Opinion
C.A. No. 06C-07-008.
Date Submitted: December 1, 2006.
June 1, 2007.
Edward C. Gill, Esquire, Law Office of Edward C. Gill, P.A., Georgetown, DE 19947-0824.
Douglas T. Walsh, Esquire, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman Goggin, Wilmington, DE 19899.
Dear Counsel:
This is my decision on Defendant Delaware Transit Corporation's ("DTC") motion to dismiss Plaintiff Robert Schunck's ("Schunck") complaint for the failure to state a claim in this personal injury case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Schunck was a passenger on a DTC bus traveling on Route One near Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. A pick-up truck veered in front of the DTC bus, causing it to hit the curb and abruptly stop. Schunck was injured in the accident. The DTC bus was not equipped with passenger restraint devices. Schunck filed a complaint, alleging that DTC was negligent because it did not equip the bus with passenger restraint devices. The basis of Schunck's complaint is a common-law tort claim. DTC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Act") preempts Schunck's common-law tort claim and does not require DTC to equip its buses weighing more than 10,000 pounds with passenger restraint devices. The DTC bus in this case was a 2000 "Champion" bus weighing over 10,000 pounds.
DTC submitted an affidavit regarding the weight of the bus, turning its motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary Judgment may be granted only when no material issues of fact exist. The moving party bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact. Once the moving party meets its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence sufficient under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 in support of its motion and the burden shifts, then the non-moving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but instead must provide evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If, after discovery, the non-moving party cannot make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of her case, then summary judgment must be granted. If, however, material issues of fact exist or if the Court determines that it does not have sufficient facts to enable it to apply the law to the facts before it, then summary judgment is inappropriate.DISCUSSION
I. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
Congress enacted the Act in 1966. The purpose of the Act is to reduce traffic accidents, and deaths and inj uries to pe rso ns resu lti ng fr om traff ic accidents. The Act directed t he Secre tary of Transportation to promulgate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("FMVSS"). The Secretary of Transportation delegated his authority to promulgate the standards to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). NHTSA promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 ("FMVSS 208"). FMVSS 208 specifies performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes. Section 4.4 sets forth the requirements that buses must meet. The requirements vary depending on the gross vehicle weight of the bus. Buses manufactured on or after September 1, 1991 and having a gross vehicle weight of more than 10,000 pounds must comply with Section 4.4.2.1 or Section 4.4.2.2. Buses manufactured on or after September 1, 1991 and having a gross vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less, except a school bus, must comply with Section 4.4.3.2. Sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2 offer two options. The first option mandates a "complete passenger protection system-driver only" and the second option mandates a "belt system — driver only." Section 4.4.3.2 requires a seat belt assembly for the driver and all passengers. Given the distinction that the Act draws between buses weighing more, and less, than 10,000 pounds and the reference to "driver only" for buses weighing more than 10,000 pounds, the only reasonable conclusion is that the Act does not require a manufacturer to equip a bus weighing more than 10,000 pounds with passenger restraint devices. Thus, the Act does not require DTC's 2000 Champion bus to have passenger restraint devices because it weighs more than 10,000 pounds.Delaware statutory law also does not require DTC's 2000 Champion bus to have passenger restraint devices. The Delaware Legislature enacted the Occupant Protection System Safety Act. It requires the driver and each occupant of the passenger department of a motor vehicle to wear a seat belt. The provisions of this act do not apply to "a motor vehicle which is not required to be equipped with an occupant protection system under federal law or has otherwise been exempted from compliance in conformity with federal law." In summary, both federal and Delaware statutory law do not require DTC's 2000 Champion bus to have passenger restraint devices.
21 Del.C. §§ 4801-4803.
21 Del.C. § 4802(c)(2).
II. Preemption
A state law that conflicts with a federal law is invalid. Federal preemption can occur: (1) where Congress explicitly preempts state law; (b) where preemption is implied because Congress has occupied the entire field; or (c) where preemption is implied because there is an actual conflict between federal and state law.
The Act's preemption clause states:
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.
The Act's savings clause states:
Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.
The issue of whether a common-law tort claim is preempted by FMVSS 208 has been addressed by the Delaware Superior Court on several occasions and the United States Supreme Court. In Gulko v. GMC, the plaintiff, who was badly injured when the car that she was riding in as a passenger struck a tree, sought to amend her complaint to allege that the car's manufacturer, the General Motors Corporation, should have manufactured the car with a passenger-side air bag. The applicable section of FMVSS 208 gave automobile manufacturers the discretion whether to install manual seat belts, airbags, or both. The car that the plaintiff was riding in had manual seat belts. The Superior Court addressed the Act's savings clause in relation to FMVSS 208 and stated that "this apparent contradiction is readily resolved, however, by noting that the savings clause cannot preserve a common-law claim that a fortiori contradicts a clear federal regulatory mandate, such as presented by FMVSS 208." Similarly, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., the plaintiff, who was badly injured when the car she was driving struck a tree, alleged that Honda should have manufactured her car with a driver's side airbag. The plaintiff's car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts. The United States Supreme Court held that FMVSS 208 preempted her claim, reasoning that her common-law tort claim conflicted with FMVSS 208 because it only required automobile manufacturers to equip some, but not all, of their cars with passive restraints.
710 A.2d 213 (Del.Super. 1997).
Id. at 215 (Del.Super. 1997).
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Id. at 866.
However, there are limits to the extent of the federal preemption. In Smith v. DaimlerChrysler, the plaintiff, who was injured when the driver's side air bag in her car deployed during a single-car collision with a deer, alleged that the air bag was defective and that Chrysler should have recalled the car. Chrysler argued that FMVSS 208 preempted plaintiff's negligent failure to recall claim. The Superior Court, after examining FMVSS 208 and concluding that none of its numerous standards entailed a recall of vehicles containing airbag systems such as those in the plaintiff's car, stated, "there is no preemption where there is no standard." It went on to state that the "intention of Congress in enacting the saving clause was not to preserve common law claims in conflict with NHTSA standards, but to prevent a manufacturer from having a complete defense to a common law action not addressed by a NHTSA standard b y merely stating that it is in full compliance with all federal safety standards." Thus, a common-law tort claim that conflicts with a NHTSA standard is preempted. However, where there is no NHTSA standard, there is no preemption and the common-law tort claim would survive.
2002 WL 31814534 (Del.Super. Nov. 20, 2002).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6.
Schunck argues that there is no federal standard for passenger restraint devices on buses with a gross vehicle weight of more than 10,000 pounds. Thus, according to Schunck, his common-law tort claim does not conflict with federal law and, therefore, is not preempted by it. I disagree. NHTSA has studied the issue and concluded that large buses are, by virtue of their weight, safer than small buses. NHTSA dealt with this by requiring passenger restraints on small buses, but not on large buses. This, however, does not mean that there is no standard for large buses. There is a 10,000 pound weight standard. A manufacturer can, under FMVSS 208, either build buses weighing less than 10,000 pounds with passenger restraint devices, or buses weighing more than 10,000 pounds without passenger restraint devices, or do both. Thus, for a manufacturer to build a bus without passenger restraint devices, the bus must weigh more than 10,000 pounds. To require manufacturers to also equip buses weighing more than 10,000 pounds with passenger restraint devices, as Schunk seeks to do with his common-law tort claim, would conflict with NHTSA's regulatory framework. Thus, Schunck's claim is preempted by federal law.
CONCLUSION
DTC's motion to dismiss Schunck's complaint is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
E. Scott Bradley