Opinion
No. 297562.
June 9, 2011. UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from Macomb Circuit Court, LC No. 2009-002073-NI.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and O'CONNELL and METER, JJ.
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court's March 29, 2010, order granting defendant summary disposition. We affirm.
Plaintiff William Schmitt (hereinafter "Schmitt") acted as a porter driver for defendant dealership; he picked up and delivered automobiles. After one such delivery, another individual was driving Schmitt back to the dealership in an automobile owned by defendant when an accident occurred. Schmitt sustained severe injuries, and he and his wife sued defendant under various theories. Defendant argued that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was provided by the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., because Schmitt was defendant's employee. The trial court agreed.
On appeal, plaintiffs solely argue that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether Schmitt was defendant's employee because a magistrate had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue under the WDCA.
We review de novo whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Attica Hydraulic Exch v Seslar, 264 Mich App 577, 587; 691 NW2d 802 (2004). In Sewell v Clearing Machine Co, 419 Mich 56, 57-58, 64; 347 NW2d 447 (1984), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant in a personal-injury action. Based on Sewell, we are bound to conclude that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether Schmitt was defendant's employee. See Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 447; 761 NW2d 846 (2008). Although some members of the Supreme Court criticized the "atmospherics surrounding the Sewell decision" in Reed v Yackell, 473 Mich 520, 539; 703 NW2d 1 (2005) (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J., joined by YOUNG and MARKMAN, JJ.), and Justice Corrigan concluded that Sewell was wrongly decided, id. at 553-560 (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.), the Court explicitly did not overrule Sewell, and until a Supreme Court decision is overruled by the Supreme Court itself, we must follow the decision. Paige v City of Sterling Hts, 476 Mich 495, 524; 720 NW2d 219 (2006). Plaintiffs acknowledge this in their brief. Plaintiffs must direct their arguments that Sewell was wrongly decided to the Michigan Supreme Court.
Affirmed.