(“Diamond Parking's activities are not governed by the FDCPA. Diamond Parking's principal business is parking enforcement activities, and not collection of debts.”), aff'd, 646 Fed.Appx. 505 (9th Cir. 2016); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rather, the complaint's factual matter, viewed in the light most favorable to the Schlegels, establishes only that debt collection is some part of Wells Fargo's business, which is insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA.”)

Virgo relies on Schroeder v. Diamond Parking, Inc., where the defendant “did not employ an instrumentality of interstate commerce in 27 issuing . . . parking penalty notices to [the] [p]laintiff, ” because “[t]he notices were affixed to [the] [p]laintiff's vehicle.” No. 12-CV-378 (HG) (RLP), 2013 WL 5348472, at *13 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2013), aff'd, 646 Fed.Appx. 505 (9th Cir. 2016). This argument is unavailing.

One of the elements of such a claim is that the government's action against a plaintiff be the kind that would "chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities." See Schroeder v. Diamond Parking, Inc., 646 Fed. Appx. 505, 505 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)). They set reasonable boundaries, and Larkins does not identify any reason why they could not be imposed on any patient, even if there were no concern about the patient's behavior.