The absence of this language from the ODA, coupled with the nature of the injuries recognized therein, suggest that the legislature viewed the occupational diseases scheme as the only forum in which those injuries, intentionally inflicted or not, might be compensated. See Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker (1953), 123 Ind. App. 674, 684, 112 N.E.2d 221, 224 (observing that ODA's passage reflects legislature's realization that "the slow, creeping, insidious progress of disease often may be more devastating, crippling and lethal to a workman than the disablement resulting from accidental physical injury" but that such disease could rarely be recovered for in negligence or otherwise). In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the possibility that the phrase "by occupational disease" contains a non-intentionality requirement, a possibility which might complement the remedial purposes of the ODA and harmonize it with various components of the worker protection scheme.

However, that is not the principle of the larger group of states of which Missouri is a member. This matter is well stated in Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, banc, 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221, l.c. 224-225: "In many ways the appellant, in its brief, appears to urge upon us a limitation of the scope and application of the Act to a few diseases of an unusual nature which are natural incidents of employment in a particular calling or occupation, and which are from common experience known to be usual and customary incidents to such callings or occupations.

We do not construe this sentence to also mean that the claimant's disease should be excluded merely because it is one which members of the general public may acquire under ordinary circumstances, provided that the claimant's particular disease arose from the peculiar hazards of his employment. Cf. Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953) (bronchiectasis caused by inhalation of iron dust held occupational disease, defined, in part, in Ind.Code § 22-3-7-10 (1976) (formerly 1937 Ind.Acts, ch. 69, § 6) as disease "which does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been equally exposed outside of the employment"); Robinson v. Crider Mining Co., 533 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Ky. 1976) (remanding for consideration of whether claimant's chronic bronchitis was an occupational disease under statutory definition revised to eliminate the exclusion of ordinary diseases to which the general public is equally exposed); Herrera v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 89 N.M. 245, 246-47, 550 P.2d 144, 145-46 (1976) (chronic bronchitis, kidney disorders and chronic asthma caused by inhalation of paint fumes held occupational disease, defined as "disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such"); King v. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., 25 Or. App. 685, 550 P.2d

The appellant cites a number of cases which are distinguishable. Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 112 N.E.2d 221 (Ind.) and Whitehead v. Holston Defense Corporation, 326 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn.) were cases, like our Thurston case, supra, where the evidence supported a finding that the claimants developed lung diseases as a direct result of exposure to particular dusts, which characteristically could be said to be a hazard peculiar to the industry. Cf. American Bridge Division, U.S. Steel Corp. v. McClung, 333 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn.).

See Chapters 287-292 of the Acts of 1951. The cases in other jurisdictions — such as Crutcher Dental Depot v. Miller, 251 Ky. 201, 64 S.W.2d 466 (1933); Shoemaker v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 41 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio App. 1942); Ramsey v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 314 Mich. 169, 22 N.W.2d 259 (1946); and Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 112 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. App. 1953) — cited by the claimant, although not directly in point in that they involve different factual situations and statutory provisions from those with which we are presently concerned, tend to show that lung irritations caused by long exposure to chromic fumes and dust do exist in the chrome industry, and further tend to establish the fact that some lung diseases, such as pneumonia and bronchitis, are hazards of employment in chrome plants. Indeed, in the Hacker case, under a statute comparable to ours, it was held that there was a causal connection between the bronchiectasis — a disease marked by dilation of the bronchi — that the milling machine operator had contracted and the iron oxide, zinc chromate and chromate oxide to which he had been exposed during the course of his employment.

(See, also, Lewis v. Industrial Commission, 38 Ill.2d 461, 231 N.E.2d 593, 596 [3], where the holding in Allis-Chalmers was reaffirmed.) The Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc, in Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221, construed its Occupational Disease Act, a statute identically worded to both our own and that of Illinois. Claim was made for bronchiectasis incidental to inflammation of the lungs caused by inhalation of contaminated industrial dust generated by milling machines operated by the employee and other workmen. There was medical evidence that bronchiectasis is a disease the general public can develop under non-occupational conditions. The employer contended that bronchiectasis is not an occupational disease because it is general to the public and one to which the public is exposed outside of any employment. The Indiana Appellate Court held, much as did the Illinois Supreme Court, that the question is not whether the workman has a disease which is common to others of the general public, but whether the particular conditions of his work caused him to succumb to the disease (l.c. 228 [4]):

(Transfer on said cause denied March 29, 1943). We quote also from the case of Schwitzer-Cummins Company v. Hacker (1953), 123 Ind. App. 674, 697, 112 N.E.2d 221, which arose under the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, wherein the court said in part: ". . . The interpretation we have herein placed upon the Act seems to us to be consonant with justice and the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the written Act, and in accord with the apparent leanings of our courts as indicated in their previous holdings.