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Schaad v. Susquehanna Capital Group

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Mar 3, 2005
No. 03 Civ. 9902 (LTS)(DFE) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2005)

Opinion

No. 03 Civ. 9902 (LTS)(DFE).

March 3, 2005


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


This Court, on August 10, 2004, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding petitions by Petitioner Ian Schaad to confirm an arbitration award and by Respondents Susquehanna Capital Group ("SCG"), Susquehanna Financial Group LLP ("SFG"), Susquehanna International Group ("SIG"), and Susquehanna Ireland Limited ("SIL"), to vacate the award, pursuant to section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 9. The petition to confirm the award was granted in part and denied in part; the petition to vacate the award was granted to the extent it granted declaratory relief against Respondents SIG and SIL; the petition to vacate was denied insofar as it sought to vacate the attorneys' fee portion of the award; and the Court entered judgment on the award. Respondents SCG and SFG now seek reconsideration of the Court's refusal to vacate the attorneys' fee portion of the award. The Court construes the reconsideration application as a request pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the judgment.

The Court has considered carefully the parties' submissions in this regard. Respondents' motion to reconsider is denied. In general, in order to succeed on a motion for reconsideration, a party must show that the Court overlooked "controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court." Range Road Music., Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The relevant standards for relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) are even more stringent. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).

In moving to vacate the attorneys' fee component of the arbitration award, Respondents argued that the arbitrators exceeded their authority because they awarded attorneys' fees in a manner inconsistent with the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") rules governing arbitration. Respondents also raised an argument that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by including in the amount of attorneys' fees awarded costs incurred by Petitioner in his defense of related litigation in Pennsylvania state court brought by Respondent SIG. The Court ruled that the record was insufficient to support a determination on the latter issue because there was no evidence proffered to explain the allocation of attorneys' fees as between the arbitration and the Pennsylvania litigation, nor was it apparent from the face of the award how the attorneys' fees were allocated. Mem. Op. and Order, at 12 n. 1.

Respondents now renew the argument that the attorneys' fee award included costs incurred in the Pennsylvania litigation, citing Petitioner's affidavit submitted in connection with his Petition to confirm, which represents that the $48,172 amount of attorneys' fees was incurred "in connection with my prosecution of the arbitration and my defense of the Pennsylvania litigation."

Aff. of Ian R. Schaad at ¶ 2.E.

The Court did not overlook Schaad's affidavit or any other part of the record before it in ruling on the parties' respective motions to confirm and vacate the arbitration award. As noted in the August 10, 2004, decision, the arbitrators invoked NASD rule 10215 in making the fee award as against NASD members SCG and SFG. The arbitrators also issued declarations purporting to declare Petitoner's rights under the employment and tax equalization agreements in question as against those two entities. Rule 10215 is written broadly: "The arbitrator(s) shall have the authority to provide for reasonable attorneys' fee reimbursement, in whole or in part, as part of the remedy in accordance with applicable law." NASD Rule 10324 empowers the arbitrators "to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code," and further provides that "[s]uch interpretations . . . shall be final and binding upon the parties."

For the reasons explained at pages 11 through 13 of the Court's August 10, 2004, Order, and because the breadth of NASD Rule 10215 provides at least a colorable basis for a fee award in connection with the Pennsylvania dispute over Schaad's employment and tax equalization agreements, vacatur of the fee award would be improper even if the factual record were clarified to show that most of the fees awarded were incurred in the Pennsylvania litigation regarding the validity of the agreements. See Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).

Respondents have not raised any controlling decisions or factual matters that this Court failed to consider in ruling on the motions to confirm and vacate the arbitration award, nor have they demonstrated that any of the Rule 60(b) criteria are met. Accordingly, Respondents' motion for reconsideration is denied.

For the reasons stated above, the Court would adhere to its August 10, 2004, decision even if it were to grant reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Schaad v. Susquehanna Capital Group

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Mar 3, 2005
No. 03 Civ. 9902 (LTS)(DFE) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2005)
Case details for

Schaad v. Susquehanna Capital Group

Case Details

Full title:IAN SCHAAD, Petitioner, v. SUSQUEHANNA CAPITAL GROUP, SUSQUEHANNA…

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Mar 3, 2005

Citations

No. 03 Civ. 9902 (LTS)(DFE) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2005)