Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-4649.
October 22, 2008
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Fredrick Scott, is a prisoner currently incarcerated in the Rayburn Correctional Center in Angie, Louisiana. He filed this complaint pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Martin E. Coady of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parishes of St. Tammany and Washington, Washington Parish Sheriff Aubry Jones and Washington Parish Sheriff Bobby Crowe.
In his complaint, Scott states that Judge Coady granted his motion for a refund of attachment fees and ordered both of the defendant Sheriffs to refund the fees, but that neither Sheriff has complied. Scott alleges specifically that Judge Coady ordered Sheriff Jones to refund the attachment fees to plaintiff on May 30, 2008, but Sheriff Jones did not comply. He states that Judge Coady ordered Sheriff Crowe to refund the same fees on July 30, 2008, but that Sheriff Crowe has not complied. Plaintiff contends that Judge Coady violated his constitutional rights by failing to take any further action concerning the two orders. Record Doc. No. 1, Complaint at p. 5, ¶ IV. Plaintiff apparently seeks enforcement of the state court orders and court costs. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 5.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A prisoner's pro se complaint for alleged civil rights violations must be screened by the court as soon as practicable after docketing, regardless whether it has also been filed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Such complaints by prisoners must be dismissed upon review if they are frivolous or fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
"A federal court may dismiss a claim in forma pauperis `if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.'" Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), now incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as amended). A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The law "`accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
"`A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.'" Davis, 157 F.3d at 1005 (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)). "When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate; however, dismissal under the section 1915(d) standard is not." Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992). An in forma pauperis complaint which is legally frivolous, fails to state a claim or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In this case, plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) as frivolous because it lacks an arguable basis in law or under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim under the broadest reading.
Pro se civil rights complaints must be broadly construed,Moore, 30 F.3d at 620, and I have broadly construed the complaint in this case.
II. SECTION 1983 CLAIM: JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Plaintiff's claim against Judge Coady is barred by judicial immunity. For more than one hundred years, judges have been held immune from liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871)); Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1996). "A judge, of whatever status in the judicial hierarchy, is immune from suit for damages resulting from any acts performed in [his or her] judicial role." Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1447 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted);accord Mays, 97 F.3d at 110-11. This judicial immunity applies even if a judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly.Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled in part on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), as recognized by Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 1993); Mays, 97 F.3d at 110-11. Judicial officers are absolutely immune from liability for damages unless they are without jurisdiction. Id. at 111;Dayse v. Schuldt, 894 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1990); Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988).
In the past, however, judicial officers did not enjoy absolute immunity from suits seeking injunctive relief. Relief of that nature was available under Section 1983 against state court judges acting in their judicial capacity. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984). However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 ("FCIA") amended Section 1983 to provide that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The FCIA therefore statutorily overruled Pulliam's holding regarding the availability of injunctive relief against a state judge in his official capacity. Guerin v. Higgins, No. 00-0244, 2001 WL 363486, at *1 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Nollet v. Justices, 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000); see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (1996 amendment to Section 1983 limits the relief available against a federal judge to declaratory relief). Thus, injunctive relief is not available to Scott in this Section 1983 action against Judge Coady. Tesmer v. Granholm, 114 F. Supp. 2d 603, 618 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Nollet, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
Furthermore, to whatever extent, if any, that Scott seeks an order of this court directing Judge Coady to take some action concerning plaintiff's state court proceedings, a federal court has no power to direct a state court or its judicial officers in the performance of their duties when mandamus is the only relief sought. In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001); Santee v. Quinlan, 115 F.3d 355, 356-57 (5th Cir. 1997); Russell v. Knight, 488 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1973); Move v. Clerk, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); Lamar v. 118th Judicial Dist. Court, 440 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1971); White v. Stricklin, No. 3:02-CV-688-D. 2002 WL 1125747. at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2002);Norman v. Louisiana S. Ct., No. 01-2225, 2001 WL 881298, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2001) (Duval, J.). This court is without authority to order officials of the state court in which plaintiff's case is pending to treat his claims in any particular way or to otherwise interfere with the rulings of its judges.
To whatever extent, if any, that Scott seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Coady and the other defendants, his claims against Judge Coady are within the scope of the judge's role as a judicial officer and therefore within his jurisdiction. Consequently, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars Scott's suit for injunctive relief against Judge Coady. For these reasons, all of Scott's claims against Judge Coady must be dismissed as legally frivolous or for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
III. SECTION 1983 CLAIM: LOSS/DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
Scott alleges that his personal property, consisting of attachment fees that he paid, was not refunded by the defendant Sheriffs, despite court orders that they should do so. Construed broadly, these allegations may constitute a complaint that Scott was deprived of his property in violation of his due process rights. However, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim in this regard, and his claim must be dismissed.
In deciding whether state action has violated an individual's right to due process, the court must address two questions: "whether the state action has deprived the individual of a protected interest-life, liberty or property," and if so, "whether the state procedures available for challenging the deprivation satisfy the requirements of due process." Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1984);accord Neuwirth v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1988); Cuellar v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 825 F.2d 930, 934 (5th Cir. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that a prisoner's property and due process rights are circumscribed by his custodial status. In general, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state actor's random and unauthorized deprivation of a prisoner's property, whether negligent or intentional, does not result in a violation of due process rights if the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986));accord Wilson v. Holt, 158 Fed. Appx. 546, 2005 WL 3420898, at *1 (5th Cir. 2005).
More specifically, in Parratt, a state prisoner, like Scott, sued prison officials under Section 1983 alleging that their negligent loss of a hobby kit he had ordered from a mail order catalog deprived him of property without due process of law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in the prisoner's favor, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that no due process violation occurs when a state employee negligently deprives a prisoner of property, provided that the State makes available a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44. cited in Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532.
In Hudson, a state prisoner filed suit under Section 1983, alleging that the correctional officer defendants had "conducted a `shakedown' search of [the prisoner's] locker and cell for contraband," and had "intentionally destroyed certain of his noncontraband personal property during the . . . search." Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519-20. The Court specifically approved the conduct by prison officials of "wholly random searches" or "routine shakedowns of prison cells" as "essential" to the effective security and administration of prisons. Id. at 529. Finding that the State had provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of plaintiff's property, the Court found no violation of his rights actionable under Section 1983. "We hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell. We hold also that, even if [the officers] intentionally destroyed [the prisoner's] property during the challenged shakedown search, the destruction did not violate that Fourteenth Amendment since the [State] has provided [the prisoner] an adequate post-deprivation remedy." Id. at 536.
The Fifth Circuit has clearly recognized that Louisiana law provides an adequate remedy for both intentional and negligent deprivations of property. Hutchinson v. Prudhomme, 79 Fed. Appx. 54, 2003 WL 22426661, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003); Copsey v. Swearingen, 36 F.3d 1336, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994); Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1984).
Thus, the deprivation of property alleged by Scott in this case, whether negligent or intentional, is precisely the kind of prisoner's claim as to which the Fifth Circuit has consistently affirmed dismissals by applying the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 2003 WL 22426661, at *1 (affirming dismissal of prisoner's claim "that prison personnel mishandled and embezzled funds deposited in his inmate account" because Louisiana law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy). Such dismissals are mandated, even when the plaintiff has alleged that the property deprivation violates some prison regulation or policy.See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996) (no due process violation when prison officials debited inmate's prison account to pay for medical services provided in prison, even when the action violated the prison's own policies, procedures or regulations); Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1994) (inmate's Section 1983 claim that his dictionary (later destroyed as contraband), cup and bowl were confiscated without regard to prison policy was properly dismissed when adequate state post-deprivation remedies were available); Stewart v. Herrington, No. 5:06cv177-MTP, 2008 WL 3822597, at *3-4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 12, 2008) (inmate's allegation that prison nurse charged him twice, although he saw the doctor only once, resulting in an overcharge, was dismissed because state law provided adequate post deprivation remedy). Although the alleged appropriation of Scott's property in this case apparently occurred outside the prison context, the law is the same. No cause of action lies under Section 1983 if state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Quickie Chickie, Inc. v. Sexton, 194 Fed. Appx. 259, 2006 WL 2460909, at *1 (5th Cir. 2006) (corporation's Section 1983 challenge to allegedly illegal seizure of its immovable property resulting from Sheriff's execution of writ of sequestration was properly dismissed; plaintiff failed to show that it did not have adequate post-deprivation remedy under Louisiana law).
Plaintiff's state law remedy for the alleged negligent or intentional deprivation of his property lies in a conversion or other tort suit for damages in state court. Because no constitutional violation has been alleged, his complaint in this court fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983 and/or is legally frivolous and must be dismissed. Scott remains free to pursue his claim concerning his property in state court against the state officials who allegedly failed to refund the attachment fees.
RECOMMENDATION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, either as legally frivolous or for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within ten (10) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
New Orleans, Louisiana.