Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1974 Section "R" (4).
February 10, 2005
AMENDED ORDER AND REASONS
On February 1, 2005, the Court entered an order and reasons dismissing plaintiff Janice Seals' claims. That order is hereby vacated and replaced with this amended order and reasons, which does not change the substance of the Court's decision.
Plaintiff Janice Seals objects to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, which recommended that her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A. Having reviewed de novo the complaint, the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, and Seals' objections, the Court affirms the magistrate judge and dismisses Seals' claim under section 1983 with prejudice to the claim being asserted again until certain conditions are met.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Janice Seals is a prisoner in the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women in St. Gabriel, Louisiana. On July 22, 2004, she filed an in forma pauperis complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the New Orleans Police Department and three police officers, Officers Theodore and Prozano and Officer Michael Mims. Seals alleges that, on three occasions when the officers arrested her, they violated her constitutional rights by sexually assaulting her and charging her with crimes she did not commit.
First, Seals alleges that, on January 6, 1996, Officer Mims strip-searched her in the middle of the street and searched inside her underwear, where he apparently found cocaine. Seals stated that, as a result, she was arrested and convicted of possession of cocaine and served 30 months.
Second, Seals alleges that, on February 27, 2000, three plain-clothes officers approached her while she was with her daughter and searched in her bra and underwear. She also asserts that they threw her against a wall, twisted her arms and handcuffed her, then walked her through a crowd of people with her jeans opened. After this arrest, Seals was charged with crimes against nature.
Finally, Seals alleges that, on August 6, 2000, she was stopped by Officer Theodore. She asserts that Officer Theodore and Officer Prozano then drove her some distance away, where they assaulted her until they both ejaculated into a towel. Seals alleges that Officer Prozano then transported her to jail and charged her with crimes against nature. Seals was convicted of the crimes against nature charges and received the five-year sentence she is currently serving.
On October 26, 2004, the magistrate judge conducted a hearing under Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Seals testified to the facts recounted above. She also stated that she filed a federal habeas corpus petition addressing the crimes against nature charges, and the petition was denied.
See Misc. Action 01-1723. The court denied pauper status and Seals has not pursued the petition any further.
On December 29, 2004, the magistrate judge dismissed Seals' complaint with prejudice, finding that Seals' complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim because it is barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Seals sent a letter to the magistrate, which the Court will treat as an objection to the magistrate's findings.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the court determines that the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), § 1915A(b) (1). A claim is frivolous only when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim if, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001); see Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Co., 238 F.3d at 387.
The magistrate found that Seals fails to state a section 1983 claim because her claims are barred by the doctrine the Supreme Court announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, if Seals' success in her section 1983 suit would challenge the constitutionality of her convictions, and Seals cannot show that the convictions have been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by the issuance of a habeas writ, the Court must dismiss her section 1983 claim under section 1915(e). See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (1995) (applying Heck). If, however, the Court decides "that the plaintiff's [section 1983] action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
The threshold question for the Court, then, is whether a judgment in Seals' favor on her section 1983 claim "`would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction.'" Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Here, Seals challenges the validity of the charges against her, the lawfulness of her arrests, and the legality of her convictions on the charges. She appears to allege that the officers assaulted her and then charged her with crimes she did not commit. The Court agrees with the magistrate that if Seals were to succeed on her section 1983 claim that the officers violated her constitutional rights by sexually assaulting her and fabricating charges against her, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of her convictions on those charges. Because Seals' convictions have not been reversed, invalidated, or called into question by the issuance of a habeas writ, her section 1983 claim is barred by Heck. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Seals' section 1983 claim with prejudice the claim being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Seals' section 1983 claims against defendants with prejudice to the claim being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.