We, and our predecessors, however, have sustained delegations of legislative power to administrative officials, boards and commissions involving comparable guides and standards or even those less restrictive. See, e.g., McBriety v. Baltimore City, 219 Md. 223, 238, 148 A.2d 408, 418 (1959) [rules and regulations "proper and necessary" to enforce multiple-family dwelling ordinance for protection of the public interest]; Givner v. Commissioner of Health of Baltimore City, 207 Md. 184, 191-92, 113 A.2d 899, 902 (1955) [rules and regulations "necessary and proper" for the enforcement of the health ordinance], citing with approval Petrushansky v. State, 182 Md. 164, 32 A.2d 696 (1943) ["maintain the premises in clean condition"]; Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951) [Private trade schools must obtain certificates of approval by the State Superintendent of Schools where the conditions of entrance, scholarship, educational qualifications, standards and facilities "were adequate and appropriate" for the purposes, program, training and courses to be taught.]. In Givner, we said in regard to our prior decisions:

There are general statements in past opinions of this Court, which taken apart from the actual decisions involved, appear to support the claim that even though there be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared that where there is full opportunity for a property owner to protest an assessment to administrative agencies and adequate provisions for judicial review of the agencies' action, a court shall not take jurisdiction unless the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

There are general statements in past opinions of this Court, which taken apart from the actual decisions involved, appear to support the claim that even though there be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared that where there is full opportunity for a property owner to protest an assessment to administrative agencies and adequate provisions for judicial review of the agencies' action, a court shall not take jurisdiction unless the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

It is interesting to note that the General Assembly of Maryland in the Acts of 1947, Chapter 489, Code (1957), Article 77, § 25, required all private schools or educational institutions, "except those operated by bona fide church organizations" to obtain a certificate of approval from the State Superintendent of Schools of Maryland before they could begin or continue to operate in Maryland, thus making a similar (but perhaps broader) type of classification as is involved in the case at bar. Our predecessors in Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951) sustained the constitutionality of the guides and standards set forth in the act for the guidance of the State Superintendent in issuing the certificates of approval, but did not specifically consider the portion of the statute above quoted. We agree with the appellants that the mere fact that a private school may operate for profit while a parochial school generally does not, would not be, in itself, a sufficient distinction to justify a different treatment by the legislative body. There may well be private schools which are not parochial within the meaning of the ordinance, and which operate on a non-profit basis, but which may also be required to obtain a special exception under the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance.