Opinion
CASE NO. 2:17-CV-12123
08-15-2017
JAKWAUN SCOTT, #871730, Petitioner, v. SHANE PLACE, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS , DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
I. Introduction
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Jakwaun Scott ("Petitioner") was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 35 to 70 years imprisonment and two years imprisonment in 2014. In his pro se pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the conduct of the prosecutor, the use of a photographic lineup, the effectiveness of trial counsel, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the validity of his sentence.
On July 13, 2017, the Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas actions. Petitioner filed a timely response to the Court's show cause order asserting that he was mistaken about the deadline for seeking habeas review. Having further reviewed the matter, the Court concludes that the habeas petition is untimely and must be dismissed. The Court also concludes that a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal must be denied.
II. Procedural History
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising claims concerning the conduct of the prosecutor, the use of a photographic lineup, and the effectiveness of trial counsel. The court denied relief on those claims and affirmed his convictions. People v. Scott, No. 320232, 2015 WL 2412325 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2015) (unpublished). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Scott, 499 Mich. 869, 875 N.W.2d 199 (March 8, 2016). Petitioner did not pursue collateral review in the state courts.
Petitioner dated his federal habeas petition on June 7, 2017 and it was filed by the Court on June 27, 2017. Under the prison mailbox rule, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), his petition is considered filed on June 7, 2017 because that is when he signed it and presumably gave it to prison officials for mailing. See Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008); Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 812-13 (6th Cir. 2002). In his pleadings, Petitioner admits that he has not exhausted certain ineffective assistance of counsel claims, his insufficient evidence claim, and his sentencing claim in the state courts.
III. Discussion
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., became effective on April 24, 1996. The AEDPA includes a one-year period of limitations for habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging state court judgments. The statute provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A habeas petition filed outside the proscribed time period must be dismissed. See Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 694-95 (6th Cir. 2000) (dismissing case filed 13 days late); Wilson v. Birkett, 192 F. Supp. 2d 763, 765 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
A preliminary question in this case is whether Petitioner has complied with the one-year statute of limitations. "[D]istrict courts are permitted . . . to consider sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner's federal habeas petition. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006).
Petitioner's convictions and sentences became final after the AEDPA's April 24, 1996 effective date. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on direct appeal on March 8, 2016. Petitioner's convictions became final 90 days later, see Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 120 (2009) (a conviction becomes final when "the time for filing a certiorari petition expires"); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333 (2007); S. Ct. R. 13(1), on June 6, 2016. Consequently, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition by June 6, 2017, excluding any time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or collateral review was pending in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner, however, dated his federal habeas petition on June 7, 2017 - one day late. His petition is thus untimely and subject to dismissal.
Petitioner does not allege that the State created an impediment to the filing of his habeas petition or that his habeas claims are based upon newly-discovered evidence or newly-enacted, retroactively applicable law. His habeas petition is therefore untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that the one-year statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar and is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). The Supreme Court has explained that a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling "only if he shows '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 783-84 (6th Cir. 2010). A petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2004). "Typically, equitable tolling applied only when a litigant's failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant's control." Jurado v. Burt, 337 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Petitioner neither alleges nor establishes any such facts. He asserts that he was unaware of the filing deadline and that a legal writer misinformed him about the correct deadline. Such a circumstance does not justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Dodd v. Mackie, No. 2:14-CV-128, 2014 WL 5105705, *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2014) (citing cases, adopting report and recommendation, and ruling that legal writer's erroneous advice about deadline did not justify tolling); Birge v. Berghuis, No. 1:14-CV-439, 2014 WL 4187671, *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2014) (same and stating that "[b]ad advice - from a lawyer, prisoner, a legal writing program, or anyone else is not a basis for equitable tolling"). The fact that Petitioner is untrained in the law, is (or was) proceeding without a lawyer or other legal assistance, and/or may have been unaware of, or mistaken about, the statute of limitations does not warrant tolling. See Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2012) (pro se status is not an extraordinary circumstance); Allen, 366 F.3d at 403 (ignorance of the law does not justify tolling); Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2002) (illiteracy is not a basis for equitable tolling); Rodriguez v. Elo, 195 F. Supp. 2d 934, 936 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (the law is "replete with instances which firmly establish that ignorance of the law, despite a litigant's pro se status, is no excuse" for failure to follow legal requirements); Holloway v. Jones, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1189 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (lack of legal assistance does not justify tolling); Sperling v. White, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing cases stating that ignorance of the law, illiteracy, and lack of legal assistance do not justify tolling). Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling under Holland.
Both the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have held that a credible claim of actual innocence may equitably toll the one-year statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 588-90 (6th Cir. 2005). As explained in Souter, to support a claim of actual innocence, a petitioner in a collateral proceeding "must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995)); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537-39 (2006). A valid claim of actual innocence requires a petitioner "to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness account, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Furthermore, actual innocence means "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. In keeping with Supreme Court authority, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that the actual innocence exception should "remain rare" and "only be applied in the 'extraordinary case.'" Souter, 395 F.3d at 590 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321). Petitioner makes no such showing. Petitioner fails to establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year period. His habeas petition is therefore untimely and must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that the habeas petition is untimely. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court's decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court's assessment of the claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). When a court denies relief on procedural grounds without addressing the merits, a certificate of appealability should issue if it is shown that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id. In this case, jurists of reason could not find the Court's procedural ruling that the petition is untimely debatable. Accordingly, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
Lastly, the Court finds that an appeal from this decision cannot be taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: August 15, 2017
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of this opinion and Order was sent to counsel and/or parties of record on this 15th day of August, 2017 by regular U.S. mail and/or cm/ecf.
s/ Carol J Bethel
Case Manager