Opinion
02 Civ. 9530 (SAS).
April 24, 2009
For Plaintiffs: Thomas P. Puccio, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas P. Puccio, New York, New York, Gary A. Orseck, Esq., Lawrence S. Robbins, Esq., Damon W. Taaffe, Esq., Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner Sauber LLP, Washington, DC, Will Aitchison, Esq., Mark A. Crabtree, Esq., Aitchison Vick, Inc., Portland, Oregon, John T. Brennan, Esq., Law Offices of John T. Brennan, Brooklyn, New York.
For Defendants: Lorie E. Almon, Esq., Jeremi L. Chylinski, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, New York, James M. Lemonedes, Andrez Carberry, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York, New York.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Over fifteen thousand current and former New York City police officers and detectives ("plaintiffs") assert that the City of New York and the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") (collectively "defendants") systematically violate plaintiffs' overtime rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). This lawsuit addresses the policies and practices of the nation's largest police department, and plaintiffs claim hundreds of millions of dollars in damages based on defendants' alleged failures concerning the accrual, use, and payment of overtime. This Court must now address whether defendants may be relieved from the FLSA's liquidated damages provision on account of a good faith attempt to comply with the statute.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201- 219.
Plaintiffs brought five claims. Two are relevant to this motion. First, plaintiffs claim that some regular work schedules contain overtime, for which they are not compensated (the "chart" claim). Second, plaintiffs claim that defendants improperly exclude shift differentials and longevity pay when calculating FLSA overtime rates (the "regular rate" claim).
See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 22-31.
See id. ¶¶ 32-35.
In August, 2008, this Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs concerning both of these claims. In November, this Court conducted a jury trial concerning liability on the remaining claims and on whether defendants' violation of the chart claim and the regular rate claim was willful. The jury concluded that defendants had willfully violated plaintiffs' FLSA rights concerning the chart claim and the regular rate claim. The jury further found that defendants had not violated the FLSA with regard to the remaining claims.
See Scott v. City of New York, 592 F. Supp. 2d 386, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 2430-2431.
See id. at 2429, 2431-2432.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
"Any employer who violates [the FLSA's overtime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of . . . their unpaid overtime compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." However,
if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA], the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or [a reduced award].
Id. § 260.
"Under 29 U.S.C. § 260, the employer bears the burden of establishing, by `plain and substantial' evidence, subjective good faith and objective reasonableness." "The burden . . . `is a difficult one to meet, however, and [d]ouble damages are the norm, single damages the exception.'" Where the evidence "is sufficient to support the jury's finding of reckless or willful violation," "the resulting compensatory award should be doubled pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act's liquidated damages provision."
Reich v. Southern N.E. Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Id. (quoting Brock v. Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d 11, 19 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing, inter alia, EEOC v. Detroit Health Dep't, 920 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1990)).
III. DISCUSSION
If this Court were free to determine independently whether defendants acted in good faith, I would address evidence presented at trial concerning defendants' consultation of in-house lawyers and outside counsel, along with other compliance efforts. However, the Second Circuit has squarely held — along with the majority of other Circuits — that a district court may not find good faith after a jury has concluded that the employer willfully violated the FLSA. Therefore, I decline to find that defendants acted in good faith and hold that plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages in equal amount to compensatory damages resulting from the chart claim and the regular rate claim.
See, e.g., Tr. 1789-1791.
See Alvarez-Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1166 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that the mandatory liquidated damages rule "puts us on what appears to be the majority side of the circuit split on this issue") (citing, inter alia, Pollis, 132 F.3d at 120).
This inquiry is necessary to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Although the default statute of limitations for a FLSA claim is two years, upon a finding of willfulness the limitations period is extended to three years. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
SO ORDERED: