Opinion
No. 27418
May 9, 2006
Appeal from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission.
Dean L. Christianson, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Cara L. Harris, for Respondent.
Annette Schoemehl ("Appellant") appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") awarding her permanent disability benefits for the period of time from December 3, 2003, to January 2, 2004, rather than awarding her the continuing permanent disability benefits of her deceased husband, Fred Schoemehl ("Fred"). We affirm.
We refer to Fred Schoemehl by his first name for ease of discussion only and intend no disrespect by using this convention.
The facts of this case have been stipulated to by the parties. Fred was married to Appellant on January 18, 1986, and remained married to her until his death on January 2, 2004. During their marriage, and specifically on May 11, 2001, Fred worked as an employee for Cruiser Country, Inc. ("Cruiser Country"). Cruiser Country was operating and subject to the provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. On May 11, 2001, Fred injured his left knee during a work-related accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment with Cruiser Country. Fred filed a claim for compensation against Cruiser Country and the Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund ("Respondent"). Cruiser Country and its insurer paid Fred $20,661.65 in temporary total disability benefits and $9,477.08 in medical benefits.
On January 2, 2004, Fred died from causes unrelated to his May 11, 2001, work-related injury. The only dependent Fred left upon his passing was Appellant. Appellant then filed an amended claim for compensation against Cruiser Country and Respondent on February 19, 2004. Appellant settled her claim against Cruiser Country and its insurer for payment of a lump-sum amount of $11,844.37, which was based upon disability of twenty-five percent of Fred's left knee, and $1,433.97 in underpaid temporary total disability benefits. At the time of settlement with Cruiser Country and its insurer, the claim against Respondent for total permanent disability remained.
Appellant's status as Fred's dependent for purposes of Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law is not disputed by Respondent.
Appellant's claim for compensation against Respondent was heard by the Division of Workers' Compensation. The administrative law judge ("ALJ") hearing the case determined that Fred was rendered permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combination of his May 11, 2001 work-related injury and his preexisting disabilities. The ALJ ordered Respondent liable to Appellant for permanent total disability benefits from December 3, 2003, through Fred's death on January 2, 2004. The total amount ordered to be paid to Appellant was $1,157.01. The ALJ denied Appellant's claim for additional weekly benefits of $261.62 for the remainder of Appellant's lifetime after January 2, 2004. In his ruling, the ALJ stated,
[Appellant] was not the injured employee, her husband was. Section 287.200.1, RSMo, states: "Compensation for permanent total disability shall be paid during the continuance of such disability for the lifetime of the employee at the weekly rate of compensation in effect under this subsection on the date of the injury for which compensation is being made." (Emphasis added.) Fred Schoemehl is the employee who was injured; his lifetime (hence the payment of permanent total disability compensation) ended on January 2, 2004.
In a 2-1 decision, the Commission adopted the decision of the ALJ. In her sole point on appeal, Appellant posits that the Commission misconstrued the Workers' Compensation Law by denying her Fred's permanent total disability benefits of $261.26 per week following his death on January 2, 2004. Appellant claims that it was error for the Commission to apply section 287.200.1 in the manner that it did; she claims she was entitled to weekly benefits of $261.26 for the remainder of her lifetime following Fred's death on January 2, 2004.
All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise specified.
Appellant initially argues that the Commission's decision created legislative disharmony. Appellant claims that the Commission incorrectly applied the Workers' Compensation Law because as Fred's dependent, she is considered an "employee" under section 287.020.1, and thus under section 287.200.1, permanent total disability benefits are to continue for the remainder of her lifetime. She also relies upon section 287.230.2 for her claim that unpaid unaccrued benefits should be paid to the dependents of the injured employee if that employee dies of causes unrelated to the work-injury. Her second contention is that the decision contains a constitutional infirmity, mainly that it violates the Equal Protection clauses of both the United States Constitution, amend. XIV, and the Missouri Constitution, article I, section 2, because the decision treats dependents of permanently totally disabled individuals worse than it treats dependents of permanently partially disabled individuals.
Section 287.495.1 governs this Court's standard of review in this case, which provides, in pertinent part:
The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for hearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the award was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award;
(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
Section 287.495.1. Neither Appellant nor Respondent disputes the facts, but rather argue over the Commission's legal construction of the Workers' Compensation Law.
This Court is not bound by the Commission's interpretation and application of the law. Bowers v. Hiland Dairy Co. , 132 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App.S.D. 2004); Williams v. City of Ava , 982 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Mo.App.S.D. 1998). Furthermore, this Court affords no deference to the Commission's interpretation of the law. See Pierson v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri , 126 S.W.3d 386, 387 (Mo. banc 2004). It is noted that no Missouri cases have decided whether the right to compensation for the permanent total disability of an injured employee, who has died from causes unrelated to the work-related injury, survives to the dependents of that injured employee. Accordingly, the issue presented in this case is one of first impression.
In her argument, Appellant first directs this Court's attention to section 287.020.1, which provides in pertinent part:
The word "employee" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean every person in the service of any employer, as defined in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or election, including executive officers of corporations. Any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also include his dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may be payable.
Section 287.020.1 (emphasis added). Appellant also relies upon section 287.200.1, which further provides:
This section was amended in 2005; however, the changes are not applicable to this case.
Compensation for permanent total disability shall be paid during the continuance of such disability for the lifetime of the employee at the weekly rate of compensation in effect under this subsection on the date of the injury for which compensation is being made.
Appellant then notes section 287.230.2, which states:
Where an employee is entitled to compensation under this chapter for an injury received and death ensues for any cause not resulting from the injury for which he was entitled to compensation, payments of the unpaid accrued compensation shall be paid, but payments of the unpaid unaccrued balance for the injury shall cease and all liability therefor shall terminate unless there are surviving dependents at the time of death.
Section 287.230.2 (emphasis added).
Appellant's logic is as follows. Because Appellant is a dependent of Fred, she is considered an "employee" under section 287.020.1. She is, therefore, entitled to "step into the shoes" of Fred upon his death and succeed his right to be compensated for his permanent total disability under section 287.200.1. Under this interpretation, Appellant reads the word "employee" in section 287.200.1 as including herself, and thus requiring that compensation for Fred's permanent total disability continue for her lifetime. Appellant further supports this argument by contending that section 287.230.2 requires such a result because Fred was entitled to compensation and died of causes not resulting from the work-related injury for which he was entitled to compensation, and, therefore, payments of the unpaid unaccrued balance of the compensable injury do not cease when there exist surviving dependents of the injured employee. Appellant urges this Court that her statutory construction best harmonizes all the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law. We disagree.
Although the word "employee" is statutorily defined, the definition of "employee" in section 287.020.1 does not include the dependents of the employee for all purposes, as Appellant contends. Section 287.020.1 defines employee as
[E]very person in the service of any employer, as defined in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or election, including executive officers of corporations. Any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also include his dependents and other persons to whom compensation may be payable.
Section 287.020.1. A dependent of an injured employee is only considered an "employee," under section 287.020.1, "when the employee is dead." During the lifetime of the injured employee, dependents are not considered to be employees for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law. The question is whether, under section 287.200.1, the word "employee" includes dependents.
Section 287.200.1 speaks in terms of the "lifetime of the employee." It mandates that compensation for permanent total disability is to be paid for the "lifetime of the employee." Once the "lifetime of the employee" has terminated, compensation for permanent total disability terminates. Under Appellant's construction of the law, any dependents she may have at the time of her death would then be considered "employees" as well because she considers herself to be an injured "employee" under section 287.020.1. If the dependents of Appellant are considered "employees," then the dependents' dependents, two generations removed from Appellant, would have to be considered "employees" at the time of Appellant's dependents' deaths. There would be a seemingly endless cycle of dependents turning into employees, and Respondent's obligations to compensate for the permanent total disability of the first employee, Fred in the case at bar, would never end. That is not a logical interpretation of section 287.200.1.
Furthermore, under Appellant's interpretation, the second clause of section 287.200.1, "during the continuance of such disability," would have no meaning. Presumably, Fred's permanent disability would continue indefinitely and not be subject to further review. Appellant is not contending that she must have a continuing disability, only the initial employee. To reach the result in Appellant's interpretation, Appellant would be an employee in one section of the statute whereas Fred would be the employee in the second clause. Again, we find such reasoning illogical in construing section 287.200.1.
We recognize the cases relied on by Appellant contain language which seems to indicate that the plain language of section 287.230.2 allows for the payment of unpaid unaccrued benefits to dependents of the employee after the death of the initial employee. We note that these cases involve permanent partial disability and not permanent total disability. The distinction is important because (1) section 287.200.1 does not apply to compensation for permanent partial disabilities, but instead only applies to cases of permanent total disabilities, and (2) compensation for permanent partial disabilities involves a pre-determined finite amount to be paid, thus not resulting in the endless obligation of Respondent to pay.
The first case Appellant relies on is Nations v. Barr , 43 S.W.2d 858 (Mo.App. St.L.D. 1931). In that case, the injured employee was awarded compensation on his claim for permanent partial disability for 103.5 weeks. Id. at 859. The employee died of causes unrelated to his work-injury before the permanent partial disability compensation was fully paid. Id. at 860. The court cited section 3318 RSMo (1929), which was similar to section 287.230 and which provided:
Where an employee is entitled to compensation under this chapter for an injury received and death ensues for any cause not resulting from the injury for which he was entitled to compensation, payments of the unpaid unaccrued balance for such injury shall cease and all liability therefor shall terminate unless there be surviving dependents at the time of such death.
Id. at 861.
In interpreting this provision, the court held that the right of the injured employee to compensation survived to his dependents. Id. The court held that "[i]t is the right to the compensation, not the evidence of it, that survives to the dependents." Id. Thus the dependents of the injured employee were entitled to the balance of the compensation due following the injured employee's death.
The second case relied on by Appellant is Henderson v. Nat'l Bearing Div. of Am. Brake Shoe Co. , 267 S.W.2d 349 (Mo.App. St.L.D. 1954). The court followed Nations in analyzing section 287.230 RSMo (1949), which was similar to section 287.230. Henderson , 267 S.W.2d at 351-53. The court held that under section 287.230 RSMo (1949), the right to compensation for permanent partial disability would have died with the injured employee if he had no dependents, but because he was survived by a dependent, that dependent was entitled to the balance of the compensation following the death of the injured employee. Id. at 353.
The third case relied on by Appellant is Bone v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. , 449 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. banc 1970). In Bone , an employee filed a claim against the Second Injury Fund for a permanent partial disability. Id. at 170. While that claim was pending, the employee died, and his widow amended and proceeded with the claim. Id. The Commission entered an award in favor of the widow in the fixed amount of $2,975 as compensation for the employee's permanent partial disability. Id. On appeal, the Second Injury Fund argued that section 287.230 only intended that the liability of an employer is not affected by death of an employee, and that it was not intended to apply to continue liability of the Second Injury Fund after the employee's death. Id. at 173. There was no dispute in the case that the employee had a right to be compensated for his disability. Id. at 174. The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Injury Fund and held that the widow, as a dependent of the employee, succeeded to the employee's right to collect the compensation for his permanent partial disability. Id.
Like Nations and Henderson , the disability at issue in Bone was a permanent partial disability and not a permanent total disability. Section 287.200, dealing with cases of permanent total disability, was not mentioned or applied in these three cases because the disability was not permanent and total in those cases. The fairest way to read Nations, Henderson , and Bone is that the cases stand for the proposition that under section 287.230, the right to compensation for permanent partial disability of an injured employee, who dies from causes unrelated to the work-injury, survives to the dependents of that injured employee.
Nevertheless, Appellant argues that because there are no cases limiting section 287.230 to compensation for permanent partial disability and that section speaks in terms of "compensation" generally, it should be interpreted to include compensation for permanent total disabilities as well. In making this argument, Appellant ignores a significant difference between compensation for permanent total disability and all other forms of compensation for work-injuries. The difference is that at the time of an award of compensation for permanent total disability, there is no pre-determined ending date to payment. This is unlike the cases of permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, and temporary partial disability. See sections 287.190, 287.170, 287.180. In those cases, parties in the position of Respondent must only continue to make payments to the injured employee for the finite time period mandated by the respective provisions of the statute. Under section 287.230, as interpreted by Nations and Henderson , the right to this finite amount of money survives to dependents of the injured employee when the employee dies of causes unrelated to the work-related injury. Section 287.230.2.
Payment for permanent total disability, on the other hand, has no pre-determined ending date because the injured employee is totally disabled when he or she is unable to return to any employment. Section 287.020.7. Therefore, the legislature enacted section 287.200.1, a provision that only applies to compensation for permanent total disabilities, so that employers would be obligated to make payment for an injured employee's permanent total disability for the "lifetime of the employee." Section 287.200.1. Compensation for permanent total disabilities continues so long as the employee is alive or no longer disabled. Section 287.200.1. Once the employee has died, he or she is no longer entitled to compensation for the permanent total disability, thus leaving nothing for dependents to claim.
This interpretation of section 287.200.1 is in harmony with section 287.230.2. Section 287.230.2 only applies to dependents of the deceased injured employee "[w]here an employee is entitled to compensation . . . and death ensues for any cause not resulting from the injury for which he was entitled to compensation. . . ." Section 287.230.2 (emphasis added). The key word is entitled. If the employee is no longer entitled to compensation, the dependents are entitled to nothing. Thus, in the cases of Nations, Henderson , and Bone , which all involved compensation for permanent partial disability, the employees were entitled to compensation for a fixed amount of time. Bone , 449 S.W.2d at 174; Nations , 43 S.W.2d at 859; Henderson , 267 S.W.2d at 351. Although the employees in all three cases died before this fixed amount of time expired, they were still entitled to that compensation, and as section 287.230.2 required, their respective dependents became entitled to the right to that compensation.
On the other hand, permanent total disability awards by their very nature are not fixed amounts in total, and such payments last for an indefinite time period. See section 287.200. The injured employee is only entitled to compensation for permanent total disabilities "during the continuance of the disability for the lifetime of the employee." Section 287.200.1. Thus, once either (1) the disability no longer continues or (2) the lifetime of the employee is terminated, the employee is no longer entitled to compensation for the permanent total disability.
If the employee is not entitled to compensation, section 287.230.2 is not triggered and the result is that there is nothing for the dependents of the injured employee to be compensated for. In the case at bar, the injured employee was entitled to compensation for permanent total disability starting from December 3, 2003, to either (1) a time when the disability no longer continued or (2) the time when his lifetime terminated. His permanent total disability never ceased to exist during his lifetime; however, his life terminated on January 2, 2004. Under section 287.200.1, Fred was no longer entitled to compensation for his permanent total disability after January 2, 2004. Thus under section 287.230.2, Appellant, as Fred's dependent, was likewise not entitled to compensation for Fred's permanent total disability after January 2, 2004. The decision of the Commission did not create legislative disharmony.
Likewise, the decision did not violate the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions. Appellant argues the Commission's decision "operate[d] to the disadvantage of a distinct class of persons in that it treats dependents of permanently totally disabled individuals worse than it treats dependents of permanently partially disabled individuals." There is a two-step analysis in determining whether there is a violation of equal protection. Etling v. Westport Heating Cooling Servs., Inc. , 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. banc 2003). "The first step is to determine whether the classification 'operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.'" Id. at 774 ( quoting Marriage of Kohring , 999 S.W.2d 228, 231-32 (Mo. banc 1999)). Suspect classes include race, national origin, or illegitimacy; fundamental rights include the rights to free speech, to vote, to freedom of interstate travel, and other basic liberties. Id. If the statute does not operate to the disadvantage of a suspect class or does not impinge upon a fundamental right, appellate review is limited to determining whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. Permanently totally disabled persons are not a suspect class, nor is there a fundamental basic liberty at issue; therefore, review is limited to whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
It is important to note that Appellant's equal protection of the laws challenge is directed to the Commission's award, and not to the provisions of the statute on which the award is based. "If the validity of the statute were challenged, the supreme court would have exclusive appellate jurisdiction." Tunstill v. Eagle Sheet Metal Works , 870 S.W.2d 264, 272 (Mo.App.S.D. 1994) ( citing Mo. Const. art. V, section 3). It is undisputed that the Commission is a state agency, and that its decision in this case constitutes state action. Id. As such, the equal protection clause applies to the decision of the Commission in this case. Id.
The focus of the statutes is on the compensation to which the employee is entitled. Section 287.230.2 essentially provides a right to dependents of an employee, who dies of causes unrelated to the injury for which he or she is entitled to compensation, to collect that compensation entitled to the deceased-employee. Section 287.200.1 essentially grants an employee the right to be compensated for permanent total disabilities only for his or her lifetime. A permanently totally disabled person is not entitled to benefits after his or her death. The Commission's decision interpreted the statute in a way that was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. That interest is in the different compensation of totally disabled persons and partially disabled persons.
In the present case, Fred had a permanent total disability, and therefore, pursuant to section 287.200.1, he was entitled to compensation during his lifetime. Upon his death, his dependents were not entitled to receive any of that compensation. If Fred had a permanent partial disability, his compensation would have been determined according to section 287.190, and that amount would have been fixed and finite. Fred would have been entitled to that full compensation. Bone , 449 S.W.2d at 174; Nations , 43 S.W.2d at 859; Henderson , 267 S.W.2d at 351. Thus, under section 287.230.2, his dependents, upon his death, would have been entitled to the balance of the compensation that he was already entitled to. Thus, there is a rational basis for the Commission's construction of the statutes in that it only allows dependents of a deceased employee to collect that compensation which the employee was entitled to receive. There being a rational basis for the Commission's construction of the law, this Court must conclude that the Commission's decision violated neither the equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution nor of the Missouri Constitution. The point is denied.
As noted in the facts, Cruiser Country in fact settled the permanent partial disability claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
Parrish, J., Lynch, J., concur.