Opinion
2:20-cv-4288-BHH-MGB
10-24-2023
Elizabeth De'Anna Scannell, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, Medical University of South Carolina, Cynthia Bradford, Mosetta Clark, Louchetia Simmons-Robinson, Jane Bell, Michael Leach, Donna Johnson, Michelle Irene Amaya, Kelly Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, MUSC Administrator 3, and MUSC Public Safety Supervisor, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Elizabeth De'Anna Scannell (“Plaintiff”), now proceeding pro se, brought this civil action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), and South Carolina state law. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) This matter is before the Court upon two Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 130, 132)-one filed by the Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) and its employees (the “individual MUSC Defendants,” and together, the “MUSC Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 130), and one filed by the South Carolina Department of Social Services (“SCDSS”) and its employees (the “individual SCDSS Defendants,” and together, the “SCDSS Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 132). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motions (Dkt. Nos. 130, 132) before the Court be GRANTED.
The allegations contained herein are taken primarily from the Complaint in an effort to ensure that this Background section is drafted in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.)
This civil action centers around the birth of Plaintiff's child. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was 49 years old when she became pregnant with her child through in vitro fertilization. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9.) Early in her pregnancy, she was diagnosed with placenta previa, a medical condition where the placenta lies low in the uterus and partially or completely covers the cervix. (Id. at 11.) Because of her advanced age and placenta previa diagnosis, Plaintiff's pregnancy was considered high-risk, and she was referred to the Maternal-Fetal Medicine unit at MUSC. (Id. at 12-13.) Throughout her care at MUSC, Plaintiff was advised that she should deliver her child before 40 weeks of gestation via cesarean section to avoid complications. (Id. at 13-17.) Plaintiff expressed a desire for a natural birth no sooner than 40 weeks gestation. (Id.)
On May 26, 2018, Plaintiff was brought to MUSC by ambulance due to vaginal bleeding. (Id. at 16.) The bleeding was managed, and Plaintiff was discharged after a period of observation. (Id. at 16-17.) Plaintiff was instructed to return for inpatient management until delivery if she experienced bleeding again. (Id.) Plaintiff visited MUSC for several prenatal appointments in the following weeks. (Id. at 17-20.) At those appointments, she was advised of the risks to her and her child if she did not have a cesarean delivery prior to 40 weeks gestation. (Id.) She continued to “express[] her desire for a natural childbirth and allowing the baby to develop in the womb for as long as possible.” (Id. at 18.) At one appointment, Plaintiff was advised of “the hospital's position regarding [its] responsibility to rescue her and the baby if she were not to consent to cesarean.” (Id. at 20.) On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff agreed to a tentative birth plan. (Id. at 21-22.)
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff agreed to schedule a cesarean delivery on a few occasions but changed her mind each time. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19-20.)
On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff was brought to MUSC by ambulance. (Id. at 22.) She reported that she was assaulted by the father of her child and complained of “pain all over.” (Dkt. No. 1309.) She was sent to the Labor and Delivery unit for observation. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 22.) According to the Complaint, she was “assessed, and discharged with no new concerns.” (Id.)
On the evening of July 7, 2018, Plaintiff reported to MUSC with concerns of decreased fetal movement. (Id.) It was recommended that she be admitted for cesarean delivery, but she declined and was discharged. (Id. at 22-23.) She returned to MUSC hours later, at approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 8, 2018, by ambulance, due to bleeding. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff had “passed a golf ball sized clot” and was experiencing irregular contractions. (Id.) She was set up with continuous electronic fetal monitoring in the Labor and Delivery unit. (Id.) Her fetal status was reassuring. (Id.) Over the next few days, the doctors at MUSC repeatedly recommended that she undergo a cesarean delivery. (Id. at 23-30.) Plaintiff repeatedly declined. (Id.) At one point, she agreed to schedule the cesarean delivery, but then changed her mind. (Id.) According to the Complaint, the results of her “antepartum non-stress tests” remained “reactive and reassuring” throughout this period. (Id. at 23-29.)
On July 12, 2018, Defendant Johnson met with Plaintiff. (Id. at 29-30.) According to Defendant Johnson's notes from this meeting, Defendant Johnson spent many hours discussing a cesarean delivery with Plaintiff and explaining the consequences if Plaintiff continued to decline to have one. (Id.) Defendant Johnson noted that Plaintiff was bleeding and trying to hide her pads from the nurses, presumably so they could not see the extent of the bleeding. (Id.) Defendant Johnson also noted that Plaintiff remaining pregnant was detrimental to her child. (Id.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff still insisted on a vaginal delivery. (Id.)
Defendant Johnson indicated that Plaintiff may not be capable of making medical decisions for herself and her child, and recommended that Plaintiff have a psychological consult. (Id. at 30.) A psychiatrist was sent to Plaintiff's room, but Plaintiff asked him to leave before he could complete an evaluation. (Id. at 30-31.) Defendant Johnson's notes also indicate that she spoke to administration about Plaintiff, and that “the pediatric team [] notified DSS” of Plaintiff's situation. (Id. at 30.)
Soon after Defendant Johnson's meeting with Plaintiff, Plaintiff was placed in Emergency Protective Custody (“EPC”). (Id. at 31.) Later that evening, Defendant Johnson returned to Plaintiff's room to inform her that she was in EPC. (Id. at 32.) Plaintiff delivered her child via cesarean delivery early the next morning (Friday, July 13, 2018). (Id. at 35.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff agreed to have the cesarean section delivery before it was performed. (Id. at 32-35.) Defendant Bradford, a case worker for SCDSS, arrived at the hospital later that day and notified Plaintiff that her child was placed in EPC upon delivery. (Id. at 36-37.)
The following Monday, July 16, 2018, the Charleston County Family Court held a probable cause hearing to consider Plaintiff's and her child's placement in EPC. (Id. at 49-50; see also Dkt. No. 132-8.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel at this probable cause hearing. (Dkt. No. 132-8.) At the hearing, the family court determined that there was probable cause for both placements, but probable cause no longer remained for either. (Dkt. Nos. 132-8, 156-2, 156-3.) The family court ordered that Plaintiff's child should be returned to her custody, that SCDSS should complete their investigation into Plaintiff's situation, and that Plaintiff should comply with all aspects of SCDSS's investigation. (Dkt. Nos. 132-8, 156-3.) A merits hearing was scheduled for August 8, 2018. (Dkt. No. 132-2; Dkt. No. 132-6; Dkt. No. 156-2; Dkt. No. 156-3.)
On July 17, 2018, Defendant Bradford met with Plaintiff in her hospital room to develop a safety plan to protect Plaintiff's child during SCDSS's investigation of the situation. (Dkt. No. 11 at 52; Dkt. No. 132-2 at 5.) The safety plan was to take effect upon Plaintiff's discharge from the hospital. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 52; Dkt. No. 132-2 at 5.) Under its terms, Plaintiff was to be supervised when caring for her child. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 5.)
Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital later that day. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 53.) According to the Complaint, she “left the hospital with her baby and entered twenty-four hour a day supervision at her own home.” (Id.) Later, she moved into her friends' home because supervision within her own home was not feasible. (Id. at 54.) In the following weeks, SCDSS conducted their investigation into Plaintiff's case. (Id. at 54-55.)
At the previously scheduled August 8, 2018 merits hearing, the presiding judge recused herself from Plaintiff's case, and the family court scheduled a second merits hearing on October 16, 2018. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 6; Dkt. No. 132-6 at 2; see generally Dkt. No. 132-9.) SCDSS's investigation into Plaintiff's case-which consisted of, inter alia, reviewing Plaintiff's medical records, visiting Plaintiff's home, and interviewing Plaintiff and her friends-continued until that date. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 4-7; Dkt. No. 132-6 at 1-3.) At the October 16, 2018 merits hearing, Plaintiff's case was closed, and she was no longer required to have supervision when caring for her child. (Dkt. No. 132-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 132-10 at 14.)
Plaintiff claims that she suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries on account of the Defendants' above-referenced actions. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) As such, she filed the instant litigation alleging violations of § 1983, § 1985, the ADA, the SCTCA, and South Carolina state law. (See generally id.) Plaintiff requests, inter alia, an award of damages and costs incurred in the filing of this lawsuit. (See generally id.)
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff originally filed this case in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, through counsel. The case was removed to federal court on December 20, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw stating that “Plaintiff and counsel do not agree on how to proceed in this matter.” (Dkt. No. 20.) The motion was granted by the Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks, United States District Judge, on March 1, 2022. (Dkt. No. 23.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. No. 26.)
After granting Plaintiff multiple extensions of time to retain new counsel, the Court briefly stayed the case to allow Plaintiff ample opportunity to find representation. (Dkt. Nos. 27, 31, 35, 36, 37.) On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff informed the Court that she was unable to retain counsel and would proceed as a pro se litigant. (Dkt. No. 39.) Upon receipt of this information, the Court entered a Fourth Amended Scheduling Order, requiring discovery by November 4, 2022, mediation by November 28, 2022, and dispositive motions by December 9, 2022. (Dkt. No. 40.) Following some discovery issues, the Court extended the dispositive motions deadline to May 5, 2023. (Dkt. No. 120.) The MUSC Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on that date, as did the SCDSS Defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 130, 132.) Plaintiff responded in opposition to the Motions on June 8, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 140, 141.) The MUSC Defendants replied to Plaintiff's response to their Motion on June 15, 2023. (Dkt. No. 143.) After requesting and receiving an extension, the SCDSS Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's response to their Motion on June 29, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 144, 146, 151.) As such, the Motions before the Court have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Because Plaintiff is representing herself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing her filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (referencing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
DISCUSSION
I. Federal Claims
Plaintiff's Complaint brings the following federal claims:
• Section 1983 claims against Defendants Cynthia Bradford, Mosetta Clark, Louchetia Simmons-Robinson, and Jane Bell (all SCDSS employees), alleging violation of Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights;
• Section 1983 claims against Defendants Donna Johnson, Michelle Irene Amaya, Kelly Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3 (all MUSC employees) for violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights;
• A claim against Defendant MUSC for violation of the ADA; and
• Section 1985 claims against Defendants Donna Johnson, Michelle Irene Amaya, Kelly Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3 (all MUSC employees) for violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 60-77.) The undersigned considers each of Plaintiff's federal claims, below.
For ease of reference, the undersigned has divided the discussion of Plaintiff's federal claims into those against the MUSC Defendants, and those against the SCDSS Defendants.
A. MUSC Defendants
1. Section 1983
Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights. Instead, it provides a remedy to redress violations of federal law grounded in federal constitutional provisions or statutes. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). In order to sustain a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997); accord West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the individual MUSC Defendants violated her constitutional rights by placing her in EPC “even though she was not a threat to herself or others and not a victim of abuse or neglect,” and by reporting her to SCDSS “despite the fact that no harm had been done and there was no threat of harm” to her unborn child. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 64-65.) Plaintiff claims that her placement in EPC constitutes an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 65.) Plaintiff also appears to allege that her baby's placement in EPC violated her constitutional right to maintain custody of her child. (Id.)
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people from “unreasonable searches and seizures” and applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 884 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022).
a. Defendants MUSC Administrators
At the outset, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Defendants MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3 from this case, without prejudice. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to uncover the identities of these Defendants, but discovery has now ended, and Plaintiff has not substituted named defendants in place of the unnamed MUSC Administrator Defendants. See Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 625-28 (4th Cir. 2019) (recognizing a court may dismiss a John Doe defendant without prejudice “if it does not appear that the true identity of an unnamed party can be discovered through discovery or through intervention by the court” (citing Schiff v. Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1982))); Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 347 n.1 (4th Cir. 2014) (same). Accordingly, the MUSC Administrator Defendants should be dismissed.
Regardless, the Section 1983 claims against the MUSC Administrator defendants would fail for the same reasons as her claims against the other individual MUSC Defendants. (See infra at Section I.A.1.b.)
b. Defendants Johnson, Amaya, and Finke
As noted, Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims against Defendants Johnson, Amaya, and Finke-all of whom are MUSC employees-alleging that they violated Plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizure. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 64.) In their summary judgment motion, the individual MUSC Defendants argue that “there is no dispute among the parties that the MUSC Defendants were acting as government officials during the alleged constitutional violations.... [t]hey are therefore afforded qualified immunity.” (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 16, referencing Dkt. No. 11 at 65-66.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned agrees and RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the individual MUSC Defendants be DISMISSED.
Defendant Johnson is a physician and Professor employed by MUSC; Defendant Amaya is a physician and Associate Professor employed by MUSC; and Defendant Finke is a Licensed Master Social Worker employed by MUSC. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5-6.)
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for “bad guesses in gray areas” and bases liability on the violation of bright-line rules. Id. (quoting Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Cloaninger ex rel. Est. of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the Court makes a two-pronged inquiry. Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The first prong asks “whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the [government official's] conduct violated a federal right.” Id. The second prong considers whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred, such that a reasonable person would have known the conduct was unconstitutional. Id. Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
Here, the individual MUSC Defendants first argue that they did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights when placing her baby in EPC because “a parent's right to custody is not absolute, and the authority of law under which the EPC was placed on the child in this matter is constitutional.” (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 17.) In support of this position, the individual MUSC Defendants cite to White by White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1997), where the Fourth Circuit determined that “removal of a child in an emergency action is constitutional when there is ‘some evidence of child abuse.'” (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 17.) The individual MUSC Defendants argue that “there was much more than ‘some evidence' of potential child abuse in this matter” and that “[t]he evidence is clear that there were serious concerns over Ms. Scannell's medical decisionmaking and the safety of the child's potential home, which warranted the EPC in this situation.” (Id.) The individual MUSC Defendants further note that “the family court analyzed the situation and found probable cause did exist [for the EPC]”, noting that probable cause is “a much higher standard than ‘some evidence.'” (Id.)
Based on the record before this Court, the undersigned concludes that the individual MUSC Defendants are indeed entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims that they violated her constitutional rights by placing her child in EPC. First, the record is replete with evidence indicating that the individual MUSC Defendants genuinely feared for the safety of Plaintiff's child. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 13021, 156-4.) For example, various medical records show that Plaintiff's doctors were concerned for the health of her child on account of Plaintiff's advanced age and high-risk pregnancy. (Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21.) These records also indicate that Plaintiff was repeatedly warned of the risks to herself and her child if she did not agree to have a cesarean section (including a warning that vaginal delivery “would most likely be catastrophic”), yet she continually declined the procedure. (Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21.)
Plaintiff's medical records also show that she was admitted to the hospital just days before she gave birth following a domestic violence incident in which she was assaulted by her baby's biological father. (Dkt. No. 130-9.) All of this evidence supported the individual MUSC Defendants' determination that Plaintiff's child should be placed in EPC. See Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs. for Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that removal of a child in an emergency action is constitutional when there is “some evidence of child abuse”); see also White by White, 112 F.3d at 736 (concluding that defendants' decision to pursue an order for removal of children was supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, constitutional, where medical professionals indicated that child's injury was evidence of abuse and investigation of alternative explanation for injury proved implausible).
What is more, Plaintiff's child was placed in EPC “under the authority of law which [the Fourth Circuit] has adjudged constitutional.” White by White, 112 F.3d at 735. As the Court explained in White by White, “South Carolina law limits the state's authority to assume emergency protective custody over children to those circumstances where ‘there is probable cause to believe that by reason of abuse or neglect there exists an imminent danger to the child's life or physical safety,'” and such significant substantive limitations upon removal authorization ensure that emergency custody remains constitutional by substantially reducing the risk of error when emergency removal of a child from his or her parents' custody is required. Id. Here, the family court presiding over Plaintiff's custody case determined that the decision to place Plaintiff's child in EPC was supported by probable cause. (Dkt. Nos. 156-2, 156-3.) As such, the undersigned simply cannot conclude that the individual MUSC Defendants' violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by placing her child in EPC. See White by White, 112 F.3d at 735-36. Further, the record before this Court supports a finding that the individual MUSC Defendants' decision to place Plaintiff's child in EPC was warranted based on the information before them at the time that decision was made.
Plaintiff's claims that the individual MUSC Defendants violated her constitutional rights by placing her in EPC fail for many of the same reasons. As noted, Plaintiff's medical records indicate that she was repeatedly informed of the risks to her own health if she did not have a cesarean section, yet she continued to delay the procedure. (Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21.) The medical records also note that Plaintiff was the victim of an assault at the hands of her child's father. (Dkt. No. 130-9.) Plaintiff makes much of the fact that she did not live with her child's father and that she ultimately agreed to have a cesarean delivery; however, she provides no evidence to suggest that the individual MUSC Defendants were aware of her specific living arrangements, nor evidence indicating that the individual MUSC Defendants could have predicted that Plaintiff would eventually succumb to their pleas for her to undergo a cesarean section. (See generally Dkt. No. 140.) Again, the record before the Court shows that the individual MUSC Defendants reasonably believed, based on the information available to them at the time, that Plaintiff was a vulnerable adult in a life-threatening situation who required protective custody. See S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-55.
Further, it is undisputed that MUSC's public safety officers actually placed Plaintiff in EPC, not Defendants Johnson, Amaya, and/or Finke.(See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 130-1, 140.) As with Defendants Johnson, Amaya, and Finke, the record demonstrates that the MUSC public safety officers had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff and her child were in imminent danger. Again, Plaintiff's doctors indicated that Plaintiff's medical decision-making put both Plaintiff and her child at risk. (See Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21. 156-4.) Plaintiff's doctors also had reason to believe that Plaintiff and her child might encounter domestic violence at the hands of Plaintiff's child's biological father upon their return from the hospital. (See Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21. 156-4.) Thus, Plaintiff's doctors requested that the MUSC public safety officers take Plaintiff and her child into EPC. In doing so, the MUSC public safety officers acted in reliance on the doctors' recommendations, as well as valid state statutes. See S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-55 (noting that a law enforcement officer may take a vulnerable adult in a life-threatening situation into protective custody if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that by reason of abuse, neglect, or exploitation there exists an imminent danger to the vulnerable adult's life or physical safety; (2) the vulnerable adult or caregiver does not consent to protective custody; and (3) there is not time to apply for a court order); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-620 (explaining that a law enforcement officer may take emergency protective custody of a child without the consent of the child's parent[] . . . if: “(1) the officer has probable cause to believe that by reason of abuse or neglect the child's life, health, or physical safety is in substantial and imminent danger if the child is not taken into emergency protective custody, and there is not time to apply for a court order pursuant to Section 63-7-1660.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's placement in EPC was not unconstitutional, nor was her child's.
Plaintiff's Complaint does not bring a Section 1983 claim against MUSC's public safety officers. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Even assuming that a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights had occurred, there is nonetheless “no clearly established authority available which would have notified [the individual MUSC Defendants] that their conduct was unlawful.” S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff points the Court to no such authority and the Court's independent research confirms the same. In sum, the record conclusively demonstrates that the individual MUSC Defendants made necessary choices under difficult circumstances, and acted within the bounds of the law to do what they thought was best for Plaintiff and her baby. The record simply does not support a finding that the individual MUSC Defendants “transgress[ed] [any] bright line []” that would render qualified immunity unavailable. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). For these reasons, the individual MUSC Defendants would also be entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims and such claims should therefore be dismissed.
2. ADA
Plaintiff next brings a claim against Defendant MUSC under the ADA. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 67-69.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she is “a qualified individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act in that she was perceived to have a disability and was denied reasonable services by [Defendant MUSC]” and that Defendant MUSC “violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by claiming and perceiving [Plaintiff] was mentally incompetent but it refused to provide her with services and treatment when she was seized and placed into the care of [Defendant MUSC].” (Id. at 68-69.) Plaintiff's ADA claim falls short for the reasons set forth below.
To sustain a Title II discrimination claim under the ADA (which appears to be the type of claim alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint),Plaintiff must prove that (1) she had a disability; (2) she was otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of the public service, program, or activity; and (3) she was denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of her disability. See Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018).
To the extent Plaintiff intended to allege an interference claim under the ADA-as opposed to a Title II discrimination claim-any such claim would also fail, as Plaintiff has not articulated the protected activity with which the MUSC Defendants purportedly interfered, and there is no evidence of discriminatory intent. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 140.)
Defendant MUSC argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claim because Plaintiff was not perceived to be mentally incompetent by her doctors and, therefore, they did not perceive her as having a disability. (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 19.) Defendant MUSC also argues that “it is unclear from the Complaint what ‘reasonable medical services' that the Plaintiff is alleging that MUSC refused to provide her” and “[t]here are simply no medical services desired by Plaintiff which MUSC refused to give her, and certainly none based on any perception of a disability.” (Id. at 20.) The undersigned considers these arguments, in turn.
First, a person has a disability as defined in the ADA if she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102. “An individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment' if the individual establishes that [] she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Id. Here, the record is not clear as to whether the MUSC Defendants regarded Plaintiff as mentally incompetent. Defendant MUSC argues that “uncontroverted evidence in this case” dispels the notion that Plaintiff was regarded as mentally incompetent-mainly, Defendant Johnson's testimony during Plaintiff's family court proceedings and certain of Plaintiff's medical records. (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 19-20, citing to Dkt. Nos. 130-21, 156-4.) However, the record also reflects that Defendants Johnson, Amaya, and Finke thought Plaintiff to be sufficiently incapable of making medical decisions for herself and her child such that they placed both in EPC. (See supra at 10-15.) Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record could support a finding that the Plaintiff was regarded as mentally incompetent.
Regardless, Plaintiff's ADA claim is deficient in other respects. As noted, Defendant MUSC argues that Plaintiff cannot show that it deprived her of medical services. (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 20.) It is true that neither Plaintiff's Complaint, nor her response in opposition to the MUSC Defendants' summary judgment motion articulate the medical services of which Plaintiff believes she was deprived. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 140.) The record before the Court demonstrates that Defendant MUSC provided Plaintiff with all the medical services she requested. Indeed, the detailed medical records provided in support of the MUSC Defendants' summary judgment motion show that Plaintiff's medical providers took care to develop a birthing plan for Plaintiff, to answer Plaintiff's questions (even when that took hours), to explain developments in and changes to Plaintiff's medical circumstances, to walk Plaintiff through the various risks associated with her decision to delay a caesarian delivery, and, overall, to ensure that Plaintiff and her unborn child remained healthy and alive. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21.) The record also reflects that Plaintiff's primary request regarding medical services was that the Defendant MUSC and its employees not provide certain services, i.e., a cesarean delivery. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 1307, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21.) Though Plaintiff's medical providers encouraged her to reconsider her approach, they nonetheless complied with Plaintiff's request until they deemed delaying the cesarian section no longer possible. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 130-2, 130-3, 130-4, 130-5, 130-6, 130-7, 130-8, 130-9, 130-10, 130-11, 130-21, 156-5.) At that time, Plaintiff agreed to have the cesarean section, and her doctors performed it. (See generally Dkt. No. 156-5.) As such, the record before the Court simply does not support Plaintiff's claim that she was denied medical services by Defendant MUSC-whether as a result of her perceived mental incompetence or otherwise. Defendant MUSC is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claim, and the undersigned recommends that such claim be dismissed.
3. Section 1985
Plaintiff's final federal claim against the MUSC Defendants is her Section 1985 claim against the individual MUSC Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 75-77.) In support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that the individual MUSC Defendants “conspired to directly and indirectly deprive Plaintiff of equal protection, due process, and equal privileges under the law in that [the individual MUSC Defendants] conspired to place Plaintiff into Emergency Protective Custody when no emergency existed and there was no threat that [Plaintiff] would harm herself or her child.” (Id. at 76.)
To sustain her Section 1985 conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of the following: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in [her] person or property, or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983). The individual MUSC Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence whatsoever that a conspiracy existed in this case” and because “Plaintiff has failed to prove that the alleged conspirators were motivated by a ‘discriminatory animus.'” (Dkt. No. 130-1 at 29.) The undersigned agrees.
As with Plaintiff's ADA claim, her Complaint and her response in opposition to the MUSC Defendants' summary judgment motion provide no specificity as to how the individual MUSC Defendants conspired against her such that she is entitled to relief under Section 1985. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 140.) Plaintiff's evidence of conspiracy is limited to her own bare assertions that the individual MUSC Defendants “conspired” with each other. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 140.) Such bare assertions cannot sustain Plaintiff's Section 1985 claim, and nothing in the record before the Court supports a finding that the individual MUSC Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of her rights and privileges. See Ross, 759 F.2d at 365 (noting that conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion). Based on the above, the individual MUSC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1985 conspiracy claim. The undersigned recommends that this claim should therefore be dismissed.
It is worth noting that Plaintiff did not attach a personal affidavit to her response in opposition to the MUSC Defendants' summary judgment motion-these assertions are merely contained in her Complaint and response brief. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 140.)
B. SCDSS Defendants
1. Section 1983
As noted above, Plaintiff also brings Section 1983 claims against the individual SCDSS Defendants, alleging that they violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 60-62.) In connection with such claims, Plaintiff alleges that “SCDSS has a long history of allowing its caseworkers . . . to remove children under the guise of safety plans by using threats, intimidation, false statements, suppression of evidence, and abusing their authority as caseworkers to detain children and family members” and that “Micheal Leach, as [] Director of [SCDSS,] is responsible for implementing policies and procedures related to the use, implementation and due process protections for safety plans .... [He] has failed to provide any post-deprivation process for parents whose children are wrongfully seized . . . [and he] is aware of the due process violations ....” (Id. at 61.) Plaintiff further alleges that “despite the Family Court issuing an order restoring [Plaintiff's] parental rights, [the individual SCDSS Defendants] used threats, intimidation, false statements, suppression of evidence, and abuse of their authority to extrajudicially limit [Plaintiff's] custody and relationship with her [child].” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the individual SCDSS Defendants forced her into a safety plan and told her that she must be supervised when with her child, requiring her to live outside of her home. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that the individual SCDSS Defendants “refused to allow [her] to resume sole custody of her child despite a court order and physicians opining she did not present a threat of harm to herself or her [child],” and that such actions “are part of Defendant SCDSS's policy, custom, pattern, or practice of violating the constitutional rights of children, parents, and families.” (Id. at 62.) The undersigned considers these allegations, below.
Plaintiff's Complaint states that her Section 1983 claims related to the SCDSS Defendants are against “Cynthia Bradford, Mosetta Clark, Louchetia Simmons-Robinson, and Jane Bell.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 60.) However, the factual allegations supporting her Section 1983 claims appear to also allege a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Michael Leach. (Id. at 60-61.) In an abundance of caution, the undersigned has addressed Plaintiff's allegations against all of the individual SCDSS Defendants, including Defendant Leach.
a. Unlawful Seizure
The individual SCDSS Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments fail because she “does not specify how she contends the Fourth or Fifth Amendment are implicated.” (Dkt. No. 132-1 at 7.) The undersigned agrees. Based on the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and the arguments set forth in her response in opposition to the SCDSS Defendants' summary judgment motion, it is unclear how Plaintiff believes her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 141.)
However, the undersigned briefly considers these claims, in an abundance of caution. To the extent Plaintiff claims that she and/or her child were unlawfully seized by the individual SCDSS Defendants, this claim fails because it is undisputed that MUSC's public safety officers- not the individual SCDSS Defendants-placed Plaintiff and her child in EPC. See Parkins by & through Turner v. South Carolina, No. 7:21-CV-2641-HMH, 2023 WL 2248325, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (noting that the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim failed on the merits because law enforcement, not DSS, placed him in emergency protective custody). The undersigned can discern no other potentially unlawful seizures from the factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Even assuming that the individual SCDSS Defendants had been responsible for placing Plaintiff and her child in EPC, the record makes clear that the EPC placements were initiated at the request of Plaintiff's medical providers at MUSC. (See supra at 10-15.) As the Fourth Circuit noted in White by White, social workers are entitled to rely on the professional judgments of medical providers when considering whether protective custody is necessary. 112 F.3d at 736. Here, Plaintiff's medical providers clearly thought EPC was necessary for both Plaintiff and her child, and the individual SCDSS Defendants were entitled to rely on the medical providers' recommendations.
Further, the individual SCDSS Defendants, like the MUSC Defendants, would be entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims based on the purportedly unlawful seizures of her and her child for the reasons set forth in Section I.A.1.b above. See e.g., White by White, 112 F.3d at 736 (“Premature action by a social worker can disrupt the legitimate interest parents possess in raising and disciplining their children. On the other hand, a failure to act can leave a child defenseless in the face of physical abuse and brutality. These types of decisions are precisely the sort that the doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to protect.”); Perry v. Pamlico Cnty., 88 F.Supp.3d 518, 538 (E.D. N.C. 2015) (“Qualified immunity can apply to social workers involved in child abuse and custody cases.”); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (noting that qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”).
As for Plaintiff's unadorned allegations that the individual SCDSS Defendants violated her Fifth Amendment rights, the undersigned considers these allegations sufficiently covered in the due process analysis contained in Section I.B.1.b below.
b. Due Process
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations that the individual SCDSS Defendants violated her constitutional rights by denying her due process, the individual SCDSS Defendants argue that they are also entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “Plaintiff received all of the due process protections that she was due.” (Dkt. No. 132-1 at 9.) The individual SCDSS Defendants contend that their actions “following the receipt of custody by way of the EPC and the subsequent abuse and neglect investigation, including the use and implementation of a Safety Plan, did not violate the Plaintiff's due process rights.” (Id. at 13.)
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords both procedural and substantive due process of law. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). In the context of parenting, the Constitution recognizes both a protected “procedural due process interest in parenting a child and a substantive fundamental right to raise one's child.” Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000). To establish a procedural due process claim based upon her protected interest in parenting her child, Plaintiff must show: “(1) a cognizable liberty or property interest; (2) the [intentional] deprivation of that interest by some form of state action; and (3) that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.” Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 528 (4th Cir. 2011); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”). To sustain a substantive due process claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a liberty (or property) interest; (2) the deprivation of that interest by the state; and (3) that “the state's action falls so far beyond the outer limits of legitimate governmental action that no process could cure the deficiency.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995).
At the outset, the individual SCDSS Defendants correctly note that it is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges a procedural or substantive due process claim. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1; see also Dkt. No. 132-1 at 7.) Indeed, her Complaint does not expressly mention “substantive due process” or “procedural due process,” nor does it specifically allege the elements of or facts to support a claim for either. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) For example, Plaintiff does not allege lack of notice or an opportunity to be heard with respect to any actions taken by the individual SCDSS Defendants (which would support a procedural due process claim). (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) Plaintiff also does not allege that the individual SCDSS Defendants engaged in arbitrary, oppressive, or conscience-shocking conduct (which would support a substantive due process claim). (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) Nonetheless, the undersigned assumes-in an abundance of caution-that Plaintiff intended to pursue both substantive and procedural due process claims.
Plaintiff's purported procedural due process claim fails for many of the same reasons as her Section 1983 claims against the individual MUSC Defendants. (See supra at 10-15.) First, as set forth above, Plaintiff's placement in EPC was constitutional, as was her child's. (See supra at 10-15.) The MUSC public safety officers-upon the request of Plaintiff's doctors-acted in accordance with valid state statutes to initiate EPC for both mother and child. (See supra at 1015.)
The record reflects that Plaintiff then received notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to both her own EPC and her child's EPC. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 22; Dkt. No. 156-2 at 2-3.) In fact, Plaintiff was represented by counsel at her probable cause hearing on July 16, 2018-the Monday following her placement in EPC (late on Thursday, July 12, 2018), and her child's placement in EPC (following the child's birth on Friday, July 13, 2018). (Dkt. No. 156-2 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 156-3 at 2-5.) At the July 16 probable cause hearing, the family court judge determined that probable cause no longer existed for either EPC, and that Plaintiff's child should be returned to her custody. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 156-2 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 156-3 at 2-5.) However, the family court judge instructed that SCDSS should complete their investigation into Plaintiff's ability to care for her child to determine whether further action was necessary. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 4.) The family court judge instructed Plaintiff to fully cooperate with SCDSS's investigation. (Id.)
On July 17, 2018, Defendant Bradford-a caseworker employed by SCDSS-met with Plaintiff to develop a safety plan for Plaintiff and her child, which would begin upon their release from the hospital and would end upon completion of SCDSS's investigation. (Id at 5.) Under the terms of the safety plan, Plaintiff was to be supervised when caring for her child. (Id.) Although Plaintiff claims that she did not sign the safety plan, a true and accurate copy of the safety plan is contained in the record and clearly bears her signature.(Id. at 5, 63.)
Plaintiff also admits to signing the safety plan in her Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 52.) Regardless, whether Plaintiff signed the safety plan is not a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.
Following the probable cause hearing and the family court judge's instructions to SCDSS that it should conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's ability to care for her child, a merits hearing was scheduled. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 4-6; Dkt. No. 132-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 156-2 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 1563 at 2-5.) At the August 8, 2018 merits hearing, the presiding judge recused herself from Plaintiff's case, and the family court scheduled a second merits hearing on October 16, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1322 at 6; Dkt. No. 132-6 at 2; see generally Dkt. No. 132-9.) SCDSS's investigation into Plaintiff's case-which consisted of, inter alia, reviewing Plaintiff's medical records, visiting Plaintiff's home, and interviewing Plaintiff and her friends-continued until that date. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 47; Dkt. No. 132-6 at 1-3.) At the October 16, 2018 merits hearing, Plaintiff's case was closed, and she was no longer required to have supervision when caring for her child. (Dkt. No. 132-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 132-10 at 14.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel throughout the entirety of this process. She did not object to any portion of SCDSS's investigation, or any family court proceedings.
Based on the above, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the individual SCDSS Defendants for purported violation of her procedural due process falls short. Nothing in the record before this Court supports a finding that the individual SCDSS Defendants intentionally deprived Plaintiff of a cognizable liberty or property interest, nor that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate. See Kendall, 650 F.3d at 528. Rather, the record reflects that SCDSS investigated Plaintiff's situation in good faith and upon a direct order from a family court judge.
Further, the record reflects that Plaintiff received all process due under South Carolina law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-55; S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-610, et. seq.; see also Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that no additional due process is required for a safety plan because “[t]here is no right to a hearing when no substantive right has been infringed or is threatened with being infringed. The state does not force a safety plan on the parents; it merely offers it. Parents are entitled to a hearing if their parental rights are impaired, but the offer of a settlement no more impairs those rights than a prosecutor's offer to accept a guilty plea impairs the defendant's right to trial by jury”).
While Plaintiff may take issue with the way in which SCDSS conducted its investigation or the information on which SCDSS initially relied, her difference of opinion cannot, without more, sustain a valid due process claim. See Ross, 759 F.2d at 365 (noting that conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion). The overwhelming record evidence demonstrates that the individual SCDSS Defendants worked with Plaintiff to come up with a safety plan that allowed Plaintiff to retain custody of her child during the pendency of the family court proceedings. (See supra at 24-25.) Plaintiff was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard at every turn, and she does not even appear to allege that she was entitled to more process than she received. (See supra at 24-25; see also Dkt. No. 1-1.)
To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with the family court's determinations and instructions, such disagreement amounts to no more than an impermissible collateral attack and cannot sustain her due process claim.
As for Plaintiff's supposed substantive due process claim, nothing in the record supports a finding that the individual SCDSS Defendants violated Plaintiff's right to substantive due process. “[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense,'” such that it creates a substantive due process violation. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). Here, the record does not reflect egregious official conduct. Instead, the record demonstrates that the individual SCDSS Defendants responded to complaints from Plaintiff's medical providers indicating that Plaintiff was a danger to herself and her unborn child. (Dkt. No. 132-2 at 2-3.) The individual SCDSS Defendants then took care to investigate the situation, monitor Plaintiff's mental health and maternal capabilities, and report those findings to the family court. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 132-2, 132-3, 132-5, 132-6, 132-8, 132-9, 132-10.) Although Plaintiff alleges that the individual SCDSS Defendants abused their power throughout their investigation, she does not articulate specific facts indicating how the individual SCDSS Defendants did so, and nothing in the record supports such a finding. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 141.) Regardless, only an abuse of power which “shocks the conscience” indicates a violation of substantive due process rights. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. As the Fourth Circuit opined in Wolf v. Fauquier Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
Were we to say that DSS's investigation violated due process, we would surely place social services workers in an impossible situation. In the face of a complaint alleging child abuse, DSS employees would have two choices. On the one hand, they could investigate and face § 1983 liability if their investigation was somehow imperfect or the complaint turned out to be unfounded. On the other hand, they could do nothing-and risk tragic consequences such as those illustrated by the facts of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), in which social services employees failed to protect a child from being so savagely beaten by his father that the child was rendered profoundly retarded. Surely the Constitution does not require that social services workers be placed in any such dilemma.555 F.3d 311, 323 (4th Cir. 2009).
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to show that the individual SCDSS Defendants violated her substantive and/or procedural due process rights. The individual SCDSS Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 due process claims, and the undersigned recommends that such claims be dismissed.
The individual SCDSS Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's Section 1983 due process claims, even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that they violated her constitutional rights. Indeed, there is “no clearly established authority available which would have notified these [officials] that their conduct was unlawful.” S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 1998). As with Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the individual MUSC Defendants, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with authority indicating that the individual SCDSS Defendants' conduct was unlawful, and the Court's independent research has uncovered none.
c. Monell Claim
Any potential claims Plaintiff attempts to bring under a theory of Monell liability also fail. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 62-63.) At the outset, the doctrine of vicarious liability and the doctrine of respondeat superior are not applicable in Section 1983 actions. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 927-29 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.” (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978))). Thus, to establish Section 1983 liability on the part of a supervisory defendant (as Plaintiff seems to attempt here with her allegations against Defendant Leach), a plaintiff must show that the supervisory defendant tacitly authorized or was indifferent to an employee's actions which violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990). As noted, the undersigned finds that none of the individual SCDSS Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (See supra at 21-28.) Further, the record makes clear that Defendant Leach was not personally involved in any aspect of SCDSS's investigation of Plaintiff. (See generally Dkt. No. 132-4.); see also Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights”). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Leach.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring a custom, policy, or practice claim, she cannot sustain this claim. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any specific evidence of unconstitutional policies, practices, or customs implemented by the SCDSS Defendants. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 141.) Thus, the SCDSS Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any such claims.
II. State Law Claims
Plaintiff also brings the following state law claims: (1) a gross negligence claim against Defendant SCDSS; (2) a negligence/gross negligence claim against Defendant MUSC; (2) civil conspiracy claims against Defendants Johnson, Amaya, Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3; (3) abuse of process claims against Defendant MUSC and Defendants Johnson, Amaya, Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3; (4) an assault claim against Defendant MUSC Public Safety Advisor; (5) fraud and misrepresentation claims against Defendants Johnson, Amaya, Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage claims against Defendants Johnson, Amaya, Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3; and (7) false imprisonment claims against Defendants Johnson, Amaya, Finke, MUSC Administrator 1, MUSC Administrator 2, and MUSC Administrator 3, and Defendants Bradford, Clark, Simmons-Robinson, and Bell. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) However, the original federal jurisdiction claims will be dismissed if the District Judge accepts this Report and Recommendation. As such, the only remaining claims will be Plaintiff's state law claims. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Further, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that “trial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
When considering whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court must consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 & n.7 (1988). Here, the balance of these factors weighs in favor of remanding Plaintiff's state law claims. See id. (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). Having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction in this case, the undersigned further recommends that the Court: (1) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and (2) remand such claims to the state court where Plaintiff originally filed this action.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 130, 132) be GRANTED. The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to each of Plaintiff's federal claims. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendants, REMAND such claims to state court, and DISMISS Plaintiff's federal case in full.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).