Opinion
Hearing Granted by Supreme Court May 5, 1927.
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Ralph H. Clock, Judge.
Action by Georgia E. Scott against S. Beck. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
COUNSEL
McKenna & McKenna, of Los Angeles, for appellant.
Andreani & Haines and John L. Bisher, Jr., all of Los Angeles, for respondent.
OPINION
CASHIN, J.
An action to quiet the title to lot 93 in tract No. 909, situated in the city of Los Angeles.
The complaint alleged title in the plaintiff with the right to possession. The averments of the complaint were denied by defendant, who alleged title in himself through a tax deed from the state of California. Neither of the parties to the action was in actual possession of the lot, which was unimproved. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appeals on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the allegations of the complaint and the conclusion of the trial court that defendant had no title to the property.
The plaintiff, in support of her complaint, introduced in evidence a deed dated October 16, 1911, executed by Clara G. Spring et al., which in terms transferred the tract mentioned to Lizzie J. Brent, a deed from the latter and her husband to Brent Investment Company, a corporation, conveying the same property, together with a deed from the corporation to plaintiff of the lot in question, the latter transfer being dated April 3, 1913. The testimony of an officer of the corporation sufficiently shows that Lizzie J. Brent was in actual possession of the entire tract, and that the corporation likewise was in possession at the time of the transfer to the plaintiff. This evidence was sufficient prima facie to establish ownership in the plaintiff. Holthoff v. Freudenthal, 22 N.M. 377, 162 P. 173; Mitchell v. Titus, 33 Colo. 385, 80 P. 1042; Rockey v. Vieux, 179 Cal. 681, 178 P. 712; Pearson v. Hellman Commercial T. & S. Bank (Cal. Sup.) 249 P. 10; Kilfoil v. Warden, 46 Cal.App. 502, 189 P. 303.
Defendant claims title as grantee under a tax deed dated August 4, 1919, executed by the tax collector of Los Angeles county. The deed recited that the lot described was duly assessed for taxation in the year 1913 to Lizzie J. Brent, and was thereafter, on the 3d day of July, 1919, duly sold to S. Beck by W. O. Welch, tax collector of the county of Los Angeles, for nonpayment of delinquent taxes which had been legally levied in the year 1913 and were a lien thereon; further stating the total amount for which the same was sold and that all taxes levied and assessed against the property prior to the year 1919 had been paid and discharged. The deed was in the form, and contained the recitals, provided by section 3785b of the Political Code (Stats. 1913, p. 558).
It appears from the evidence that the lot was assessed to the plaintiff in the years 1916 to 1920, inclusive, and that the taxes levied thereon after the year 1913, to and including the first installment of the year 1921, were paid by her with the exception of the second installment of 1919, which became delinquent, and the lot was again sold to the state in 1920. Defendant redeemed the property from the latter sale, and, after the year 1920, the taxes levied thereon, with the exception of the first installment of 1921, were paid by him. The proceedings leading to the sale to defendant on July 3, 1919, were conducted under the provisions of sections 3764 and 3771 of the Political Code as amended in 1913 (Stats. 1913, pp. 556, 557). In the addenda attached to the published tax list and notice of sale appeared the name of Lizzie J. Brent, the person to whom the lot which was therein described was assessed for the delinquent taxes of 1913. The name of the plaintiff, who was the record owner in the years 1918 and 1919, and to whom the property was last assessed next before the sale in question, did not appear in the list or in the notice mentioned above. Furthermore, it was not directly shown at the trial that the tax collector complied with the provisions of section 3771 of the Political Code by mailing a copy of the list or publication to the last-known post office address of the plaintiff. It is contended by the plaintiff that it was essential to the validity of the published notice that her name, as the owner and the person to whom the property was last assessed next before the sale, be inserted therein, and that the evidence was insufficient to show a compliance with the statutory requirement of notice by mailing.
It was provided by section 3764 of the Political Code (Stats. 1913, p. 556) that on or before the 5th day of June of each year the tax collector must publish the delinquent list, which must contain, among other things, "the names of persons and a description of the property delinquent," and that before its publication the tax collector and auditor should jointly arrange the list so as to designate in some particular manner the property contained in the list which was sold to the state five years previous under the provisions of section 3771 of the Political Code.
It was provided by section 3771 of the Political Code (Stats. 1913, p. 557) that the property contained in the advertised list, as provided by section 3764 of the Political Code, which had not been redeemed from the previous sale to the state, be sold by the tax collector at public auction, and, further, that within five days after the first publication of the list the tax collector should mail a copy of the list or publication, postage prepaid thereon and registered, to the party to whom the land was last assessed next before such sale at his last-known post office address. It was further provided by section 3785b of the Political Code (Stats. 1913, p. 558) that the tax collector should execute to the purchaser a deed to the property sold, this deed to contain certain recitals, those here material being as follows: That the property was duly assessed for taxation, the year assessed and the name of the person to whom assessed being stated, and was thereafter, on the date of the sale, sold by the tax collector to the grantee named for nonpayment of the delinquent taxes which had been legally levied in the year first mentioned, and were a lien on the property, no provision being made for a recital of the name of the owner or of the person to whom the property was last assessed next before the sale. It was also provided that no matters other than those stated in the section need be recited in the deed, which by subdivision 5 of section 3786 of the Political Code (Stats. 1911, p. 1102) was made primary evidence that "at a proper time and place the property was sold as prescribed by law, and by the proper officer."
Sections 3764, 3771, and 3785b of the Political Code comprise a complete plan for the sale of property for the nonpayment of taxes, and must be considered and construed together. Jacoby v. Wolff, 198 Cal. 667, 247 P. 195. It is evident from the provisions of these sections that the delinquent person whose name was required to be stated in the published notice of sale was the person to whom the delinquent taxes were assessed at the time of the sale to the state; this conclusion being supported by the fact that the statute required the name of that person and no other to be recited in the deed, and that special provision was made for a notice by mail to the person to whom the property was last assessed next before the sale. As stated, a compliance with the latter provision was not directly shown, and it was testified by the plaintiff that no such notice was received. While the mailing of the notice is one of the facts necessary to authorize the tax collector to make the sale (Smith v. Furlong, 160 Cal. 522, 117 P. 527), there is no provision in the statute making it any concern of the tax collector whether the person to whom the notice is mailed receives it (Healton v. Morrison, 162 Cal. 668, 674, 124 P. 240); and in an action to quiet title to real property, where the defendant bases his claim to the property on a tax sale, the tax deed from the state is admissible in support of his claim of title, and is prima facie evidence of the fact that a copy of the notice of sale was mailed to the person to whom the property was last assessed (Jacoby v. Wolff, supra).
We find no merit in plaintiff’s contentions that the proceedings for the assessment and collection of the taxes involved in the action for the year 1913 were irregular or invalid, nor that it was essential that defendant, in order to establish his claim of title, produce in evidence a deed to the state as well as a deed from the state (Jacoby v. Wolff, supra).
The record sufficiently shows that the tax proceedings were valid and resulted in a transfer of the title to the defendant, and that the findings to the contrary were unsupported.
The judgment is reversed.
We concur: TYLER, P. J.; KNIGHT, J.