Opinion
1:23-CV-00116-RAL
12-01-2023
JHEN SCUTELLA, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, DEPUTY WARDEN BRYANT, MIKEY HOLMAN, JOHN DOE, DENTIST; LOUISE, DENTAL ASSISTANT; AND MICHELLE EARLEY, MEDICAL SUPERVISOR, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ECFNO. 12
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Pending before the Court is a motion for preliminary injunction filed by the Plaintiff, Jhen Scutella. See ECF No. 12. It is respectfully recommended that the motion be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background
Scutella, a detainee at the Erie County Prison (ECP), commenced this lawsuit against the ECP, the Warden and Deputy Warden of the ECP, Wexford Health Services, and three individuals who apparently provided medical or dental services at ECP. He alleges that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with adequate dental care during his detention and seeks redress of this violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF Nos. 1-1; 7, ¶¶ 17-24. Scutella's pro se Complaint was docketed on August 18, 2023, but several of the Defendants have yet to be served. ECF Nos., 1, 6, 7.
Scutella filed the instant motion for preliminary injunction on November 2, 2023. ECF No. 12. Scutella avers that he is “unable to access the grievance system due to the screening process that is in place.” Id., ¶ 1. He explains that he “intends on filing another federal lawsuit on ECP, Wexford Health Services, and Trinity Food Services, but has not been able to exhaust his remedies.” Id.
B. Standard of Review
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Whitaker v. Armel, 2022 WL 18133593, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 2, 2022) (citing Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1806080 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2022). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992); Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010)) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are satisfied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1).
A preliminary injunction should be entered only when it is “the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be granted sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
C. Discussion
Scutella has failed to support an entitlement to injunctive relief. First, his motion does not support a sufficient nexus or connection between the allegations and claims raised in his Complaint and the relief he seeks in the motion. See Whitaker, 2022 WL 1813594, at *3 (holding that “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct in the underlying complaint.”) (citing Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015)). Scutella's motion alleges that he wants to file “another Federal lawsuit,” but ECP has in place unspecified “screening” procedures that are frustrating his ability to exhaust his administrative remedies. At least one of the defendants to his proposed new federal lawsuit is “Trinity Food Service,” which is not a defendant in this action. Scutella's acknowledgement that he seeks injunctive relief in this action to facilitate his filing of a different lawsuit demonstrates the absence of any reasonable nexus between the motion and his Complaint in this action. ECF No. 12, ¶ 1. His motion also provides no support for a finding that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the claims asserted in this action.
Furthermore, his own allegations demonstrate that injunctive relief is unnecessary and inappropriate. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires Scutella to exhaust only those administrative remedies that are “available.” See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that an administrative remedy is not “available” under the PLRA where prison authorities thwart a prisoner's efforts to exhaust administrative remedies.”). If Scutella demonstrates in his new lawsuit that ECP personnel adopted procedures that rendered his grievance or other administrative remedies unavailable, he will be excused from exhausting them. See, e.g., Estien v. Showalter, 2018 WL 4310188, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2017) ("Notably, if Plaintiff could show that prison authorities prevented him from timely filing, then he would be able to proceed ..."). Thus, if Scutella is correct that prison officials have prevented him from filing a grievance, the law already provides him with an adequate remedy to prevent the very harm he allegedly fears-the loss of his claims due to a failure to exhaust. That argument, however, is only appropriate to raise in his threatened future suit. It is not appropriately raised in this action
III. Conclusion
Because Scutella's motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 12) does not support a likelihood of success on the merits or any threat of irreparable harm, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be denied.
IV. Notice Regarding Objections
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the United States Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) &(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of this Court, the Plaintiff shall have fourteen days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. The Plaintiffs failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.