Opinion
# 2012-039-304 Claim No. 120680 Motion No. M-80947
05-07-2012
SCOTT v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Defendant's motion to dismiss the claim is granted. The claim seeks declaratory relief and challenges administrative determinations of DOCCS as to whether claimant would receive a merit termination of his sentence or an early discharge. Thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Case information
UID: 2012-039-304 Claimant(s): ROBERT SCOTT Claimant short name: SCOTT Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 120680 Motion number(s): M-80947 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: James H. Ferreira Claimant's attorney: Robert Scott, pro se Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General of the State of New York Defendant's attorney: By: Michael T. Krenrich Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: May 7, 2012 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
In 2002, claimant was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 5 to 15 years in prison. He was released to parole supervision in November 2008. In February 2010, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS)determined that claimant was eligible for merit termination of his sentence pursuant to Executive Law (former) § 259-j.After review, in a determination signed March 26, 2010, DOCCS denied claimant merit termination of his sentence and deferred further review of the matter for 12 months. Claimant thereafter commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking review of DOCCS' determination. Supreme Court (Hunter, Jr., J.) denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. In March 2011, DOCCS again determined that claimant was eligible for merit termination of his sentence pursuant to Executive Law (former) § 259-j. After review, in a determination signed March 25, 2011, DOCCS again denied claimant merit termination of his sentence and deferred further review of the matter for 12 months. In November 2011, parole officers issued a recommendation that claimant was not a suitable candidate for an early discharge, and in a decision signed November 10, 2011, DOCCS denied claimant an early discharge pursuant to Executive Law § 259-j.
Effective April 1, 2011, the Department of Correctional Services was merged with the Division of Parole to create DOCCS.
Executive Law § 259-j was recently amended, effective March 31, 2011.
Presumably, as of November 2011, claimant would have been on unrevoked community supervision for at least three consecutive years, and thus would have been eligible for early discharge under revised Executive Law § 259-j.
Claimant filed this claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claims on December 12, 2011. In it, claimant alleges that DOCCS violated several of his rights under the New York Constitution when it denied him merit termination of his sentence in March 2011 and an early discharge in November 2011. He asserts that DOCCS' March 2011 determination was retaliatory and that DOCCS failed to consider relevant factors in making the determination. Claimant further alleges that, in assessing his candidacy for early release in November 2011, DOCCS improperly considered an arrest that had been dismissed and sealed, failed to give adequate reasons for denying him early release and applied an erroneous standard. Claimant also asserts that Executive Law § 259-j is unconstitutionally vague. Claimant seeks nominal damages of $50.00 and punitive damages of $600,000.00.
Defendant now moves the Court, in lieu of an answer, for an order dismissing the claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, the claim fails to state a cause of action and the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In relevant part, defendant argues that the Court of Claims does not have authority to provide the type of equitable relief sought by claimant in this claim and that his challenge to DOCCS' determinations would be "more appropriately sought in the nature of a [CPLR a]rticle 78 proceeding and not a claim in the Court of Claims" (Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss ¶ 15). The motion was made returnable on March 7, 2012. To date, the Court has not received any papers in opposition from claimant.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited, with some exceptions not relevant here, to claims for money damages against the State (see Carver v State of New York, 79 AD3d 1393, 1394 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 707 [2011]; see also NY Const, art VI § 9; Court of Claims Act § 9). "In determining whether the Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, the initial question is '[w]hether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim' " (Green v State of New York, 90 AD3d 1577, 1578 [2011], lv dismissed and lv denied 18 NY3d 901 [2012], quoting Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]; see Buonanotte v New York State Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 60 AD3d 1142, 1143 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]). The second inquiry is "whether the underlying claim, regardless of how it has been characterized, 'would require review of an administrative agency's determination - which the Court of Claims has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain' " (Matter of Salahuddin v Connell, 53 AD3d 898, 899 [2008], quoting City of New York v State of New York, 46 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 705 [2008]; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v State of New York, 86 AD3d 820, 820 [2011]).
Here, claimant's challenge to the constitutionality of Executive Law § 259-j seeks declaratory, rather than monetary, relief and the Court thus lacks jurisdiction over that aspect of the claim (see Shelton v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145, 1150-1151 [2009]; Chapman v State of New York, 193 Misc 2d 216, 219 [Ct Cl 2002]). Although claimant seeks in the remainder of the claim to recover money damages for alleged state constitutional violations, the claim plainly challenges DOCCS' determinations with respect to whether claimant would receive a merit termination of his sentence or an early discharge. The Court cannot ascertain claimant's entitlement to relief without reviewing the underlying administrative determinations (see Matter of Salahuddin v Connell, 53 AD3d at 899-900). In the Court's view, this "is a quintessential example of a dispute governed under CPLR article 78" (Madura v State of New York, 12 AD3d 759, 761 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 704 [2005]; see CPLR 7803). As such, the claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, it would dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of action. A cause of action which seeks damages for the violation of a state constitutional right lies in the Court of Claims only if the claimant has no other adequate remedy in another forum (see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83 [2001]; Carver v State of New York, 79 AD3d at 1395; Shelton v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d at 1150). Here, invocation of a constitutional tort cause of action is unnecessary because claimant has an adequate alternative remedy in the form of commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding or a declaratory judgment action (see Carver v State of New York, 79 AD3d at 1395; Shelton v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d at 1150-1151).
Based upon the foregoing, M-80947 is granted and the claim is dismissed in its entirety.
May 7, 2012
Albany, New York
James H. Ferreira
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion dated January 23, 2012; and
2. Affidavit in Support by Michael T. Krenrich, AAG dated January 23, 2012 and exhibits attached thereto.