Crystal also challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's reasoning in ruling for the insurers. However, we need not address this issue for two reasons: (1) our review is de novo, Schapiro v. Security Sav. Loan Ass'n, 149 Wis.2d 176, 181, 441 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App. 1989); and (2) we reverse the court's ruling on other grounds. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The case law is sparse but two cases shed some light on the way the state courts view the question. In Schapiro v. Security Savings Loan Ass'n, 149 Wis. 2d 176, 441 N.W.2d 241 (Ct.App. 1989), S.A. Schapiro conveyed his and his wife Violetta's residence to his brother in 1976, without informing his wife or obtaining her consent. A few days later, Violetta Schapiro moved out of the house and filed for divorce. Sometime afterwards, S.A.'s brother conveyed the property to his sister, who managed the property before later selling it. (S.A. gave his sister a quit claim deed to the property in 1977.)

" The December 2002 and April 2003 mortgages here were not conveyances between spouses, but were conveyances between Stehno and U.S. Bank. As we have stated, "A conveyance that does not satisfy the statute is void and cannot be enforced against either spouse." Schapiro v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 149 Wis. 2d 176, 181-82, 441 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing State Bank of Drummond v. Christophersen, 93 Wis. 2d 148, 157, 286 N.W.2d 547 (1980) ).¶12 As indicated, U.S. Bank asserts that "Wells' signatures on the [December 2002 mortgage] or the [April 2003 mortgage] were not required under [ WIS. STAT. ] § 706.02(1)(f)," because Wells "no longer had an interest in the homestead property" after she executed the December 2002 quit claim deed. It cites to our supreme court's decision in Jones v. Estate of Jones, 2002 WI 61, 253 Wis. 2d 158, 646 N.W.2d 280, claiming that the court there "confirmed" that the wife in Jones"had the full authority to convey the homestead without requiring the husband to sign the deed or a separate conveyance because he waived his rights in the homestead" in a premarital agreement he signed years earlier.

¶ 8. WISCONSIN STAT. § 706.09 operates as a "title curative" statute that corrects defects in titles to real estate. Schapiro v. Security SL Ass'n, 149 Wis. 2d 176, 185-86, 441 N.W.2d 241 (Ct.App. 1989). It extinguishes interests or claims that are adverse to or inconsistent with merchantable title when the following circumstances are present. See WIS. STAT. § 706.09; see also Badger State Agri-Credit Realty, Inc. v. Lubahn, 122 Wis. 2d 718, 728-29, 365 N.W.2d 616 (Ct.App. 1985).

In reviewing summary judgments, we apply the methodology set forth in § 802.08(2), Stats., in the same manner as the trial court. We owe the trial court no deference and conduct our review de novo. SeeSchapiro v. Security Sav. Loan Ass'n, 149 Wis.2d 176, 181, 441 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App. 1989). That methodology has been often repeated, seePreloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis.2d 112, 115-16, 334 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Ct.App. 1983), and we do not, therefore, recite it here. Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

On July 31, 1992, Judge Hugh F. Nelson retired and was succeeded by Judge Donald A. Poppy, who entered summary judgment in favor of Newell and an order denying Roebke's motion for reconsideration. In reviewing summary judgments, we apply the methodology set forth in sec. 802.08(2), Stats., in the same manner as the trial court, and our review is de novo. Schapiro v. Security Sav. Loan Ass'n, 149 Wis.2d 176, 181, 441 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App. 1989). The summary judgment methodology has been repeated often, and we need not recite it here.

The plaintiffs do not dispute that the farm was Jerold's and Ruth's homestead and that Ruth had an interest therein. The mortgages were subject to ch. 706, Stats., sec. 706.01(1) and (4), Stats. "A conveyance that does not satisfy the statute [of frauds] is void and cannot be enforced against either spouse." Schapiro v. Security Savings Loan, 149 Wis.2d 176, 181 441 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App. 1989). The circuit court held however, that Jerold and Ruth waived the statute of fraud's defense by not pleading it as an affirmative defense. We agree.

. . . Any of the . . . issues raised and not discussed . . . can be deemed to lack sufficient merit or importance to warrant individual attention. State v. Waste Management of Wis., Inc., 261 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Wis. 1978); see also Schapiro v. Security Sav. Loan, 441 N.W.2d 241, 245 n. 4 (Wis.Ct.App. 1989); Brandmiller v. Arreola, 525 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Wis.Ct.App. 1994). Moreover, "[p]rocedural fairness does not require an appellate court to discuss every issue raised by an appellant.

They must also show that their removal from the property was "made ‘with a certain and abiding intention to return to the premises and reside there .... A vague intention to return someday is insufficient.’ " Krueger , 507 N.W.2d at 157–58 (quoting Schapiro v. Sec. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 149 Wis.2d 176, 441 N.W.2d 241, 244 (App. 1989) ). II

We have found none. See, e.g., Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Wis.2d 824, 840-42, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993); Elmakias v. Wayda, 228 Wis.2d 312, 318-23, 596 N.W.2d 869 (Ct.App. 1999); Chase Lumber Fuel Co., Inc. v. Chase, 228 Wis.2d 179, 206-10, 596 N.W.2d 840 (Ct.App. 1999); Gardner v. Gardner, 190 Wis.2d 216, 248-51, 527 N.W.2d 701 (Ct.App. 1994); Schapiro v. Sec. Sav. Loan, 149 Wis.2d 176, 187-89, 441 N.W.2d 241 (Ct.App. 1989); Tracy v. DOR, 133 Wis.2d 151, 162-63, 394 N.W.2d 756 (Ct.App. 1986); Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis.2d 575, 580-84, 338 N.W.2d 861 (Ct.App. 1983). ¶ 7 JON P. WILCOX, ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and DIANE S. SYKES, JJ., did not participate.