Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-202.
May 20, 2002.
OPINION
Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, to Transfer the above-captioned matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404 filed on behalf of the Defendant, American Airlines, Inc. This cause came for hearing on March 27, 2002, without oral argument. The Court, having studied the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
On February 13, 2001, Eric Searcy was traveling from New Orleans, Louisiana to Quito, Ecuador aboard an American Airlines, Inc. ("American Airlines") plane. Eric Searcy is a C-5, C-6 quadriplegic as a result of a prior motor vehicle accident that is not at issue in this matter. On the date in question, Eric Searcy was accompanied by his mother, Rhonda Searcy. Eric and Rhonda Searcy boarded a plane in New Orleans. The plane made a stop in Miami, Florida where Eric and Rhonda Searcy transferred to another American Airlines flight for the final leg of the flight to Ecuador. While assisting Eric onto the plane for the flight from Miami to Ecuador, Eric allegedly suffered damages due to the negligence of the American Airlines employees.
On January 28, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed the above-captioned matter in the Eastern District of Louisiana. On February 22, 2002, the Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, to Transfer Venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowery v. Texas AM University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997); Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the original complaint must be taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1980). A district court may not dismiss a complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit defines this strict standard as, "whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247 (citing 5 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACT[CE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601 (1969)).
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for relief for the alleged injuries suffered by Eric Searcy. Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention:
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if he accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any other operations of embarking or disembarking."
It is obvious by the face of the complaint that the Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for relief for the alleged injuries to Eric Searcy under the Warsaw Convention.
The Defendant argues that even if the Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for relief for Eric Searcy's injuries, they have not stated a valid claim for relief for Rhonda Searcy's injuries. The complaint filed by the Plaintiffs alleges that Rhonda Searcy suffered emotional damages due to the physical damages allegedly suffered by her son. The Plaintiffs have not alleged that Rhonda Searcy suffered any physical injury in conjunction with the facts at issue. In support of its argument, the Defendant cites both Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991), and El Al Isreal Airlines, Ltd.v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 570 (1999), where the Supreme Court held that purely mental injury claims that are not accompanied by bodily injury are not compensable under the Warsaw Convention. In addition, the Supreme Court held in both Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd and El Al Isreal Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng that if a plaintiff does not have a remedy under the Warsaw Convention, then a plaintiff does not have a remedy. The Defendant argues that because Rhonda Searcy's alleged emotional injuries are not accompanied by bodily injuries, she does not have a cause of action because her alleged injuries are not compensable under the Warsaw Convention.
The Court agrees with the Defendant's argument as it pertains to the claims made by Rhonda Searcy. Based on the holdings of the Supreme Court in both Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd and El Al Isreal Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, the Court dismisses Rhonda Searcy's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Motion to Transfer Venue:
In the alternative to dismissal, the Defendants move this Court to transfer the instant case to the Southern District of Florida and place it on the docket of that court. A district court may transfer any civil action to any other district in which it might have been brought for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or if such transfer is found to be in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). In determining whether to transfer venue in a particular case, "the court must exercise its discretion in light of the particular circumstances of the case." Hanby v. Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. 1:00CV331, 2001 WL 640639, at * 3 (E.D.Tex. March 5, 2001) (citing Radio Santa FE v. Sena, 687 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Tex. 1988)). In doing so, the court must balance two categories of interests: 1) the so-called private interests, which take into account the convenience of the litigants, and 2) the public interests, which take into account the fair and efficient administration of justice. See Hanby, 2001 WL 640639, at *3 (citing Robertson v. Kiamichi RR Co., L.L.C., 42 F. Supp.2d 651, 655 (E.D.Tex 1999)).
In balancing the aforementioned categories of interests, courts are to consider the following factors:
Convenience factors, [which] include (1) plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) convenience of parties and witnesses; (3) place of the alleged wrong; (4) location of counsel; (5) cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses; (6) accessibility and location of sources of proof; and (7) possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is granted.
Public interest factors, [which] include: (1) administrative difficulties caused by court congestion; (2) local interest in adjudicating local disputes; (3) unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty; and (4) avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws.Hanby, 2001 WL 640639, at *3 (quoting Robertson v. Kiamichi RR Co., L.L.C., 42 F. Supp.2d 651, 655 (E.D.Tex. 1999)); see also Willis v. Parrot, Civ.A. No. 96-691, 1996 WL 337241, at *4 (E.D.La. June 17, 1996).
Furthermore, it is important to note that typically, unless these factors balance heavily in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. See Willis, 1996 WL 337241, at 4 (citing Schexnider v. McDermott Intern., Inc., 817 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 488, 98 L.Ed.2d 486 (1987); Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S.Ct. 328, 107 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989)). However, when the plaintiffs choice of forum has no factual nexus to the case or when the plaintiff has chosen a district other than the district in which he or she resides, then courts are to give that choice of forum little weight. See Robertson, 42 F. Supp.2d at 656; Paul v. International Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp. 174, 179 (S.D.Miss. 1985); 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3848 (1986).
C. Application of the Factors to the Case at Hand:
The Plaintiffs in this action have obviously chosen the Eastern District of Louisiana as their forum. Plaintiffs reside in Louisiana and Eric Searcy continues to receive medical care in Louisiana. Because the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed, and because this matter has been filed in the district in which these plaintiffs reside, the requested transfer to the Southern District of Florida is not warranted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the claims of Rhonda Searcy pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the claims of Eric Searcy pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Transfer be, and the same is hereby DENIED.