Schefflerv. Archdiocese of St. Paul Minneapolis, 563 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn.App. 1997). Summary jdugment, however, is appropriate when there is "compelling evidence that a reasonable person in the same situation as the complainant" should have known that he or she was abused.
Generally, the date on which a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he or she was sexually abused involves a factual determination and it is, therefore, a question for the trier of fact. See Scheffler v. Archdiocese of St. Paul Minneapolis, 563 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn.App. 1997), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1997). Summary judgment is proper, however, when there are no genuine issues of material fact and any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment on appellants' nonfraud claims.
We disagree. In Scheffler v. Archdiocese of St. Paul Minneapolis, 563 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn.App. 1997), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1997), the plaintiff argued that he did not recognize a sexual encounter with a priest in 1981 as abuse until 12 years later, when another person labeled it abuse. This court pointed out that Scheffler never forgot the sexual abuse, although his memory became less accessible due to years of denial and substance abuse after the contact, and cited the supreme court's ruling that [c]oncepts of sexual abuse and injury within the meaning of [the delayed discovery statute] are essentially one and the same, not separable — as a matter of law one is `injured' if one is sexually abused.