Opinion
No. 3-03-CV-1804-B.
September 29, 2004
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The following groups of defendants have filed separate motions for summary judgment in this pro se civil rights action: (1) Defendants C. David Fielder and Alicia Stephenson; (2) Defendant M. Kent Sims, Linda Thomas, Joseph B. Morris, Mark Whittington, John Ovard, Bill Rhea, Mary Murphy, Quay Parker and Megan Frederick f/k/a Megan Hare; (3) Defendants Pam Gidney and David Childs; (4) Defendants Sheila Fuqua Carter, Dale Linebarger, Thomas S. Goggan III, Stephen S. Blair, Juan Pena, DeMetris Sampson, Edward Lopez, Jr., Pamela Pope Johnson, and Ashley Carroll; (5) Defendants John Wiley Price, Kenneth A. Mayfield, Jim Jackson, Mike Cantrell, Jana Prigmore, Lucille Davis, Jim Bowles, Rita D'Alessandro, Robert Tucker, and Larry Strout; (6) Defendant Randall L. Shepherd; and (7) Defendants Peter G. Smith, Melissa M. Morales, and David Berman. For the reasons stated herein, the motions should be granted and this case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
This is the latest in a series of federal lawsuits brought by Plaintiff Dallas Wayne Scott protesting efforts to collect delinquent ad valorem property taxes. Although the precise nature of his claim is difficult to decipher, it appears that plaintiff challenges the conduct of legal proceedings in state district court whereby the City of Richardson, Dallas County, and the Richardson Independent School District obtained a money judgment for unpaid property taxes, penalties, and interest for the years 1995 through 1999. The judgment further provides for the foreclosure of a constitutional and statutory tax lien against plaintiff's real property. ( See Shepherd App., Exh. B at 2-4). In his most recent complaint, plaintiff alleges that various municipal and county employees, private attorneys, and state judicial officers "embarked on a series of actions with the specific intent of depriving this Plaintiff of his Civil Rights and the right to be secured from unlawful acts without due process of law. This illegal action caused this Plaintiff to be deprived of the right to be secured from unreasonable seizure without due process of law." (Plf. Am. Compl. at 4). By this suit, plaintiff seeks more than $69 million in damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
The City of Richardson was awarded $2,525.63 for unpaid property taxes for the years 1996 through 1999. Dallas County was awarded $1,460.94 for unpaid property taxes for the years 1997 through 1999. The Richardson Independent School District was awarded $8,633.55 for unpaid property taxes for the years 1995 through 1999. ( See Shepherd App., Exh. B at 2-3).
All defendants now move for summary judgment. One argument made by defendants is that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, deprives this court of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff was ordered to file a consolidated response to the summary judgment motions by September 17, 2004, but has failed to do so. The court will therefore decide the motions without the benefit of a response.
Although the court may not enter a "default" summary judgment when the non-movant does not file a response, it is permitted to accept the movant's evidence as undisputed. See Galvan v. Gerald, 1999 WL 632832 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 1999) (Kaplan, M.J.), citing Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F.Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
II.
A party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must prove that jurisdiction is proper. See Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 771 (1996); Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, A Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 723 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1984). In this case, the burden falls on plaintiff. The allegations of his complaint must be taken as true and all inferences drawn in his favor. Saraw Partnership v. United States, 67 F.3d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1985). However, dismissal is warranted if those allegations together with any undisputed facts establish that the district court lacks jurisdiction. See Saraw, 67 F.3d at 569; Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1992).A.
The Tax Injunction Act provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.28 U.S.C. § 1341. "The Act functions as a broad jurisdictional impediment to federal court interference with the administration of state tax systems." Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 277-28 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1188 (2001), citing Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The statute also applies to taxes imposed by municipalities. Home Builders, 143 F.3d at 1010 n. 6; see also Alnoa G. Corp. v. City of Houston, 563 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1610 (1978).
B.
Plaintiff does not seek to directly "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection" of his property taxes. Rather, he seeks money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of legal proceedings to collect delinquent ad valorem property taxes. While such a claim may not fall within the ambit of the Tax Injunction Act, it is precluded nonetheless. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that taxpayers may not challenge the validity of a state tax system in a federal civil rights action where state law provides an adequate remedy. In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981), the Court explained:
The recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a "declaration" or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation. And damages actions, no less than actions for an injunction, would hale state officers into federal court every time a taxpayer alleged the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim. We consider such interference to be contrary to "[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts." (Citation omitted).
Therefore . . . we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. (Citations omitted).Fair Assessment, 102 S.Ct. at 186. See also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1722, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) ( Fair Assessment limited scope of section 1983 cause of action by prohibiting suit for damages based on enforcement of state tax scheme); National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 587, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 2355, 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995) (federal courts may not award damages in state tax cases when state law provides adequate remedy); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 3238 n. 16, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982) (section 1983 does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits for tax refunds when state law provides adequate remedy).
Plaintiff does not allege, much less prove, the absence of a "plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy for him to pursue his civil rights claim. Indeed, numerous courts have held that the remedy provided under Texas law meets this burden. See, e.g. See Smith v. Travis County Education Dist., 968 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1992); McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544, 1550 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1308 (1991); Hamilton v. Dallas Central Appraisal Dist., 1999 WL 261929 *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 1999). Accordingly, this case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The resolution of this jurisdictional issue pretermits consideration of the other grounds raised by defendants in their motions for summary judgment.
III.
A court has an obligation to protect the orderly administration of justice and can issue an injunction to discharge that duty. Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Sanctions also are appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Litigants who abuse the judicial process are "not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the normal filing fees — indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period." Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Appropriate sanctions may include restrictions on the ability to file future lawsuits without leave of court and monetary sanctions. See generally, McCampbell v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 982 F.Supp. 445, 448-49 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (discussing sanctions available to deter and punish pro se litigants for abusing the judicial system by filing multiple frivolous lawsuits). The range of appropriate sanctions depends on the unique circumstances of each case. Id. at 447. However, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly admonished lower courts to impose the "least severe sanction" adequate to deter future misconduct. See Topalian v. Ehrman, 3 F.3d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 1993); Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 535 (5th Cir. 1992).Plaintiff is no stranger to the civil justice system. In fact, court records show that he has filed 26 cases in the Northern District of Texas since May 2001. Most of those actions were dismissed either as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This litigiousness already has resulted in an order barring plaintiff from filing any additional lawsuits in forma pauperis without first obtaining permission from a district judge. Scott v. AMEX/Centurion ST, 2001 WL 1645362 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2001). In a prior suit brought against some of the same defendants named in this action, plaintiff was warned that "he may be sanctioned and barred from bringing any further actions without prior court approval "if he persists in filing frivolous lawsuits. Scott v. Stephenson, 2002 WL 1432373 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 1, 2002). Another judge in this district later made good on that threat, barring plaintiff "from proceeding with any suit seeking relief in this District without first seeking and obtaining permission of a District Court in this District." Scott v. Mattin, No. 3-03-CV-1290-K (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2004).
Ten of those cases were consolidated with Scott v. AMEX/Centurion ST, No. 3-01-CV-1594-H.
The court now determines that plaintiff should be sanctioned $1,000 for bringing this patently frivolous action. This sanction must be paid to the district clerk before plaintiff even can seek leave of court to file any other lawsuits in this district. Hopefully, this monetary sanction will deter plaintiff from engaging in future frivolous conduct, thereby preserving scarce judicial resources. See Saunders v. Bush, 15 F.3d 64, 68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2678 (1994) (district court did not abuse discretion in imposing monetary sanctions against pro se litigant after prior warning).
RECOMMENDATION
Defendants' motions for summary judgment should be granted. This case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, plaintiff should be sanctioned $1,000. This sanction must be paid to the United States District Clerk for the Northern District of Texas before plaintiff can seek leave of court to file any future lawsuits in this district.