Opinion
Civ. A. No. 99-1806, SECTION "C".
October 4, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Christy R. Warrington, a third year law student at Tulane Law School, assisted in the research and preparation of this decision.
This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment due to prescription of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Having reviewed the record, the memoranda of counsel and the law, the Court has determined that the motion should be GRANTED for the following reasons.
Dr. Shirley Williams Scott, a professor in the Biology Department of Southern University at New Orleans, sues the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for the manner in which she was removed from her position as Chairperson of the Biology Department. According to the complaint Dr. Scott was demoted from her position as Chairperson without just cause and the grievance procedures outlined in the faculty handbook were not followed denying her of due process. The complaint alleges that this was due to the fact that she is a female.
The defendants argue that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims should be dismissed because they have prescribed. They contend that there is a one year statute of limitations which began to accrue on December 2, 1997, or at the very latest on May 11, 1998, and this suit was not filed until after that statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff allowed the Court to consider this issue in advance of another motion by defendant for judgment on the pleadings in the interest of judicial economy.
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the record so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of fact is one where a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The undisputed facts are that plaintiff is currently employed at the Southern University-New Orleans Campus. Plaintiff received notice from Dr. Harris, Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, by letter dated December 2, 1997 that she would no longer hold the position as Chair of the Department of Biology as of May 11, 1998. Dr. Peoples, the Chancellor, informed Dr. Scott by letter dated April 27, 1998 that her appointment as Chairperson would not be renewed, based on the recommendation of Dr. Harris' December 2, 1997 letter.
As there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal courts are to borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for an analogous claim. Braden v. Texas A M University System, 636 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1981). Claims based on the deprivation of a person's Constitutional rights and the laws of the United States are in essence delictual claims so the analogous state law claim should sound in tort. See id. Therefore, under Louisiana law the appropriate prescriptive period for this action is one year. La. C.C. article 3492.
The standard for accrual of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by federal law. The federal standard provides that the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992). The question then becomes when precisely that date of accrual is and in determining this it is necessary to identify the unlawful employment practice that is at issue. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980). In the present case Dr. Scott's complaints revolve around the reasons and manner in which she was removed from the position of Chairperson. It is appropriate to look at the time of the discriminatory act, not the point where consequences of the act are felt. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 7 (1981). Here the actual discriminatory act was the demotion itself.
Dr. Scott first received a letter from Dr. Harris on December 2, 1997 that as of May 11, 1998 Dr. Scott would no longer serve as Department Chairperson. On February 10, 1998, Dr. Harris announced to the Faculty Senate that Dr. Scott was dismissed as department chairperson. Dr. Scott submitted a grievance on March 3, 1998 to her supervisor, Dr. Causey, and then to the chancellor, Dr. Peoples, on March 30, 1998 challenging her demotion. Dr. Peoples responded by denying her request for reconsideration on April 27, 1998. Dr. Smith then appealed to the highest level on April 30, 1998 and was denied help on August 24, 1998. Her last day as Department Chairperson was May 11, 1998. This suit was filed on June 11, 1999. Dr. Smith knew or should have known of the discriminatory act when she first received the letter from Dr. Harris on December 2, 1997. Even if the last day Dr. Scott served as Department Chairperson was the appropriate date of accrual the claims had still prescribed by June 11, 1999.
As for the grievance procedure, it is a remedy for a past decision, not a way to influence a decision before it is made. See Delaware State College, 449 U.S. at 258. Therefore, the existence of such a procedure does not prevent the statute of limitations from running. See id. The fact that Dr. Scott was given reasonable notice cannot extend the period within which to file the suit. See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 7.
Demotion is a discrete event that should put an employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 240 (5th Cir., 1998). Such a discrete event does not constitute a pattern of behavior that amounts to a continuos violation. See id. A continuous violation involves a continuing system of discrimination where the cumulative effect of the discriminatory practice and not a discrete occurrence gives rise to the cause of action. See id. at 238, 239. Therefore, Dr. Harris' demotion is not a continuing violation and her claims prescribed before this action was filed.
Clearly the other state tort law claims also fall under a one year prescription period. Using the same analysis as applied to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the prescription period for the state law claims accrued on December 2, 1997 or, at the latest, on May 11, 1998. As the suit was not filed until June 11, 1999, all of the state law claims have prescribed.
Plaintiff has indicated to the Court that any breach of contract claim is governed by a one year statute of limitations. Alternatively, the state contract claim is dismissed because it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Any contract the plaintiff had was with Southern University. Under the Eleventh Amendment the citizens of a state cannot sue that state in federal court. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
A suit against state officials in federal court is considered a suit against the state if the decree would operate against the state. Seeid. at 909. Accordingly, a claim that state officials violated state law while carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the state. Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1990). As these state law claims involve state officials acting in their official capacities, they are dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 39) and the defendant's motion for summary judgment that plaintiff's state law claims have prescribed (Rec. Doc. 40) are GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Rec. Doc. 34) and the defendant's motion to dismiss state law claims (Rec. Doc. 35) are DISMISSED AS MOOT.