The Maryland Court of Appeals has already held the virtually identical language in the precursor statute to § 12-201 to be sufficiently definite and unambiguous to permit it to stand as proper legislative guidance to the State Board for Higher Education. Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951). In Schneider, a barber challenged the language about which Havis complains as an unlawful delegation of legislative power "because it provides no definite standards by which the State Superintendent of Schools is to be guided in issuing his regulations and in granting permits."

It is clear that a court of equity has jurisdiction over issues involving the maintenance of civil rights, Adams v. Commissioners of Town of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954), and at least in some matters involving consideration of personal rights, e.g., rights protected by the federal or state constitutions. In Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1951), we flatly held "that where constitutional questions are involved, the litigant has the right to raise them in a court of equity, and such court has the right to consider them." To the same effect, see Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 216 A.2d 707 (1966); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387 (1951).

We, and our predecessors, however, have sustained delegations of legislative power to administrative officials, boards and commissions involving comparable guides and standards or even those less restrictive. See, e.g., McBriety v. Baltimore City, 219 Md. 223, 238, 148 A.2d 408, 418 (1959) [rules and regulations "proper and necessary" to enforce multiple-family dwelling ordinance for protection of the public interest]; Givner v. Commissioner of Health of Baltimore City, 207 Md. 184, 191-92, 113 A.2d 899, 902 (1955) [rules and regulations "necessary and proper" for the enforcement of the health ordinance], citing with approval Petrushansky v. State, 182 Md. 164, 32 A.2d 696 (1943) ["maintain the premises in clean condition"]; Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951) [Private trade schools must obtain certificates of approval by the State Superintendent of Schools where the conditions of entrance, scholarship, educational qualifications, standards and facilities "were adequate and appropriate" for the purposes, program, training and courses to be taught.]. In Givner, we said in regard to our prior decisions:

Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880. It was used to attack the act authorizing the regulation of private trade schools. Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226. We repeat that where a statute provides a special form of remedy, the plaintiff must use such form rather than any other, but constitutional issues may be decided in an action for a declaratory judgment or decree or injunction if there is no by-passing of an administrative agency in a case calling for determination of facts within the sphere of the agency's expertness. Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 192 Md. 333, 64 A.2d 151; Francis v. MacGill, 196 Md. 77, 75 A.2d 91; Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387; Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226; Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 540, 95 A.2d 286, 288; Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 577, 97 A.2d 449, 453.

We examined the application of the declaratory judgment statutes to administrative proceedings in Secretary, Department of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 409 A.2d 713 (1979), when we stated: "Ordinarily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed to be exclusive.White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1950). More particularly, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Md. Code (1974) §§ 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly provides:

"See also, e.g., Poe v. Baltimore City, supra, 241 Md. at 308-311, 216 A.2d at 709-711; Richmark Realty v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 281, 173 A.2d 196, 200 (1961); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 84, 102 A.2d 821, 825 (1954) ("the constitutionality of a statute may be challenged in a declaratory judgment action on the ground that the title of the statute is not descriptive of the body, as required by the State Constitution"); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68-69, 81 A.2d 226, 228-229 (1951) (litigant "does not have to" invoke and exhaust his administrative remedy "in order to raise the constitutional question of the validity of the act as a whole"). The "constitutional exception" recognized in these cases does not mean that the constitutionality of a statute as a whole cannot be raised and initially decided in the statutorily prescribed administrative proceedings.

Although there is no question that the legislature may impose "rational conditions upon the right to turn to the courts for redress of grievances," Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 282-83, 385 A.2d 57, 62, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978), disapproved on other grounds, Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 734, 594 A.2d 1152, 1161 (1991), it may not "interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding." Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500, 331 A.2d 55, 65-55 (1975), citing Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1951). In the case of alleged election fraud, the arbitration requirement of § 5-310 is certainly a rational condition upon the right to turn to the courts, but the legislature could not impose a blanket prohibition of all judicial review of arbitration awards resulting from application of § 5-310.

There are general statements in past opinions of this Court, which taken apart from the actual decisions involved, appear to support the claim that even though there be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared that where there is full opportunity for a property owner to protest an assessment to administrative agencies and adequate provisions for judicial review of the agencies' action, a court shall not take jurisdiction unless the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

This compensation is in no way tied to the Workmen's Compensation statute. An attempt to so tie it ignores the fact that a scheme existed for compensation for injured prisoners under that statute and that the General Assembly in its wisdom saw fit to eliminate that scheme and to substitute the Sundry Claims Board in its stead. It has specified the criteria to be followed by the Board. We have no contention in this case that the statute is unconstitutional because of the absence of sufficient guides and standards to govern the administrative body. See, e.g., Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951), and Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 24 A.2d 911 (1942). Thus, our opinion here is not to be interpreted as approving or disapproving this statute as to constitutionality.

Ordinarily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed to be exclusive. White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1950). More particularly, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Md. Code (1974) § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly provides: