Opinion
23 Civ. 1266 (LGS)
07-24-2024
S.C., individually and on behalf of P.T., a child with a disability, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (the “Report”) of the Honorable James L. Cott, which recommends granting Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs in the reduced amount of $34,397.99, plus post-judgment interest. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs' objection (the “Objection”) to the Report is overruled, and the Report's recommendation is adopted in full.
I. BACKGROUND
This decision assumes familiarity with the factual background and procedural history, which are summarized in the Report. See generally S.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 23 Civ. 1266, 2024 WL 1447331, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2024). Plaintiff S.C. is the parent of Plaintiff P.T., a child classified as a student with a disability as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Id. at *1. On November 30, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a due process complaint before an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”), alleging violations of the IDEA. Id. On July 4, 2022, the IHO issued findings of fact and a decision granting Plaintiffs their requested relief. Id.
On February 15, 2023, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with the administrative proceeding. On February 27, 2023, this case was referred to Judge Cott for all purposes except trial. On September 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. On April 2, 2024, Judge Cott issued the Report. Plaintiffs timely filed their Objection, and Defendant filed a response.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
Motions for attorneys' fees are treated as dispositive motions for purposes of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(D) (“[T]he court . . . may refer a motion for attorney's fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.”). A reviewing court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The district court “may adopt those portions of the report to which no ‘specific[] written objection' is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Adams v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 855 F.Supp.2d 205, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)), aff'd sub nom. Hochstadt v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 547 Fed.Appx. 9 (2d Cir. 2013). For those portions to which no such objection is made, a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no “clear error on the face of the record.” Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120 n.4 (2d Cir. 2022). A district judge is required to “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to” by any party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, footnotes and citations are omitted, and all alterations are adopted.
B. IDEA
Under the IDEA, “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” based on “rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(C). To calculate a “presumptively reasonable fee,” a district court first determines the appropriate billable hours expended and sets a “reasonable hourly rate.” Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2019); accord S.W. ex rel. A.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 22 Civ. 3592, 2023 WL 5803415, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023).
The determination of a reasonable hourly rate “contemplates a case-specific inquiry into the prevailing market rates for counsel of similar experience and skill to the fee applicant's counsel, an inquiry that may include judicial notice of the rates awarded in prior cases and the court's own familiarity with the rates prevailing in the district.” Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 59 (2d Cir. 2012); accord Agudath Israel of Am. v. Hochul, No. 22-38, 2023 WL 2637344, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2023) (summary order). In determining an appropriate hourly rate, “the district court should consider, among others, the Johnson factors.” Lilly, 934 F.3d at 230; accord S.W. ex rel. A.W., 2023 WL 5803415, at *3.
The Johnson factors, which are relevant to attorney fee calculations, are: “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability' of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 186 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 92-93, 96 (1989)); accord S.W. ex rel. A.W., 2023 WL 5803415, at *4. “A district court need not recite and make separate findings as to all twelve Johnson factors, provided that it takes each into account in setting the attorneys' fee award.” S.W. ex rel. A.W., 2023 WL 5803415 at *4; see, e.g., Alston as Tr. Of Loc. 272 Lab. Mgmt. Pension Fund v. Nagle Parking Inc., No. 23 Civ. 1739, 2023 WL 4157186, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2023).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs are a “prevailing party” entitled to recover fees and costs under the IDEA. The only issue is whether Plaintiffs' requested award of $88,290.00 in fees and $438.86 in costs (plus post-judgment interest) is reasonable, such that the Report errs by recommending a reduced amount. Plaintiffs challenge the Report's reduction of the fee award on several bases. Plaintiffs' Objection is unavailing.
A. Hourly Rates
Plaintiffs object to the Report because it provides an insufficient basis to review its determination of hourly rates. The Report establishes a reviewable basis for its rate determination, which was not in error.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the Report inadequately considers the Johnson factors in determining the hourly rate. This argument is incorrect. Courts need not make explicit findings as to each Johnson factor. See S.W. ex rel. A.W., 2023 WL 5803415, at *4. The Report states that it “considered all the Johnson factors in its analysis for each timekeeper” and centers its discussion “around the facts it has found determinative.” S.C., 2024 WL 1447331, at *3. The Report assesses the complexity of the underlying administrative proceeding, finding that the case was not novel or difficult and detailing Defendant's limited opposition. See S.C., 2024 WL 1447331, at *4. Plaintiffs take issue with the Report's assessment of complexity, arguing that the Report incorrectly states that Defendant did not submit an “opening or closing brief,” when Defendant in fact presented an opening statement after missing its first opportunity to do so.
However, the Report considers several facts in assessing the overall complexity of the administrative proceeding, and no portion of the Report solely turns on Defendant's alleged failure to present an opening.
The Report also explains in detail why it found unpersuasive Plaintiffs' evidence in support of their proposed rates. See id. at *3-5. For example, the Report rejects affidavits from other IDEA practitioners as self-serving, rejects general surveys of attorney rates in New York City as lacking data on education law practitioners and rejects results from ChatGPT-4 as nonprobative and unreliable. See id. at *5.
Plaintiffs take particular issue with the Report's reliance on rates found reasonable in other cases, arguing that the Report fails to analyze the citations' applicability to this case. However, the Report does determine the applicability of the string-cited cases, which concern rates found reasonable for the exact attorneys here; the Report concludes that “[t]he instant litigation is of a piece with the cases cited above, and an analysis of the Johnson factors does not justify a departure from those assessed rates.” Id. at *4.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Report errs by considering the fact that Defendant ultimately did not contest Plaintiffs' case during the administrative proceeding. The argument is incorrect because that fact relates directly to the Johnson factors of “the time and labor required” as well as the complexity of the dispute. The Second Circuit recently held “that a district court does not err when it considers the complexity of the dispute both when it evaluates the time reasonably expended as well as the reasonable hourly rate.” H.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 71 F.4th 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2023). The Report does not err by doing the same.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the Report improperly penalizes them for Defendant's decision not to contest the case. This argument is unpersuasive. Courts in this district have regularly reduced billing rates when the Department of Education (“DOE”) declined to oppose an administrative case or participated only minimally during the hearing. See, e.g., R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 4054, 2022 WL 1239860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022) (determining proposed rates were excessive in part because “the DOE did not oppose R.P.'s DPC and did not to present a case at the impartial hearing”), aff'd sub nom. H.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 71 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2023); K.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 10277, 2022 WL 1689760, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2022) (reducing rates in part because after the IHO ruled in favor of plaintiff at initial hearing, “the arguments and work at the subsequent hearings and in connection with subsequent due process complaints were somewhat rote”). That Plaintiffs prepared for the hearing with the expectation that Defendant would contest their case does not alter that outcome. See, e.g., N. L-C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 8243, 2022 WL 831820, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022) (reducing rates for uncontested hearing even though plaintiff's counsel “prepared for the hearing in full anticipation of an opposition case from the DOE”).
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Report improperly requires Plaintiffs to show that other courts in this district erred in their assessments of reasonable rates for this law firm. As described above, the Report's consideration of reasonable rate determinations for these exact lawyers in similar cases is not improper.
B. Recalculation of Rates
Plaintiffs submitted a second set of billing records with their reply memorandum in support of their motion for attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs argue that the Report wrongfully penalizes Plaintiffs for their recalculation of rates and hours in the second set of records. However, Plaintiffs provide no evidence to support their contention that the recalculation was held against them. While the Report “admonished [Plaintiffs] to submit accurate timesheets,” it “treat[ed] the fee requests contained in the reply papers as the accurate representations of CLF's requested relief.” S.C., 2024 WL 1447331, at *6.
C. Administrative Proceeding Hours
Plaintiffs argue that the Report improperly reduces the hours billed for the administrative hearing. However, the Report properly concludes that Plaintiffs billed excessive time for the administrative hearing. See S.C., 2024 WL 1447331, at *7. For example, Plaintiffs billed 88.8 hours to prepare for the combined 2 hour and 43 minutes of virtually uncontested hearings on the merits, at which Defendant conceded that it did not provide P.T. with a fair and appropriate public education and did not oppose the requested relief. That Plaintiffs did not know in advance that Defendant would not present a case does not justify the excessive hours billed. As described above with regard to reduced rates, courts in this district regularly reduce hours when the Department of Education mounts a limited opposition in the administrative proceeding. See, e.g., J.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 23 Civ. 959, 2024 WL 728626, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2024) (reducing this law firm's administrative proceeding hours by 20% across the board even though two hearings were held, one of which was contested). In addition, as the Report notes, attorney Erin Murray spent more than 20 hours drafting and editing a 30-page closing brief for the hearing after Defendant informed Plaintiffs that it would not present a case. See S.C., 2024 WL 1447331, at *7.
D. Settlement Offer
Plaintiffs argue that the Report improperly precludes Plaintiffs from collecting fees after Plaintiffs rejected an offer of settlement for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $35,000. Plaintiffs may not collect fees after the date on which they refused to accept Defendant's settlement offer.
Under the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions, a court may not award attorneys' fees and related costs “subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if” the court “finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). After applying reductions to the attorneys' hourly rates and hours expended, the Report properly determines that the fees and costs Plaintiffs are entitled to through the date of the offer ($34,397.99) are less than the amount offered for fees, costs and expenses ($35,000). See S.C., 2024 WL 1447331, at *9. As many courts in this district have found in similar circumstances, it is appropriate to bar recovery for attorneys' fees incurred after the offer was rejected. See, e.g., R.P., 2022 WL 1239860, at *6 (“[N]o fees should be awarded for costs or work performed after July 7, 2021, when the DOE made a written offer of settlement.”); T.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 21 Civ. 7104, 2022 WL 3577885, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2022) (precluding costs incurred after the date on which Department of Education offered settlement).
E. Federal Litigation
Plaintiffs argue that the above errors, on their own and collectively, caused an error in “reducing and cutting off the federal billing.” In support, Plaintiffs merely repeat their arguments above. For the reasons described above, those arguments are unavailing.
F. Remaining Report
As to the remainder of the Report to which Plaintiffs did not object, the Court finds no error, clear or otherwise. Accordingly, these portions are adopted in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (In reviewing a magistrate judge's recommendations, a District Judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Objection is OVERRULED and the relevant portion of the Report is ADOPTED in full.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Dkt. No. 26 and to close this case.