Opinion
21-35970
11-10-2022
CAMRYN X. SEARLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted November 8, 2022 [**] Seattle, Washington
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Theresa L. Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05655-TLF
Before: IKUTA and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Plaintiff-Appellant Camryn X. Searls appeals the district court's decision upholding a denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the underlying decision of the administrative law judge ("ALJ") only for legal error or lack of substantial evidence. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's weighing of the medical opinions of certain examining psychologists. The ALJ reasonably discounted the opinion of Dr. Wingate on the ground that it predated the relevant time period by more than a year. See Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ discounted Dr. Tarantino's opinion as "inconsistent with the medical record as a whole and the claimant's reported activities," and substantial evidence supports that determination. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792-93 (9th Cir. 2022). For example, Dr. Tarantino's finding of concentration and attention deficits conflicted with the conclusions of other doctors. Her overall findings also conflicted with Searls's daily activities, which included playing concentration-instensive online video games "all day long" "once or twice in a week," and with records from other doctors reporting normal affect and mood. For similar reasons, substantial evidence also supports the ALJ's decision not to credit the opinion of Dr. Greenfield. And because Dr. Bowes's opinion was based on Dr. Greenfield's assessment, it was properly discounted as well. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). Finally, having appropriately found these opinions unpersuasive, the ALJ's further decision to credit the opinions of two non-examining doctors was similarly supported by substantial evidence.
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's clear and convincing reasons not to credit Searls's testimony. The ALJ did not rely solely on the view that Searls's testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, but instead appropriately considered that factor together with other factors. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). The ALJ pointed to inconsistencies between Searls's testimony and prior statements as reflected in treatment records, to inconsistencies between Searls's testimony and actual conduct, and to inconsistencies between Searls's testimony and the opinions of doctors. These are proper grounds for discounting a claimant's testimony. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. Searls's arguments that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Searls's residual functional capacity and the availability of jobs that Searls could perform are predicated upon Searls's claims that the medical evidence and Searls's testimony should have been weighed differently. These derivative arguments therefore also fail.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(A)(2)(C).
The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.