The court "exercises its discretion, informed by the record and by the expertise of the administrative agency and the school officials, as to how much deference to afford the administrative proceedings." Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008). The party challenging the hearing officer's decision bears the burden of proving that the decision is wrong.
Sebastian M., 685 F.3d at 85 (quoting Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir.1993)); see also Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207–208, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (“[C]ourts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States.... [O]nce a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.”); Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir.2008) (the reviewing district court must “exercise[ ] its discretion, informed by the record and by the expertise of the administrative agency and the [local] officials, as to how much deference to afford the administrative proceedings”); Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1087 (1st Cir.1993) (“[T]he persuasiveness of a particular administrative finding, or the lack thereof” determines whether the district court should show it deference). Additionally, the party challenging a hearing officer's decision carries the burden of proof throughout its review by the Court.
Because Ms. C and DB filed the administrative claim after DB had completed his schooling and his tuition expenses had been paid, they sought "reimbursement for past room and board and transportation expenses associated with DB's education in private schools outside of Maine." Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C, 518 F.3d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 2008). The claim was submitted to an officer appointed by the Commissioner of Maine's Department of Education, who awarded Ms. C and DB $48,890.00 for room and board and $3,241.33 for transportation expenses.
As the party challenging the Hearing Officer's decision, Campbell has the burden of proof. Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 976 F.2d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1992)). In its seminal IDEA opinion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
However, to bar the assertion of a claim, laches requires that the party's delay in bringing the lawsuit was "'1) unreasonable, and 2) resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.'" Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 911 (1st Cir. 1989)). Further, laches is an affirmative defense and a defendant claiming laches has the burden "of proving both unreasonableness of the delay and the occurrence of prejudice."
The unreasonableness of the delay is judged according to the amount of time elapsed and a whether the non-moving party's conduct amounts to acquiescence in the alleged wrong. Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008). Finally, the party asserting the defense must make a clear showing of prejudice.
We review the lower court's ruling for abuse of discretion. School Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008); Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc., 105 F.3d 745, 757 (1st Cir. 1997). 1. Unclean Hands
Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2008). It matters only that the prejudice is “material.” Trustees of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 187 F.Supp.3d 306, 318 (D. Mass. 2016).
Finally, in an action brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), the burden of proof rests with the party challenging the decision of the hearing officer. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C, 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 976 F.2d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1992)); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Background
In reviewing the decision, this court "exercises its discretion, informed by the record and by the expertise of the administrative agency and the school officials, as to how much deference to afford the administrative proceedings." Sch. Union No. 37 v. Ms. C., 518 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008). This level of scrutiny "falls somewhere between the highly deferential clear-error standard and the non-deferential de novo standard."