See, e.g., Scalia v. Unforgettable Coatings, Inc., 455 F.Supp.3d 987, 993 (D. Nev. 2020) (where the Secretary moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin retaliation because the employer made statements “intending to quash cooperation” with Department investigators); Perez, 2014 WL 1378241 at *3-4 (where the Secretary argued that an employer's “belie[f]” that an employee had spoken to the Department is protected activity giving rise to an FLSA retaliation claim); Scalia v. F.W. Webb Co., No. 20-cv-11450-ADB, 2021 WL 1565508 at *2-4 (D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2021) (where the Secretary argued that there was protected activity because an employer sent emails to employees whom “they knew or had reason to believe had been contacted or would likely be contacted by the [Department] or who had spoken or were about to speak to [Department] representatives in the [FLSA] investigation ....”)
o that level is an objective one. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 55, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (emphasizing, in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, that the standard for evaluating whether harm has occurred is objective); Lockridge v. The Univ. Of Maine Sys., 597 F.3d 464, 472 (1st Cir. 2010) (describing test for materially adverse action as "objective," which "should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances" (quoting Burlington N. at 71, 126 S.Ct. 2405)); Booker v. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, 612 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[W]hether an action is materially adverse is judged by an objective rather than a subjective standard."); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997) ("We regard Title VII . . . . and FLSA as standing in pari passu and [treat] judicial precedents interpreting one such statute as instructive in decisions involving another."); Scalia v. F.W. Webb Co., No. 20-CV-11450-ADB, 2021 WL 1565508, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2021). Although the standard is objective, it is articulated in "general terms" because the "significance of any given act will often depend on the particular circumstances" and context.
Archetype terminated her shortly after she made her statutory complaint, an allegation that permits an “inference of causation based on temporal proximity.” Scalia v. F.W. Webb Co., No. 20-cv-11450-ADB, 2021 WL 1565508, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss a retaliation claim); see also Robert Reiser & Co. v. Scriven, 130 F.Supp.3d 488, 497 (D. Mass. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss a “vague” Wage Act retaliation claim where the plaintiff alleged he was terminated after “express[ing] concerns about nonpayment of overtime”)
On similar facts, another judge in this District recently denied a motion to dismiss a FLSA retaliation claim. Scalia v. F.W. Webb Co. , 2021 WL 1565508, at *3-5 (D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2021). There, plaintiff alleged that F.W. Webb sent three emails to its salespersons that deterred them from participating in a Department of Labor investigation.