and William Michael Sullivan, Jr., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20037.
Tamas Morvai is represented by Michael Louis Koenig and Victoria Pauline Lane, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 54 State Street, Albany, New York 12207.
The Court reminds counsel of their obligation to provide the Court with updated information as to counsel of record and that "[a]n attorney who has appeared as attorney of record for a party may be relieved or displaced only by order of the Court and may not withdraw from a case without leave of the Court granted by order." Local Rule 1.4. --------