We examined the application of the declaratory judgment statutes to administrative proceedings in Secretary, Department of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 409 A.2d 713 (1979), when we stated: "Ordinarily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed to be exclusive.White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1950). More particularly, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Md. Code (1974) §§ 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly provides:

"See also, e.g., Poe v. Baltimore City, supra, 241 Md. at 308-311, 216 A.2d at 709-711; Richmark Realty v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 281, 173 A.2d 196, 200 (1961); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 84, 102 A.2d 821, 825 (1954) ("the constitutionality of a statute may be challenged in a declaratory judgment action on the ground that the title of the statute is not descriptive of the body, as required by the State Constitution"); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68-69, 81 A.2d 226, 228-229 (1951) (litigant "does not have to" invoke and exhaust his administrative remedy "in order to raise the constitutional question of the validity of the act as a whole"). The "constitutional exception" recognized in these cases does not mean that the constitutionality of a statute as a whole cannot be raised and initially decided in the statutorily prescribed administrative proceedings.

Although there is no question that the legislature may impose "rational conditions upon the right to turn to the courts for redress of grievances," Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 282-83, 385 A.2d 57, 62, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978), disapproved on other grounds, Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 734, 594 A.2d 1152, 1161 (1991), it may not "interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding." Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500, 331 A.2d 55, 65-55 (1975), citing Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1951). In the case of alleged election fraud, the arbitration requirement of § 5-310 is certainly a rational condition upon the right to turn to the courts, but the legislature could not impose a blanket prohibition of all judicial review of arbitration awards resulting from application of § 5-310.

There are general statements in past opinions of this Court, which taken apart from the actual decisions involved, appear to support the claim that even though there be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared that where there is full opportunity for a property owner to protest an assessment to administrative agencies and adequate provisions for judicial review of the agencies' action, a court shall not take jurisdiction unless the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

Ordinarily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed to be exclusive. White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1950). More particularly, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Md. Code (1974) § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly provides:

There are general statements in past opinions of this Court, which taken apart from the actual decisions involved, appear to support the claim that even though there be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared that where there is full opportunity for a property owner to protest an assessment to administrative agencies and adequate provisions for judicial review of the agencies' action, a court shall not take jurisdiction unless the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

"The Legislature cannot, of course, interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding." Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1951). Notwithstanding the clear expressed intention by Art. 26A, § 10 (a) to exempt the decisions and actions of the Board from judicial review, under Art. 41, § 255(a), this Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.

Thus, it is conceded by Smith that the constitutional attack is not upon the validity of the legislation as enacted, but upon the application of the general statutory plan to a particular situation. The Department points to Chertkof Trust v. Department of Natural Resources, 265 Md. 291, 289 A.2d 314 (1972); Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 216 A.2d 707 (1966); and Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951), and urges that before Smith can be heard in an attack upon the validity of the statutory plan as applied to its situation, it must first exhaust its administrative remedies by applying for a permit. We agree, notwithstanding Smith's contention that it did not commence the litigation and that it "cannot be premature in a suit that [it] did not institute, any more than the State can complain about prematurity in the action it did commence."

Even when there is provision for review, the jurisdiction of the courts is not ousted when the agency acts in an illegal or unconstitutional manner. Burns v. Mayor C.C. of Midland, 247 Md. 548, 554-55, 234 A.2d 162 (1967); Truitt v. Bd. of Public Works, 243 Md. 375, 391, 221 A.2d 370 (1966); Richmark Realty Co. v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 173 A.2d 196 (1961); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951). We think that the court below made the wrong choice.

"In support of their argument, the appellants cite general statements from some of this Court's prior opinions which, taken apart from the actual decisions involved, tend to support their contention. For example, in Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951), Chief Judge Marbury, for the Court, said: 'We have, however, been careful to point out that where constitutional questions are involved, the litigant has the right to raise them in a court of equity, and such court has the right to consider them,' and in Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951), Chief Judge Marbury said, for the Court: 'It has been, of course, well settled that where a constitutional question is involved, equity may intervene and enjoin action by an administrative body, although this is not favored where there are statutory remedies which permit the raising of such a question.'