Opinion
A23-0581
01-17-2024
Nicholas Schreyer, Appellant, v. USIC Locating Services, LLC, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-22-13329
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Kirk, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Keala C. Ede, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On August 24, 2022, appellant Nicholas Schreyer served respondent USIC Locating Services LLC (USIC) with a complaint alleging that USIC negligently failed to mark a buried electrical cable.
2. Schreyer alleged that he was electrocuted when he struck the cable while operating an auger on a property in Wayzata.
3. Schreyer claimed damages in excess of $50,000 due to injuries he sustained in the incident, including permanent injuries to his brain and body, which resulted in cardiac arrest, hospital and medical expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity, and physical and emotional pain and suffering.
4. USIC moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e), arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
5. The district court granted USIC's motion to dismiss. Citing Anderson v. State, Department of Natural Resources, 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005), the district court reasoned that, "[t]o state a claim for negligence, Schreyer must plead 1) USIC owed him a duty of care; 2) USIC breached that duty; 3) Mr. Schreyer was injured and 4) USIC's breach of the duty proximately caused the injury." The district court determined that "the Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted" because it "has absolutely no facts tying USIC to Mr. Schreyer's accident[,]" "[t]here are no allegations in the Complaint related to how USIC undertook or assumed a duty to do work near the site of the accident[,]" and "[t]he Complaint does not allege how any actions or omissions on USIC's behalf contributed to Mr. Schreyer's injuries."
6. Schreyer challenges the district court's rule 12.02(e) dismissal of his complaint. "We review de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Engstrom v. Whitebirch, Inc., 931 N.W.2d 786, 790 (Minn. 2019).
7. "Minnesota is a notice-pleading state." Halva v. Minn. State Colls. and Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). This means that Minnesota plaintiffs "may plead their case 'by way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions.'" Id. (quoting N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963)). Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 requires that a complaint "contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
8. "Minnesota does not require pleadings to allege facts in support of every element of a cause of action." Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997); see also Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 503 ("No longer is a pleader required to allege facts and every element of a cause of action." (quotation omitted)). "A pleading is sufficiently detailed when it gives fair notice to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader's theory upon which his claim for relief is based." Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 503 (quotation omitted). "A claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded." Graphic Commc'ns Local 1B Health &Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
9. Although the complaint in this case does not allege facts in support of every element of a negligence cause of action, it gives fair notice to USIC of the alleged August 24, 2022 electrocution incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose Schreyer's theory upon which his claim for relief is based. More specifically, the complaint provides the date and location of the injury-causing incident. It alleges that USIC was negligent because it did not mark the buried cable before that date. And it states that, as a result of USIC's negligence, Schreyer suffered damages. Based on these allegations, we conclude that it is possible that evidence might be produced, consistent with Schreyer's negligence theory, to grant the relief he demands. And because Schreyer's complaint provides the factual nexus for his alleged damages, the complaint is sufficiently detailed under Minnesota's notice-pleading requirements, and Schreyer's claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 503 (holding that, although “Halva's complaint . . . is sparse with details and does not contain a direct causal statement explaining how [the alleged Data Practices Act] violations caused him harm[,]” “it is sufficient under our normal pleading standard” because it “provides the factual nexus for his alleged damages”); see also CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d at 692.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is reversed and this matter is remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.