Opinion
C/A 5:22-612-HMH-KDW
05-13-2022
Tray'Vaune T. Scott, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Ray; Lt. Sweat; Sgt. Davis; Cpl. Glisson; and Sr. Cpl. Gregg-Wright, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Tray'Vaune T. Scott (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is an inmate incarcerated in the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center (“SLRDC”). Plaintiff filed this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights by Director Ray, Lieutenant Sweat, Sergeant Davis, Corporal Glisson, and Senior Corporal Gregg-Wright. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Complaint.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this Complaint alleging he and his cellmate were involved in a verbal altercation with inmate Thames on August 26, 2021, and Thames threatened to harm Plaintiff and his family once he was released. ECF No. 1 at 8. Plaintiff claims Thames was out on recreation when his cell door was opened and Plaintiff and his cellmate rushed out of their cell and got into a physical confrontation with Thames. Id. Plaintiff states Lieutenant Sweat wrote an incident report about this altercation. Id. Plaintiff says the next day he was served with two criminal warrants charging him with assault and battery by mob and inciting prisoners to riot based on Director Ray's recommendation. Id. Plaintiff states he was also served with a disciplinary hearing notice charging him with assault on an inmate resulting in injury. Id. Plaintiff claims later that day he asked Senior Corporal Gregg-Wright when he was going to have recreation, and she told Plaintiff he would not be coming out of his cell for 30 days per Director Ray and Sweat. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff claims this violated SLRDC policies and procedures because he had not had a hearing. Id. at 9. Plaintiff says when he informed Gregg-Wright about these violations, she told Plaintiff, “it is what it is.” Id. Gregg-Wright also informed Plaintiff he would have a hearing the next day on August 28, 2021. Id. Plaintiff says Sweat came to his cell on August 30, 2021 to take Plaintiff to his disciplinary hearing. Id. Plaintiff claims SLRDC policy stated the hearing should have been held on August 28. Id. Plaintiff says he asked Sweat why he was having a hearing when Plaintiff had already been criminally charged and sanctioned to 30 days disciplinary confinement, and Sweat told Plaintiff not to worry about it, saying he was noting Plaintiff refused his hearing. Id. Sweat walked away and 30 minutes later Corporal Glisson gave Plaintiff a copy of a hearing notice that stated a disciplinary hearing was held against Plaintiff on August 30 before Sergeant Davis and Corporal Glisson and Plaintiff was not present because he was acting out per Sweat. Id. at 10. The notice stated Plaintiff was given 30 days disciplinary segregation with loss of all privileges. Id. at 10-11.
On April 20, 2022, the court issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal because he failed to allege sufficient factual allegations to state a claim. ECF No. 17. The order further advised Plaintiff he had until May 4, 2022, to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the identified deficiencies in his pleadings. Id. Plaintiff did not file a response.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
1. Grievances
Plaintiff claims he was denied the opportunity to file grievances or use the kiosk after being placed in disciplinary segregation. ECF No. 1 at 10-12. A prisoner has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Ashann-Ra v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F.Supp.2d 559, 569 (W.D. Va. 2000) (“[A] prison official's failure to comply with the state's grievance procedure is not actionable under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's inability to file grievances does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983. The undersigned recommends this claim be summarily dismissed.
2. Due Process Violations
Constitutional due process rights are only at issue when the prisoner is deprived of a protected liberty interest. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974); Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 268 (4th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff alleges the loss of phone, visitation, and commissary privileges violated his due process rights. However, the loss of these privileges do not implicate protected liberty interests under due process. See U.S. v. Alkire, No. 95-7885, 1996 WL 166400, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1996) (explaining there is no constitutional right to the use of a telephone in prison); Bennett v. Cannon, C/A No. 2:05-2634-GR, 2006 WL 2345983, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2006) (explaining canteen access is not a protected liberty interest as [t]here is simply no freestanding constitutional right to canteen privileges at all.”); Allah v. Burt, C/A No. 4:08-1538-TLW-TER, 2010 WL 476016, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2010) (noting there is no inherent constitutional right to visitation). The undersigned recommends Plaintiff's due process claim be summarily dismissed.
Plaintiff's allegations that defendants failed to follow the rules and procedures of SLRDC are also insufficient to state a due process violation. “The failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.” Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 06-2062, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007); Riccio v. Cnty. of Fairfax, Va., 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue); Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding violations of prison policies which fail to reach the level of a constitutional violation are not actionable under § 1983).
3. Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges defendants discriminated against him when he was given a different disciplinary sanction than other similarly situated inmates. ECF No. 1 at 11-12. To succeed on an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff “must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated, and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).” The undersigned finds Plaintiff's allegations that he was punished more harshly than other inmates, without more, is insufficient to support a claim of discrimination. See Chapman v. Reynolds, 378 F.Supp. 1137, 1140 (W.D. Va. 1974) (noting a merely conclusory allegation of discrimination, without facts supporting the assertion that an officer's conduct was motivated by the litigant's race, is insufficient to state an actionable § 1983 claim). Accordingly, Plaintiff's discrimination claim should be summarily dismissed.
4. Conditions of Confinement
The undersigned finds Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment proscribes incarcerating a pretrial detainee in conditions that “amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions constitute punishment when there is “an ‘expressed intent' to punish” or “a lack of a reasonable relationship ‘to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.”‘ Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). Conditions that “are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540; see also Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 1978) (“[A]s the maintenance of institutional security directly serves the state's interest in ensuring the detainee's presence [at trial], jail order and security has been accepted as a consideration entitled to great weight when balancing the state's interest against the liberty interest of detainees.”). To demonstrate that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, “[an inmate] must (1) establish that prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference' and (2) prove extreme deprivations of basic human needs or ‘serious or significant' pain or injury.” Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). To demonstrate that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, a plaintiff must allege officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [by taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Although Plaintiff complains about the loss of visitation, phone, and commissary privileges, and limited access to showers, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show being denied these privileges resulted in an extreme deprivation of a basic human need or a serious or significant pain or injury. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown a violation of his constitutional rights.
To the extent that Plaintiff is challenging his placement in disciplinary segregation, he fails to show a constitutional violation. To determine whether an “atypical and significant hardship” has been imposed, the Supreme Court has outlined a fact intensive inquiry into “(1) the magnitude of confinement restrictions; (2) whether the administrative segregation is for an indefinite period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral consequences on the inmate's sentence.” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 530 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005)). Here, other than a loss of privileges, Plaintiff has alleged no other hardship associated with his segregation. Additionally, Plaintiff was sentenced to disciplinary segregation for a period of 30 days, not an indefinite period. Plaintiff has also not alleged any collateral consequences on any sentence as he was a pretrial detainee. The undersigned recommends Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim be dismissed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
By order issued on April 20, 2022, the undersigned provided Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his Complaint and further warned Plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed without leave for further amendment. Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. The undersigned recommends the district court dismiss this action with prejudice. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).