Scott Aviation, Inc. v. DuPage Airport Authority

6 Citing cases

  1. RECTRIX AERODOME CENTERS, INC. v. BMAC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-11246-RGS (D. Mass. Jul. 27, 2007)

    Id. at 173. Plaintiff, meanwhile, relies on Scott Aviation, Inc. v. Dupage Airport Auth., 393 F. Supp. 2d 638 (N.D. Ill. 2005). In Scott, plaintiffs alleged that the airport authority issued an ordinance unlawfully preventing them from selling aviation fuel.

  2. Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton

    152 F. Supp. 3d 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    Nor is a claim available for violations of the AAIA or ANCA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Scott Aviation, Inc. v. DuPage Airport Auth., 393 F.Supp.2d 638, 647 (N.D.Ill.2005) (holding that a plaintiff may not base a Section 1983 claim upon a violation of the AAIA); Tutor, 2004 WL 344437, at *10 n. 4 (same, but for ANCA). And although Plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claim might support a money damages award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991) (recognizing that Commerce Clause claims are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ), these damages clearly would be limited to those incurred in connection with an unconstitutional restraint on interstate commerce, see Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that the “[D]ormant Commerce Clause ... limits the power of local governments to enact laws affecting interstate commerce”).

  3. Linkmeyer v. M.S.D. Lawrence Twp. Sch. Corp.

    Cause No. 1:13-cv-1144-WTL-DML (S.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013)   Cited 2 times

    He also must state the facts he believes will entitle him to relief on that cause of action. Id. Linkmeyer's citation to Scott Aviation, Inc. v. DuPage Airport Authority, 393 F. Supp.2d 638 (N.D. Ill. 2005), is unavailing, as that case was decided prior to Twombly and therefore applied a different pleading standard. Nor does a plaintiff satisfy Rule 8 by asserting the result he intends to prove, see id., like Linkmeyer's allegation that he spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public concern.

  4. Rectrix Aerodome Ctrs. v. Barnstable Mun. Airport

    534 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Mass. 2008)   Cited 8 times
    Discussing Mass. Gen. L. ch. 90, §§ 51D-51N

    Id. § 51F. To support its argument that no clearly articulated state policy authorizes the BMAC's conduct, Rectrix relies on Scott Aviation, Inc. v. Dupage Airport Auth., 393 F. Supp. 2d 638 (N.D. Ill. 2005), where plaintiff alleged, as in this case, that an airport's monopoly over the sale of aviation fuel violated the Sherman Act. The Scott court rejected defendant's claim of state action immunity because "there [was] no clearly articulated policy by a state entity authorizing [the airport] to engage in the alleged misconduct.

  5. E. End Hangars v. Town of E. Hampton

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 1708 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    does not apply (see generally Matter of Razzano v Remsenburg-Speonk UFSD, 95 A.D.3d 1335; Matter of Neumann v Wyandanch Union Free School Dist., 84 A.D.3d at 818; Matter of Verdon v Dutchess County Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 47 A.D.3d 941; Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v Town of E. Hampton, 841 F.3d 133; Scott Aviation, Inc. v Dupage Airport Auth., 393 F.Supp.2d 638, 646 [ND Ill]).

  6. Jay v. Rock

    No. C068400 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 12, 2019)

    Little Rock Mun. Airport Comm. (8th Cir. 1997) 108 F.3d 909, 915-916 [courts interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 47107 and its predecessor statute have held that those statutes do not provide a private right of action based on a violation of grant assurances to prohibit discrimination]; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Michigan (6th Cir, 1992) 955 F.2d 1054, 1058-1059 ["Congress intended that there would be no private right of action under the [AAIA]"]; Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority (1st Cir. 1987) 816 F.2d 9, 14-15 (Interface) [predecessor statute providing that there shall be no exclusive right for use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon which federal funds have been expended does not create a private right of action; nothing in the legislative history suggests any intent to create such a right of action, and the statute provides an administrative scheme that suggests Congressional intent for administrative expertise at the enforcement stage]; Scott Aviation, Inc. v. DuPage Airport Authority (N.D. Illinois 2005) 393 F.Supp.2d 638, 647.) The AAIA grants exclusive jurisdiction to the FAA to enforce compliance with grant assurances.