"See also, e.g., Poe v. Baltimore City, supra, 241 Md. at 308-311, 216 A.2d at 709-711; Richmark Realty v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 281, 173 A.2d 196, 200 (1961); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 84, 102 A.2d 821, 825 (1954) ("the constitutionality of a statute may be challenged in a declaratory judgment action on the ground that the title of the statute is not descriptive of the body, as required by the State Constitution"); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68-69, 81 A.2d 226, 228-229 (1951) (litigant "does not have to" invoke and exhaust his administrative remedy "in order to raise the constitutional question of the validity of the act as a whole"). The "constitutional exception" recognized in these cases does not mean that the constitutionality of a statute as a whole cannot be raised and initially decided in the statutorily prescribed administrative proceedings.

There are general statements in past opinions of this Court, which taken apart from the actual decisions involved, appear to support the claim that even though there be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared that where there is full opportunity for a property owner to protest an assessment to administrative agencies and adequate provisions for judicial review of the agencies' action, a court shall not take jurisdiction unless the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

"The Legislature cannot, of course, interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding." Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1951). Notwithstanding the clear expressed intention by Art. 26A, § 10 (a) to exempt the decisions and actions of the Board from judicial review, under Art. 41, § 255(a), this Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.

Thus, it is conceded by Smith that the constitutional attack is not upon the validity of the legislation as enacted, but upon the application of the general statutory plan to a particular situation. The Department points to Chertkof Trust v. Department of Natural Resources, 265 Md. 291, 289 A.2d 314 (1972); Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 216 A.2d 707 (1966); and Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951), and urges that before Smith can be heard in an attack upon the validity of the statutory plan as applied to its situation, it must first exhaust its administrative remedies by applying for a permit. We agree, notwithstanding Smith's contention that it did not commence the litigation and that it "cannot be premature in a suit that [it] did not institute, any more than the State can complain about prematurity in the action it did commence."

By the same token, the legislature cannot "interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding." Id., at 500, 331 A.2d 55 (quoting Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951)). It is well recognized that courts cannot be divested of their inherent power to review actions of administrative agencies that are arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Gould, 273 Md. at 502, 331 A.2d 55; see also Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280, 40 A.2d 673 (1945).

Therefore, a litigant must first pursue the applicable administrative process; other remedies cannot be pursued prematurely. Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 81 Md. App. 54, 62, 566 A.2d 792 (1989). Although the Commission has not argued the principles pertaining to exhaustion of administrative remedies, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is sometimes treated like a jurisdictional issue.