Opinion
Index 84971/19
12-10-2021
Sea Park East L.P., Petitioner v. Sheniqua Foster and Rommell Middleton, Respondents.
Respondents attorney: Jasmine Crowder Legal Services NYC Petitioners attorney: Richard Byrne Rosenblum & Bianco
Respondents attorney: Jasmine Crowder Legal Services NYC
Petitioners attorney: Richard Byrne Rosenblum & Bianco
Hannah Cohen, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of petitioners motion per DRP 213 and to vacate the ERAP stay, strike the hardship declaration and leave to execute upon the warrant per DRP 217 and Chapter 417 of the laws of 2021 and ensuing opposition.
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion 1
Opposition 2
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order on these motions are as follows:
Petitioner Sea Park East L.P. commenced this nonpayment proceeding against Sheniqua Foster and Rommell Middletown seeking rental arrears. On January 29, 2020, Ms. Foster entered into a final judgment of possession and money in the amount of $13,249, issuance of a warrant forthwith and execution stayed through March 10, 2020 for payment. A warrant was issued on March 9, 2020.
The court subsequently closed on March 17, 2020 due to the health pandemic caused by COVID-19. As a result, a series of administrative orders ("AO's) and directives ("DRP's") were issued by the Chief Administrative Judge and the Supervising Judge of the Civil Court of New York.
The legislature enacted a statute to distribute funds to pay rental arrears and known as the COVID-19 Emergency Rental Assistance Program ("ERAP"), codified at L. 2021, c.56, part BB, amended by L. 2021, c 417, Part A
Petitioner by motion sought in November 2020 to execute upon the warrant per DRP 213, Said motion was calendered in May 2021 and respondent appeared and sought and received counsel. On June 4, 2021, respondent filed a hardship declaration with the court. On August 26, 2021, ERAP approved $18,636 in arrears for April 2020 through March 2021. Petitioner by motion filed in October 2021, sought to vacate the ERAP stay, strike the hardship declaration and sought leave to execute upon the warrant per DRP 217 and chapter 417 of the laws of 2021. Both parties agreed per stipulation dated November 15, 2021 that the hardship declaration was withdrawn. Respondent has now filed both an appeal of the original ERAP determination, alleging three more months of rent should have been approved and filed a second ERAP application on November 12, 2021 for the months of April 2021 through June 2021.
Petitioner argues that as a majority of the arrears are pre COVID and is not eligible for coverage under the ERAP legislation. Petitioner cites to Section 8 of subpart A of part CC of chapter 56 of the laws of 2021 which states:
"Except as provided in section nine-a of this act, eviction proceedings for a holdover or expired lease, or non-payment of rent or utilities that would be eligible for coverage under this program shall not be commenced against a household who has applied for this program or any local program administering federal emergency rental assistance program funds unless or until a determination of ineligibility is made. Except as provided in section nine-a of this act, in any pending eviction proceeding, whether filed prior to, on, or after the effective date of this act, against a household who has applied or subsequently applies for benefits under this program or any local program administering federal emergency rental assistance program funds to cover all or part of the arrears claims be the petitioner, all proceedings shall be stayed pending a determination of eligibility." Petitioner argues that the "would be eligible for coverage" indicates that the ERAP stay would not apply to pre pandemic judgments
Respondent in opposition states that the statute's plain language indicates that in any non payment proceeding, where an ERAP application is pending, the proceeding is stayed. Respondent's attorney argues that respondent erroneously sought only 12 months of arrears in her first ERAP application and should have applied for 15 months. Due to conflicting directions from OTDA, respondent filed both a new second ERAP application for the additional 3 months of rent and a notice of appeal.
The court notes that petitioner's reliance in the term "would be eligible" speaks to the ability to commence a proceeding for a household that applies for this program. The statute then begins a new sentence and states that in any pending proceeding, whether filed before, on or after September 2, 2021, against a household that has applied for this program, all proceedings shall be stayed pending a determination of eligibility. When constructing a statute, the court must conclude that the legislature deliberately placed wording to serve its intended purpose (See Rodriguez v Perales, 86 N.Y.2d 361 [1955]; Bitzarkis v Evans, 2021 NY Slip Op 21280 [Civil Ct Kings Co November 2021]). Had the legislature intended that only eligible applicants be granted a stay, pending determination, the statute would have so stated. The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that any pending ERAP application stays a proceedings until an eligibility determination is made. The circumstances herein differ from the holding in Abuelafiya v Orena, 2021 NY Slip Op 21247 [Dist Ct Nassau Co], where the court found the automatic stay provision in ERAP did not address the due process issues raised in Chrysafis v Marks, 2021 U.S. Lexis 3635, 2021 WL 3560766, (finding that Covid-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act (CEEFPA) denied landlords an ability to challenge the hardship declaration to be a violation of due process). Herein, respondent's first application was approved and a second application was placed for months erroneously not applied for in the first application. The court also notes petitioner's argument that to allow a stay for a second ERAP application would allow all respondents after being denied by ERAP, to just reapply for the ERAP program over and over again to gain a stay as unpersuasive. Should that have occurred in this case, the court may have interpreted the ERAP legislation in a different light as an absurd result, is certainly not contemplated by the legislature. (See Hibert v City of New York, 64 Misc.3d 697 [S.C. Kings Co April 11, 2019] (statutes will ordinarily be accorded their plain meaning however courts should construe them to avoid objectionable, unreasonable or absurd results); Maiello v City of New York, 103 Misc.2d 1064 [Civ Ct Queens Co April 24, 1980] (Court need not follow the literal word of a statute where to do so would produce a result that legislature clearly did not intend)].
As the respondent's second ERAP application for months not sought for in the first application is pending, the proceeding is hereby stayed pending an outcome of eligibility. Petitioner's motions are denied in all aspects.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.