Summary
In Scott v. Primedia, Inc., 3:04-CV-0680-D, 2004 WL 1179329 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2004), the court rejected federal jurisdiction despite the indications that the state law equivalent claim was subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is not the Court's duty to impose a theory of recovery that the plaintiff did not plead simply to preserve the lawsuit in the face of a dismissable claim.
Summary of this case from Beato v. Cardiology Assocs. of Corpus ChristiOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-0680-D.
May 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charlissa L. Scott ("Scott") moves to remand this action for sex and race discrimination, contending she has not pleaded a claim that arises under federal law. The court agrees and therefore grants the motion.
Defendants do not rely on diversity of citizenship to support removal.
Scott is clearly entitled to the relief she seeks. Accordingly, as permitted by N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(f), the court in its discretion is deciding this motion prior to receipt of a reply brief from Scott. See Solomon v. Godwin Carlton, P.C., 898 F. Supp. 415, 416 n. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (Fitzwater, J.) (applying former Local Rule 5.1(f)).
I
Scott sued defendants Primedia, Inc. and Primedia Workplace Learning in the county court at law of Dallas County, Texas alleging claims for sex and race discrimination. Defendants removed the case, contending that it is removable because Scott alleges federal discrimination claims within this court's federal question jurisdiction.In Scott's county court amended petition, she makes the following allegation:
Plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within three hundred (300) days of the discriminatory acts perpetrated upon her by Defendants and filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Texas Commission [o]n Human Rights ("TCHR") within 180 days of discriminatory and retaliatory acts perpetrated upon her by Defendants. A copy of the EEOC's Notice of Right to Sue is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Plaintiff has complied with all jurisdictional prerequisites to the institution of this lawsuit and Plaintiff would show that Defendant is an employer of more than 500 persons.
P. Am. Pet. ¶ 12. In their notice of removal, defendants assert that this allegation makes the case removable because Scott has specifically referred to the EEOC and its notice of right to sue, which is an administrative prerequisite for filing a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. They posit that her lawsuit involves a controversy that arises under federal law, falls within this court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is therefore removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
In their response to Scott's motion to remand, defendants again rely on ¶ 12 of her amended petition. They also argue that it can be determined that she is necessarily bringing federal claims because, at the time she filed her petition and amended petition in county court, she had failed to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). Defendants reason that, because Scott filed her lawsuit sooner than the exhaustion period dictated by the TCHRA, the only justiciable claims alleged in her county court pleadings are federal claims under Title VII.
II
Both of defendants' arguments lack force. First, defendants recognize, but then fail to apply properly, the well-pleaded complaint rule. "Removal is not possible unless the plaintiff's `well pleaded complaint' raises issues of federal law sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction." Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1993). The well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff "the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Therefore, even if federal claims are available, the plaintiff may remain in state court by relying exclusively on state law. See id. If, on its face, plaintiff's state court petition contains no issue of federal law, there is no federal question jurisdiction. Aaron v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1989). A federal claim does not exist simply because facts are available in the complaint to suggest such a claim. See Gemcraft Homes, Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289, 292 (E.D. Tex. 1988); cf. Chavez v. McDonald's Corp., 1999 WL 814527, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1999) (Fitzwater, J.) (holding that plaintiff had not alleged Title VII claim even though he referred at one point to exhausting his administrative remedies under Title VII, where he otherwise clearly alleged that his claims were based on TCHRA or Texas common law).
Defendants' first basis for removal fails because ¶ 12 of Scott's amended petition contains no issue of federal law. While it is true that Scott's pleading is ambiguous, she does not unmistakably allege that she is relying on state law, and there is at least a hint that she is relying on federal law, this is not controlling. Her well-pleaded complaint must raise an issue of federal law sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction. Rodriguez, 980 F.2d 1017. Moreover, "[b]ecause jurisdiction is so fundamental, any doubts concerning removal must be resolved against removal and in favor of remanding the case back to state court." Cross v. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp. 748, 750 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (Means, J.) (citing Ashley v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (W.D. Tex. 1976)). "The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1997), is subject to strict construction because a defendant's use of that statute deprives a state court of a case properly before it and thereby implicates important federalism concerns." Frank v. Bear Stearns Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997). Ambiguity defeats removal, it does not support it.
The court notes sua sponte that ¶ 12 of Scott's amended petition alleges, in part, that "Plaintiff would show that Defendant is an employer of more than 500 persons." P. Am. Pet. ¶ 12. The number of employees is material under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D), because it subjects the employer to a higher compensatory damages cap in actions brought under federal law.
Nor does it change the analysis that Scott asserts in ¶ 12 of her amended petition that she filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC and received a right to sue letter. She also alleges in the same paragraph that she filed a charge of discrimination with the TCHR, so ¶ 12 is in this respect no less ambiguous than is the balance of her amended petition in disclosing whether she intends to allege federal- or state-law discrimination claims.
Defendants' second argument fails for two reasons. First, "[a] determination that a cause of action presents a federal question depends upon the allegations of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint." Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Louisville Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)). Defendants are not relying on Scott's amended petition, they are invoking evidence outside that pleading to interpret what they maintain the pleading necessarily alleges. See Ds. App. 1-8 (Scott's EEOC charge and EEOC right to sue letter). Defendants maintain that it can be determined that Scott is relying on federal law because, when she filed suit, she did not have a justiciable state claim. They reason that, on the date her suit was commenced, it was timely under Title VII (i.e., within 90 days of receiving her right to sue letter) but was subject to dismissal as premature under the TCHRA (i.e., because she did not wait until at least 181 days after she filed her complaint with the TCHR). This rationale — creative though it is — simply cannot be derived from Scott's well-pleaded complaint alone.
Second, defendants' argument confuses the merits of her claim with the nature of her claim. Defendants contend that because state-law discrimination claims would be premature, Scott must be asserting federal claims. That her state-law claims may be subject to dismissal does not make them arise under federal law. If Scott's claims are not justiciable, the county court presumably will dismiss them as premature, but this possibility does not make the case removable.
* * *
The court grants Scott's April 15, 2004 motion to remand The court holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), remands this case to County Court at Law No. 4 of Dallas County, Texas. The clerk of court shall effect the remand according to the usual procedure.